Fortifications of St Eustatius: An Archaeological and Historical Study of Defense in the Caribbean by Howard, Bryan Paul
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1991 
Fortifications of St Eustatius: An Archaeological and Historical 
Study of Defense in the Caribbean 
Bryan Paul Howard 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Caribbean Languages and Societies Commons, History of Art, Architecture, and 
Archaeology Commons, Latin American History Commons, and the Military History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard, Bryan Paul, "Fortifications of St Eustatius: An Archaeological and Historical Study of Defense in 
the Caribbean" (1991). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625659. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-q2sv-ae54 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
FORTIFICATIONS OF ST. EUSTATIUS: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF DEFENSE IN THE CARIBBEAN.
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Anthropology 
The College of William and Mary
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Bryan Paul Howard 
1991
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
T&islaM ft U&iJasLA-
~J Author
Approved, May 1991
Norman F. Bark'a
Harley rown III
Theodore R. Reinhart
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FORTIFICATIONS OF ST. EUSTATIUS: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF DEFENSE IN THE CARIBBEAN.
ABSTRACT
The island of St. Eustatius developed into a major 
trade center during the 18th century. As such it played a 
major role in the conflicts of colonialist European 
nations, being situated in a convenient location for 
shipping both from and to Europe, as well as easily 
accessible as a trade and supply center to other islands of 
the West Indies. Over the course of two centuries the 
island changed hands repeatedly as result of its desirable 
geographic location and trade functions.
In an effort to protect its interests, the island was 
fortified in several successive stages, beginning in the 
early 17th century, with the last major phase ending in 
1816. The island was known to have had various defensive 
features constructed by Dutch, French, and English 
occupations.
This thesis will examine and record the defenses and 
artillery of St. Eustatius based on fieldwork conducted on 
the island during the summer of 1990. Included will be 
sections on European wars affecting the Caribbean, 
background information on defensive theory relevant to the 
Caribbean, and the island's own fortifications, batteries 
and artillery.
Bryan Paul Howard 
Department of Anthropology 
The College of William and Mary
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FORTIFICATIONS OF ST. EUSTATIUS: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF DEFENSE IN THE CARIBBEAN.
INTRODUCTION
St. Eustatius is a small island in the Dutch Lesser 
Antilles (Figure 1) . Its environment was not especially suited 
to cultivation, but its position in the Caribbean, centrally 
located along the trade winds route from Europe to the New 
World, made it a desirable island. Functioning as a trade 
center, it attained a high degree of importance to the 
colonial world. All nations recognized its vital role in the 
development of the New World territories.
As an island of value, the government which controlled the 
island would be expected to have paid considerable attention 
to its protection. Although St. Eustatius was provided with 
fortifications, even so, it surrendered nearly every time it 
came under attack.
Preliminary examinations of the history of the island 
suggest it was reasonably well fortified. Although the 
effectiveness of the fortifications was important, this must 
be combined with information as to other defensive tactics 
employed by the Statians, especially the use of Naval
2
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4protection. By the 18th century, fortifications alone were 
seldom sufficient in themselves to provide fail-proof security 
for an island nation.
This study proposes to examine the fortifications and 
defense of this crucial trade center, and attempt to determine 
why it fell to so many invaders. It is suspected that the 
surrender of the island after most invasions was not a result 
of poor fortification. It is proposed that it was rather a 
product of a lack of naval protection, defective equipment, 
and a general sense of apathy towards self protection on the 
part of the islanders.
Although numerous studies about fortification and defense 
have been undertaken over the years, few deal specifically 
with the West Indies. Research by Ed Harris of the Bermuda 
Maritime Museum has covered both artillery and fortifications 
on that island. Some work has occurred on Jamaica dealing with 
its fortifications, but little is available in published 
materials.
Spanish fortifications in the Caribbean perhaps have been 
better studied. The National Park Service has conducted 
research into the forts of El Morro, El Canuelo, and San 
Cristobal on Puerto Rico, mainly for restoration and 
interpretive purposes. In the same line, most early forts in
the United States were investigated for such goals.
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A search of the literature revealed little scholarly work 
on Caribbean fortifications, but related research for the area 
has been published. Duffy (1987) and Buckley (1979) both deal 
with West Indian troops in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, an important element for defense.
Recent research into the British East India Company could 
provide valuable comparative data. One issue of The 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater 
Exploration (February 1990) devotes itself to this subject. 
Although no articles specifically cover fortifications, at 
least one deals with shipboard artillery (Brown, 1990).
Fortification studies are abundant for some other parts of 
the world. Forts in Africa are examined by Lawrence (1963), 
and in India by Mishra (1985). Scores of colonial era North 
American sites have been reported on (e.g. Stotz 1985; 
Robinson 1977; Ivers 1970; Luzader et al. 1976; Howard 1968; 
Downey 1965; Heldman and Widder 1990; Martin 1990; et cetera). 
Hopefully future studies will provide more scholarly 
information concerning fortifications in the West Indies on 
which to test theories of Caribbean defense.
This study had several limitations within which research
had to be conducted. The surveys were undertaken by a small 
crew on limited time. Several were recorded solely by the 
author, which impeded detailed mapping, and few, save Battery 
Concordia (SE81), were allowed the luxury of a more detailed 
study.
Comparative studies were complicated by the use and re-use 
of the fortifications by at least three different 
nationalities over a period of more than two-hundred years. 
There was little hope of accurately defining which group was 
responsible for what features, especially when they were often 
separated in time by only a few months.
Access to documents was generally confined to excerpts 
offered in Attema (1976). Only one inventory was available in 
its original form, and that in a poor quality photograph. 
Documentary investigations in the Hague and Great Britain 
might have significantly strengthened the quality of this 
research, but this was not possible. In addition, a great deal 
of the Dutch records have been destroyed over the years by the 
elements, invaders, and simple neglect.
Chapter 1 
St. Eustatius
The island measures some 5 1/2 miles long (9 km) by 2 1/2 
miles wide (4.25 km) (Hartog 1976). Geographically, three 
distinct regions are represented, the mountains to the north, 
made up of eroded volcanic cones, a flat plain in the center, 
(the "Cultuurvlakte"), and the "Quill”, to the south, a more 
recent volcanic crater. The coast of the island is 
characterized by rocky cliffs abutting the sea, with scattered 
shallow beaches. Coral reefs lie offshore at numerous 
locations.
The highest point on the island is atop Mazinga, on the 
Quill, at 1,969 feet (600.4 meters). The Upper Town and Fort 
Oranje are at approximately 141 feet (43 meters) above mean 
sea level. The highest point in the northwestern mountains is 
on Boven, given as 950 feet (289.4 meters) (Cadastrial Survey 
Department, Netherlands Antilles 1963).
Rainfall is not abundant on the main part of the island. 
There are no significant springs or underground water 
supplies, forcing inhabitants of both today and in the past,to
7
8rely upon capturing what rain there is in brick cisterns.
The main bay, Oranje, is at the south-center of the island 
and has a sandy bottom suitable for large ship anchorages. 
Although there are several other bays none were generally used 
as a shipping anchorage. Winds, shallow depths, and coral 
prevented close-in docking at most coastal sites, though 
smaller boats involved with smuggling, or landing invading 
troops, could beach at several locations, necessitating 
defensive positions to be maintained around the island.
Other than Oranje Bay, sites at which small craft landing 
was possible included Tumble Down Dick Bay, Jenkin's Bay, 
Concordia Bay, Corre Corre Bay, and Back-Off Bay. Although 
landable, each of these sites would require an overland trek 
to the town and main fort. Landings are possible at a few 
other areas, but most involve difficult ascents up the 
escarpment, especially if under fire from defenders.
The European expansion into the Caribbean area began in 
earnest with the explorations of the late 15th century. It was 
on one of these voyages that St. Eustatius ("Statia") was 
first noted by non-indigenous peoples. Christopher Columbus 
sailed past the island on the 13th of November, 1493, 
recording it on his charts. Once charted, the islands would 
later be exploited by various European nations in search of
9economic growth. Thus began the colonization of the West 
Indies. In the following two centuries, many European groups 
began to send colonies to the islands, including the Dutch.
The first Dutch expeditions into the Caribbean were 
concerned with trading activities. The Netherlands thrived on 
the principle of the "mare liberum”, for without a ”free sea”, 
their world trade would come to a halt. Unlike Spain and other 
colonial expansions, the Dutch saw little need to establish 
permanent settlements in the early years. By the late 16th 
century, they had found a lucrative business in trading 
commodities from the Caribbean, with salt being of prime 
importance (Goslinga 1971). At the close of that century, they 
found more competition in the islands, during a time the Dutch 
were actively expanding their markets and resource bases. 
Conflicts with or among other nations threatened their 
commodities supply, so by the early 17th century the Dutch 
found themselves entering the colonial era along with several 
other European nations to secure permanent holdings in the New 
World.
The first decades of the 1600*s saw rapid colonization of 
lands that had been known for over a century, but sparsely 
settled. Spain and Portugal had actively colonized their 
holdings from the moment of first discovery, but it was not 
until this period that most other nations followed their lead.
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In the 1620's the English began to establish naval bases and 
mercantile colonies in the Caribbean. Among the islands they 
claimed was St. Christopher (Kitts), first settled in 1622. 
Permission was granted to English companies to colonize on 
Nevis, Montserrat, and Barbados in 1625. The French similarly 
settled on several islands, issuing charters for colonies 
between 1620 and 1630 on St. Lucia, Grenada, Martinique, and 
Guadeloupe (Claypole and Robottom 1980).
At this same time, the Netherlands enter the colonial race 
for territory. In 1621 the Netherlands (Dutch) West India 
Company was formed, after a truce had been signed with Spain. 
The Spanish and Dutch had been at odds for several years, 
particularly concerning the vital saltpans in the Indies. The 
formation of the Company was in theory to promote mercantile 
colonies, but unlike the East India Company, this was not its 
major function until after the rechartering of 1647. Until 
that time the West India Company was little more than an 
opportunity for Dutch traders to continue the fighting with 
Spain over Caribbean resources (Goslinga 1971). Open conflict 
broke out several times between the Dutch and the Spanish, 
allowing for legal privateering and destruction of competitive 
bases.
Around 1630, the Netherlands begin to establish their own 
colonies in the Caribbean. They sought a "supply station" for
11
their New World colonies, and in 1631 settled on St. Maarten 
(Hartog 197 6). St. Maarten served as an excellent supply 
center for trade with the French and English colonies, as well 
as a privateering base. In addition the presence of saltpans 
was an attraction. The holdings were protected with the 
construction of a fort in 1631 (Handle 1985) . Two years later 
the Spanish drove them off the island. Not to be daunted by 
this failure, they sent an expedition to Curacao in 1634 and 
expelled the Spanish (Hartog, 1976). In 1636 the Dutch then 
planted colonies on Aruba, Bonaire, and St. Eustatius, and 
Tortuga by 1638 (Goslinga 1971). Between 1630 and 1650, 
Netherlanders also moved into Brazil for resources and 
plantations, but would eventually lose their foothold there.
Amongst the fury to colonize the Caribbean islands, St. 
Eustatius, a small island known to the Caribs in the 17th 
century as "Aloi", would soon be chosen for colonization 
(Versteeg and Effert 1987). A group of Zeelanders proposed to 
establish a plantation colony and a centrally located trade 
base in the islands to expand their profits. Accordingly the 
merchants fitted out a ship to colonize St. Kruis (St. Croix) 
and appointed Pieter van Corselles as leader. After arriving 
at St. Croix they decided to move on to St. Eustatius and 
settled in spring of 1636 (Attema 1976).
When they arrived there were no human inhabitants,
12
although they were not the first Europeans to occupy the 
island. Expecting a Spanish attack, in 1629 a French naval 
squadron landed and constructed a fort on the cliff above the 
southern bay (Hartog 1976). It was abandoned sometime after, 
when the threat of Spanish ships abated.
Within two years of their arrival the merchants began to 
realize profits from the island. Tobacco was soon exported and 
was found to be so profitable that it was grown on nearly 
every available patch of ground. The lack of land and other 
natural resources impeded the rapid growth of the colony, 
however, and caused the island to found "sub-colonies" in 
order to supply their deficiencies. Within a few years the new 
colony was firmly established and was then able to retake St. 
Maarten for the Netherlands (Hartog 1976).
Throughout this time constant European wars and arguments 
over Caribbean and New World lands kept the island in a state 
of continual turmoil. Numerous privateers and pirates raided 
and sacked the islands, inhibiting expansion and economic 
growth. This constant disruption to planting and trading 
activities proved too difficult for the Zeelander merchants. 
They gave the island to the Netherlands West India Company in 
1682/83 (Hartog 1976).
St. Eustatius never had great potential as a plantation
13
colony. It is a small island with little arable land and no 
water supply other than rain. To make up for these drawbacks 
the Statians soon exploited their island's strength: a central 
location with a suitable harbour. As nature had placed the 
island half-way along the route following the trade winds, it 
would be a good port and resupply area for ships travelling 
between the Old and New Worlds.
Because it was the Dutch custom to favor free trade, St. 
Eustatius began exporting not only their own produce to 
Europe, but that of neighboring islands as well. The Dutch, 
coming from a long tradition of shipping, were better able to 
transport commodities from the islands and bring supplies back 
at a cost much lower than their competitors. In addition, the 
Netherlands did not impose heavy duties and taxes as many 
other nations were doing. Dutch merchants, therefore, could 
offer goods at lower prices in the colonies, and did so even 
if that meant smaller profits. In this way they were able to 
maintain their trade supremacy, whilst at the same time 
securing a loyal cliental. They engaged in trade with whomever 
they pleased, though many colonies were required by law to 
trade only with fellow countrymen. The Dutch largely ignored 
such restrictions, as did the colonists with whom they did 
business. In the same manner, planters were willing to send 
their goods back to Europe through Dutch merchants. By doing 
so, they could avoid their own governments duties and taxes,
14
and realize greater profits.
Illegal tobacco from Virginia and neighboring British 
islands commonly accompanied Statian tobacco in Dutch ship 
holds from the earliest (Attema 1976). Smuggling between St. 
Kitts and Statia was commonplace, with small crafts landing at 
night on the more secluded beaches (Kandle 1985). Each 
shipment lost to a British port meant less money to the Crown, 
though more profit to the planter. As the mother-country 
usually felt the colony*s reason for existence was to enhance 
her own interests, the planters desires were second to the 
Crown*s. Therefore intensified naval activity followed in an 
effort to curtail such illegal trade.
The growth of smuggling activity resulted in an increase 
in laws restricting trade between nations. Nearly every 
European nation enacted such acts, but the English were 
perhaps the most aggressive in creating and enforcing such 
impositions.
By the end of the 17th century St. Eustatius was firmly 
established as a major shipping port for all countries, both 
legal and illegal. Illegal trade flourished amongst all 
nations in the Caribbean, especially after the imposition of 
laws regulating trade such as the Navigation Act of 1651. A 
multitude of similar measures were taken to control the export
15
and import of goods to the colonies. It was not until the 
next century, however, that St. Eustatius1 role as a port 
would fully flower.
Around 1740 a new product began to replace the tobacco 
economy of the previous years: sugar. Due to the climate on 
Statia, sugar plantations did not thrive, though they were 
established. Sugar cane did do well on other islands, and soon 
St. Eustatius found that greater profit lay there. The island 
began a sugar refining industry to process the cane grown 
elsewhere. It was then sold abroad as sugar refined on the 
supplier*s island, thereby avoiding fees and evading monopoly 
laws.
Statia's role as an export center for other islands grew 
tremendously in these years. As this was, for the most part, 
illegal for those selling to the Dutch, most of the sugar 
trade was done clandestinely, though only to the authorities. 
In the Indies such dealings were commonplace and were seldom 
frowned upon by planters. By 1746 this business of trade had 
become quite intense on Statia. About this time new warehouses 
were built all along the beach-front of Oranje Bay (Hartog 
1976) . In 1756 St. Eustatius became a free port to compete 
with its only real rival, St. Thomas (Hartog 1976) . This would 
secure the islands place among international trade in the 
Caribbean, and legally open its port to all nations. Later in
16
the century upwards of 600 warehouses would crowd the narrow 
Statian beach (Barka 1985).
Another facet of the growth of trade was the neutrality of 
the Netherlands in many of the continual European wars. This 
enabled them to trade with surrounding islands which could not 
directly trade with each other. The major drawback of this 
role was the constant capture of their merchant vessels. Any 
vessel found to be carrying "contraband" goods was subject to 
boarding and seizure by the warring nations. Although a
frequent occurrence, it was not a great threat to Dutch trade.
The majority of Statia1s trade was with French and British 
West Indian colonies, as well as British colonies in North 
America (Kandle 1985). Thus, Dutch merchants were often
harassed by the British Royal Navy, either because they were 
shipping illegally exported British colonial produce, or 
because they were doing business with the French, a country 
which seldom got along with Britain. This situation 
deteriorated with the start of the Seven Years War when open 
hostilities broke out between France and Britain. Every war in 
Europe resulted in increased trade at St. Eustatius from all 
nations, due to the closing of other ports to certain
countries.
During the Seven Years War (1756-1763), St. Eustatius
flourished as never before. The Dutch took on the role of 
supplier to both sides, but especially for the French. They 
furnished (with considerable profit) arms and ammunition to 
the French in the Caribbean, and at the same time continued to 
sell goods to British colonies. While the Dutch often gained 
monetarily, their purchasers were not so often as fortunate. 
One arms sale in 1758 to Guadeloupe was said to have been of 
muskets meant for the African trade. Upon firing three-fourths 
of the inferior quality guns burst (Pares 1936:254 cited in 
Kandle 1985). This incident did little to discourage future 
sales, however, with the possible exception of the Governor of 
Guadeloupe. By the end of the war trade in the Dutch Indies 
was at a new height. It was not unusual for 75 to 80 ships a 
day to anchor in the Dutch roadstead (Attema 1976). St. 
Eustatius was quickly earning its title of the "Golden Rock".
Another commodity was soon to become a major source of 
income for merchants on Statia. Plantation work was difficult 
labor, and fieldhands were not easy to come by. The earliest 
planters often relied upon indian labor to tend the fields, 
but this source was neither plentiful nor adequate. The 
solution was the importation of African slaves, which the 
Dutch involved themselves in directly. On Statia the Waterfort 
was converted to hold slaves in transit, accommodating up to 
450 individuals. Dealers on the island reportedly had up to 
1,500 slaves in stock at one time (Newton 1933). Trade in
18
Africans would continue legally in the Dutch colonies until 
1784, with the last slaver arriving in Oranje Bay in 1793 
(Hartog 1976:50).
The decade following the Seven Years War witnessed a 
dramatic change in the political climate of the colonial 
world. The British North American colonies were moving closer 
to open rebellion and had found a willing accomplice in the 
merchants of the Netherlands. Britain and the Netherlands had 
themselves been entangled in several wars over the coarse of 
the last century. With the involvement of the Dutch in the 
Seven Years War there was little mutual affection. Thus, not 
only would selling banned goods to Britain*s rebels earn 
profit, it would enable the Dutch to gain vengeance for 
British seizures from previous encounters. This, however, was 
not the official policy of the Netherlands but rather a 
private affair of its merchants.
In 1774 "as many as 20 American ships at once" were 
reported in the bay at St. Eustatius (Goslinga 1979:83 quoted 
in Kandle 1985:52). Though war had not been declared, stores 
were beginning to be acquired in the event armed rebellion was 
deemed the only solution to the colonies* grievances. 
Desperately collecting supplies, the American rebels were said 
to be "offering at the Dutch, Danish, and French Islands in 
these seas unlimited prices for ammunition and warlike stores"
19
according to a loyalist in Antigua in 1775 [Clark 
1964(1):1170-1171 quoted in Kandle 1985:53].
No matter what the colonists wanted, it could be purchased 
on Statia. One Scottish visitor to the Lower Town in 1775, 
Janet Schaw, summed up the holdings of the warehouses nicely: 
"But never did I meet with such variety..." (Kandle 1985:52). 
Another observer, Abraham Van Bibber, agent for the American 
colonies, wrote in a letter concerning Statia: "Warlike
Stores are very Plenty here and much more Reasonable then they 
are at the French Islands..." [Clark 1964(7):213 quoted in 
Kandle 1985:54].
The British government was not ignorant of such trade. 
British protests were quickly sent to the States General of 
the Netherlands demanding a cessation of contraband sales to 
the rebels. The initial result was that much of the stores 
being sent to Statia were documented as destined for the 
African trade, though in fact intended for the American 
colonies (James 1903 cited in Kandle 1985). Sending military 
stores to the island was not illegal, only their resale to the 
Americans. This ruse did not hold up long, and Britain 
continued to petition the Government in Holland to take firmer 
actions.
The government of the Netherlands had no desire to reenter
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into war with Britain. Though relations were somewhat 
strained, especially in the Indies, the Dutch knew there was 
more to be gained by remaining neutral. Thus, relenting to the 
British petitions, the Dutch West India Company passed a law 
on the 2 0th of March 1775 banning trade in "warlike stores" to 
the American colonies for six months. On August 18th the ban 
was extended for one year. Later this was further extended for 
another two years (Tuchman 1988). The penalty for breaking the 
ban was 1,000 guilders (Force 1937 cited in Kandle 1985) but 
even so few merchants abided by it, either in the Netherlands 
or the Caribbean. Governor de Graaff himself ignored the 
orders, for in April of 1776 he allowed American ships buying 
these stores to anchor in the roadstead of Oranje Bay.
Numerous commodities were smuggled to and from Statia. As 
before the Revolution, sugar that entered the port illegally 
was still refined on the island. Goods of all kinds were 
traded between colonies whose countries were at war and were 
forbade to purchase such items. Among the contraband goods 
though, none were as profitable for the Dutch, and as desired 
by the Americans, as military stores. Muskets, pistols, 
cannon, mortars, flints, weapon parts, lead, balls, and 
especially gun powder, all regularly passed through the 
warehouses on St. Eustatius destined for America (Rodney 
1789). Also banned were ship stores useful to the fledgling 
American Navy, as well as cloth. Few items that were necessary
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to send an army or navy into action were unavailable on the 
island. When Admiral Rodney captured some 50 armed American 
ships in Oranje Bay,
The numerous Letters found on board them plainly prove 
that (their hulls and masts excepted) all their Rigging, 
Sails, Cannon, Powder, Ammunition, and Stores...were sent 
from this Island, without whose assistance the American 
Navigation could not possibly have been supported (Rodney 
1789:54-45 from a letter dated March 26, 1781).
Weapons and ammunition were among the most profitable to 
smuggle. Gun powder could earn a profit of 120% for the Dutch 
merchants who dealt in it (Hartog 1976) . The powder was often 
stored in barrels marked "sugar", "rum", "tea", and "rice" or 
"hidden under molasses" (Attema 1976; Jameson 1903, and Clark 
1964 (1) 1013-34 cited in Kandle 1985). Soldiers were ordered 
to try and prevent such breaches of the law but were often 
engaging in such activities themselves (Kandle 1985). 
Contemporary accounts even describe the removal of the British 
Broad Arrow, the mark of property of the Crown, so they could 
be resold to the Colonies during the war (Clark 1964 quoting 
a letter of 1776, cited in Kandle 1985). Even British 
merchants cashed in on the profits. Several merchants from St. 
Kitts were known to have rented warehouses on St. Eustatius 
and were accused of conducting illicit trade with the 
rebellious colonies.
Common landings on the island used by smugglers included
Billy*s Gut to the northwest of the Lower Town, Tumble Down 
Dick Bay, Jenkin*s Bay, and Concordia Bay. The exact volume of 
illegal trade at Statia will never be known, for no one was 
foolish enough to record many details. It is suspected to have 
been enormous, possibly even "on a level with the common 
trade", which incidentally was $3,700,000 in 1779 (Hartog 
1976:39). That year 3,551 ships officially entered Statia*s 
port plus an unknown number of illegal entries (Hartog 
1976:40). This volume of shipping kept up throughout the war, 
for by 1780 there were still 3,217 vessels registered as 
having officially entered the harbour (Spinney 1969).
Statia* s role as a trade port came to an abrupt halt with 
the British attack on February 3, 1781, shortly after the
Netherlands entered into war with Britain. Admiral Sir G.B. 
Rodney led a fleet to the island with the intention of cutting 
off supplies to the Americans by securing the port, which he 
effectively did. No sooner had he shut off this outlet than 
merchants on nearby islands, including some British subjects 
on St. Kitts, began to arrange for other means to continue the 
illegal but highly profitable trade (Rodney 1789) . St. 
Eustatius was not able to continue this activity during the 
British occupation. All stores and warehouse were closed and 
guarded, and the contents of most seized and sold at auction. 
This sale actually harmed the British forces, as although the 
proceeds went into the British war chest, the auctioned goods
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were resold to merchants dealing with the colonists.
The British occupation was cut short by a surprise French 
invasion in November of 1781. Under their administration many 
warehouses reopened and business was allowed to resume. At the 
close of the war St. Eustatius was returned to Dutch hands and 
remained a free port from 1784 to 1795. Open to all nations 
once again, Statia prospered exceedingly during the post-war 
years, experiencing growth at an enormous rate. This was soon 
stifled by yet another invasion.
In the years following the end of the American Revolution 
another revolution broke out in Europe, this time in France. 
After consolidating its own internal power, France began 
military expansion and annexed the Netherlands into her 
empire. When this Revolutionary French government took control 
of St. Eustatius in 1795, it quickly fell into economic ruin. 
With severe war debts all French possessions were heavily 
taxed, some to the point of economic collapse. This occurred 
on Statia and the island was never to recover from this 
burden. Although trade continued, it dwindled to a point that 
it soon fell behind several other ports until it was no longer 
of any significance.
St. Eustatius was restored to Dutch rule at the close of 
the Napoleonic Wars, when France was defeated by an alliance
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of several European nations. In 1816 Holland reopened the port 
without tariffs in an effort to revive trade, but by this time 
it was too late. A final blow was struck in 1819 when a 
hurricane hit the island destroying numerous warehouses. The 
warehouses of the Lower Town were, by and large, abandoned and 
began to be scavenged for brick which was sold to other 
islands. The days of the Golden Rock were over.
Chapter 2
The Need for Defense
St. Eustatius was never particularly coveted by other 
nations as a plantation colony. It offered few incentives for 
such enterprises. Had it remained a planter colony, the island 
would likely have seldom found itself in a position requiring 
it to fend off invaders.
When the island turned from its planting activities, and 
began to prosper under mercantilism, the situation was 
drastically altered. Once Statia began to accumulate wealth, 
from both international trade and industries such as sugar 
refining, it became a prime target. Pirates saw abundant 
riches waiting to be taken. Neighboring colonies found a new 
rival. European nations saw a vital trade center, and a 
potential supplier to ever changing enemies. From the very 
beginning of its prosperity, St. Eustatius was in need of 
protecting itself.
Once an island in the Caribbean began to amass wealth, it 
drew the attention of pirates. Numerous such bands roved the
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sea. Some were tolerated by certain nations, if not actually 
sanctioned by them. Others, holding allegiance to none save 
themselves, attacked all with equal zeal. A great deal were 
former privateers who found they preferred to acquire their 
riches from the toil of others. Statia was ransacked on 
several occasions by such criminals, and found she needed to 
guard against these intrusions when sufficient "booty11 was 
known to be on the island.
Most pirates traveled on small ships and relied, when 
sacking land cities, on the element of surprise. Observation 
posts alerting the town to the danger often proved sufficient 
to avert an attack. Some pirates, however, had armed frigates 
bearing from 50 to 90 guns (Cochran 1961). These were more of 
a threat, especially if they had banded together with other 
pirate ships.
Another concern the islanders had was not necessarily 
directly related to their own activity. As subjects of 
European nations, they were often drawn into conflicts based 
entirely on European disputes. As nations supported colonies 
in the New World, their colonies were often obliged to enter 
into their continental conflicts. If not involved as full- 
fledged combatants, the colonies were, at a minimum, 
encouraged to alter trade and commerce with the enemy's 
colony. This was commonly accomplished through privateering.
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In essence, a privateer was little more than a legalized 
pirate. Many privateers were former pirates, and most pirates 
were at one time or another privateers. A "Privateer" was a 
ship that sought out enemy nationals in time of war. Their 
mission was to capture or destroy their ships and confiscate 
the goods they were transporting. This also included the 
capture of goods on land, such as the busy warehouses and port 
on St. Eustatius.
The privateer captain carried a "Letter of Marque", which 
was a license to carry out piratical acts for the good of his 
country. Crews of such "licensed" ships were normally accorded 
at least minimal rights of regular combatants in the event of 
capture by the enemy. This was not always the case though, 
especially in the American Revolution. American privateers 
were often considered by the British as pirates, and 
accordingly treated by many English officers (Coggins 1969).
In reward for their work in hampering the trade and supply 
efforts of the enemy, the privateer crew was granted rights on 
the captured ship and cargo. These rights differed from 
country to country, and were agreed upon before the issuance 
of a Letter of Marque. Every person on board was allotted a 
share of the prize, which was normally sold at auction 
(Coggins 1969). Recruitment was not very difficult for a 
privateer, for they offered quite reasonable rewards to the
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crew. Naval vessels similarly allowed the crew to share in the 
value of captured enemy vessels or towns, such as when Admiral 
Rodney took St. Eustatius. The difference was the proportions 
allotted by the Navy versus the privateer. Their less generous 
system resulted in having to resort to gang impressment to 
outfit a ship.
A regular merchant ship often carried a Letter of Marque, 
even when not actively privateering. The fear of pirates and 
enemy privateers prompted most merchants to keep at least some 
cannon on board, even if only a swivel or small deck gun. 
Thus, if they inadvertently came upon a weaker opponent, they 
could vastly supplement their voyage's profits.
Privateers were often a major source of danger to the 
island. Several privateers targeted St. Eustatius during 
European wars for less than patriotic reasons as well. When 
war broke out, receiving a Letter of Marque enabled 
neighboring merchants and planters to legally destroy their 
competition. In this way they could bolster their own economy 
by widening their markets, and decreasing the supply going 
back to Europe, allowing greater control over prices.
The same reasons that would draw a privateer to an island, 
also brought armies and navies. St. Eustatius, as a major 
trade and supply center, had military value. Trade brought
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economic power to an enemy nation. Goods offered at such a 
port also meant re-supply was facilitated to enemies in time 
of war. Thus, the warehouses of the Lower Town not only 
brought money to the islanders, but danger as well. Whenever 
a war broke out, and this was often, the warehouses became 
prime potential targets. It was this aspect of St. Eustatius, 
more than any other, that necessitated a strong defensive 
system for the island. One of the leading military and 
fortification experts of the day, John Muller commented:
... their trade, on which islands chiefly depend, would 
become very precarious, without having some strong place 
or other to secure their effects in, which otherwise 
might be surprised or carried of [sic], before an army 
can arrive to defend them (Muller 1755:121).
Another concern islands had to bear in mind was their 
strategic importance due solely to geographic location. St. 
Eustatius, lying along the trade route, was such an island. It 
was centrally located between Europe and the New World, and 
within the currents and winds that carried ships between the 
two. In addition, it had a large bay capable of harboring a 
large number of ships. Professor John Muller wrote:
It may happen that in some places such as islands and 
some other places, where there are very few things to be 
had for exportation, yet if the harbour is convenient for 
ships to come in, when distressed by weather, or the 
place may serve as a magazine to bring and deposit 
European commodities, to be taken from thence transported 
by vessels, to some other market; or else fresh water is 
to be found for ships, when no other place is near hand,
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as is St. Helena; such situations may be fortified, and 
become very useful (Muller 1755:129-130).
Whilst Statia certainly was not the most logical port to 
take on fresh water and food, nor seek shelter in foul 
weather, it did function as a fine "magazine to bring and 
deposit European commodities11. As long as it offered these 
amenities, St. Eustatius would need to be capable of defense.
By the 19th century, after French rule economically ruined 
the island, the need for defense all but disappeared. The 
island no longer contained the riches sought by pirates. The 
competition privateers sought to loot or destroy was gone. The 
empty warehouses were falling into ruins, no longer of any 
concern to admirals and generals. There was no longer any 
pressing need for defense.
Chapter 3
Fortification Theory
As these kinds of situations are the most useful to a 
trading nation, we have so much the longer dwelt upon the 
method of securing them in the best manner possible (John 
Muller 1755:129).
In the 17th century fortification theory in Europe began 
to develop into a sophisticated art. By the 18th century, a 
plethora of theoretical works and manuals had been published 
on the subject. Every European military officer who was 
considered as having been "properly trained", had read one or 
more of the "treatises" then available.
Although theories of fortification developed 
simultaneously in several countries, France was long 
considered the master of the subject (Robinson 1977). Among 
the most famous of fortification champions was Sebastien Le 
Preste de Vauban (1633-1707). He alone is often credited with 
the superb re-design of the defenses of France, and with the 
high level of aestheticism these exhibit.
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Vauban was venerated in the 17th and 18th centuries as the 
authority on proper fortification. During his career, he 
personally directed about fifty sieges against fortified 
positions (Robinson 1977:11) . These experiences clearly taught 
him not only how to conduct a siege, but also how to best 
defend against them. Eventually these revelations were set 
down and organized into the classic on the subject, Memoire 
pour Servir d 1 Instruction dans la Conduit des Sieges et dans 
la Defense des Places (Vauban 1691). Within a few short years 
it was translated and widely circulated among other European 
nations (Cambray 1693).
Within this seminal work, Vauban elucidated his collected 
theories. Among these was his most basic premise, that every 
defensive work must be able to defend all areas of its own 
grounds. To achieve this, he stated that all parts of the 
fortification must be "viewed, or flanked, from some other 
part so that there would be no sheltered place where an enemy 
could lurk" (Vauban 1691) . Wide flanks were best for the 
achievement of this. Vauban developed three basic systems he 
found best suited.
First was "a simple, straight forward bastioned 
arrangement with tenailles before the curtains". Although 
perfected in the 17th century by men such as Vauban, this was 
actually first utilized by the Italians in the early 16th
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century, utilizing plans drawn in the 15th century (Robinson 
1977:8).
The bastion is a projection attached to a regular 
fortification. Loosely, it could be of round, square, or 
triangular form. Technically, a bastion must be four sided, 
but the term was used for three (a demi-bastion, or half- 
bastion) and five sides as well as circular (roundels) ones 
(Lawrence 1963:72). The feature was commonly built integral to 
the fortification wall so as to form a salient angel with at 
least two faces (Figures 2 and 3) . If it were separate, it was 
considered a form of a redoubt rather than a bastion.
The basic premise of this feature was to provide 
protection to the fort walls, ensuring there were no areas 
unable to be covered by defensive fire. All bastions were 
designed so as to allow fire from cannon and small arms to 
cover the space between it and the adjoining bastions.
Second was "an arrangement wherein the bastions were 
separated from the enceinte and the angles of the latter were 
reinforced with small, pentagonal works called tower bastions" 
(Robinson 1977:11). Similar to this was the third, although 
this would be "a more complicated assemblage having added 
outworks, larger towers, and a more complicated 
enceinte which was traced to produce, in effect, a second set
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of flanks” (Vauban 1691, as cited in Robinson 1977:11). Of 
these methods, the first was by far the most common employed. 
In the Caribbean this held true, but often without the luxury 
of tenailles.
All of these variants included a moat surrounding the 
fort. Some were in the Dark Ages fashion, filled with water, 
but most were dry by the 17th century. In either case, the 
primary purpose for this feature was ”to force aggressors into 
an exposed position in front of the enceinte” (Robinson 
1977:9). Fort Oranje would receive such a moat by the end of 
the 17th century.
Although Vauban literally "wrote the book" on 
fortification building, he did not insist upon strict 
adherence to it. . In; *fact, he urged it only be used in the 
general planning of a construction. Theories for laying out a 
fort*s plan were "idealistically based on regular geometry", 
but "the surrounding terrain-hills, swamps, water, expected 
approaches for attack, and so on-often necessitated numerous 
adjustments in design" (Robinson 1977:8). If possible, the 
surrounding natural topography should be incorporated into the 
defensive plan, "to enable the garrison to dispute with energy 
the occupancy by the assailant of every point both within and 
exterior to the defenses" (Mahan 1836). Vauban stressed that 
the specific circumstances of each situation must take
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precedence over the exact directives in his treatise (Vauban 
1691).
Most nations established some form of military engineering 
school, such as the French "Ecole Polytechnique" which founded 
their "Corps of Engineers" in 1690 (Robinson 1977) . In the 
event a country did not have its own such school, it was not 
unheard of to train in a foreign land.
Throughout the next century, Vauban remained chief pundit 
of defensive techniques. Later treatises on the subject 
continued to refer to his works for validation. Technological 
advances and new military strategies occurred, however, which 
necessitated updating the current theories. In the early 18th 
century, new battle techniques for example, such as those 
developed under the Duke of Marlborough, caused mainstream 
siegecraft to become somewhat antiquated.
Marlborough advocated military actions in enemy 
territories not against the fortified position itself, but 
against the armies it protected. Thus began the 18th century 
custom of field battles and troop maneuvers away from 
fortifications. This did not mean an abandonment of Vauban1s 
siege techniques, only their relegation to a secondary role.
During the 18th century new manuals were written which 
dealt with such alterations to established warfare. Not only
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were field guides for the military produced, but also 
fortification manuals, as the siege was not yet obsolete. One 
of the more prolific authors of such treatises was John 
Muller, "Professor of Artillery and Fortification, and 
Preceptor of Engineering, &c. to His Royal Highness the Duke 
of Gloucester" (Muller 1780).
Although never as venerated as Vauban, Muller was none­
theless a respected authority on fortifications. His writings 
were taught in most British military schools, and few educated 
officers were unfamiliar with his works. One of these, A 
Treatise Containing the Practical Part of Fortification 
(1755) , outlines what was expected of a defensive work of the 
period.
Although Vauban*s theories were the foundation of 
fortifications that would be built in the Caribbean, Muller's 
are much closer to the reality. He set down guidelines for 
field fortification, as opposed to the fortification of a 
large cities, as Vauban was accustomed. He also treated 
artillery batteries and island defense, both of which have 
more relevance to St. Eustatius than anything Vauban ever 
produced.
Muller stated that the "necessity of building fortresses 
in all states whatsoever, appears from... [an] innate
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principle of self-preservation" (Muller 1755:120). This was 
especially true for an island such as St. Eustatius which 
depended so much upon shipping:
Maritime powers, and those who inhabit islands, such as 
England, Sardinia, Sicily, & c. require no less fortified 
places; for as an enemy may invade them by a surprize, 
and though his naval force be less, yet when he once gets 
a footing, may either conquer or destroy the country. 
Besides, their trade, on which islands chiefly depend, 
would become very precarious, without having some strong 
place or other to secure their effects in, which 
otherwise might be surprized or carried of[f], before an 
army can arrive to defend them (Muller 1755:121).
Statia certainly would find itself in a "precarious" 
position if trade were suspended, and indeed, was at a loss 
several times for lack of sufficient defensive positions and 
strongholds to secure their goods. Muller, as an Englishman, 
could relate well to island situations. He devoted part of his 
treatise to the subject of island defense, for in many cases 
these situations presented unique defensive requirements.
The first principle of planning the defense of any 
position is choosing the proper location for the works. In 
land situations these were normally determined foremost by the 
location of a city. This was also true for islands, but an 
island is also a contained situation, and therefore has 
additional defensive boundaries.
In islands, the best situations are upon the coasts, and
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in such places, where an enemy may easily land, and where 
the garrison has a safe communication with some inland 
town to receive succours and subsistance in case of an 
attack  (Muller 1755:122-3).
St. Eustatius has limited coastal areas suitable for 
landing. That which was best suited, from Oranje Bay, was 
prudently the first to be fortified. Within the first century 
of its existence, the island further fortified suitable beach 
landings, as common sense and Muller suggested. A good 
seacoast fortification would force the enemy to land at an 
inconvenient spot. The French having to land at Jenkin's Bay 
is an example of how this worked. The properly placed fort 
insured the assailants would pass along a route "preselected 
by the defenders" (Lewis 1970:7).
The presence of a safe and facile means of communication 
between the garrison and the town could well be a deciding 
factor in an assault (Mahan 183 6). Batteries on St. Eustatius 
attempted to follow the advice of Muller. The French 
occupation of the 1780's is credited with building a road 
system between the forts to facilitate communication and 
movements. With the exception of the trench between Fort Panga 
and Battery Jussac, however, none were protected routes.
Not all military strategists agreed with the tactic of 
defending all suitable landings: "It is not necessary to make 
the coast a fortified line" (Lallemand 1820:103). Another 19th
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century planner felt it was often more advantageous to allow 
the enemy to land and engage him on the field. The landing 
site, however, was to be encouraged by the defender. When 
defending an island against amphibious assault, fortifications 
to prevent it were not necessarily the main objective:
the securities of the points to be covered is considered 
to be greatly augmented whenever the defenses can be so 
arranged as to oblige an enemy to land at some 
distance... Instead of being designed to prevent a 
landing on any part of the coast...the system often 
leaves this landing as an open alternative to the enemy; 
and aims so to cover the really important and dangerous 
points, as to necessitate a distant landing and a march 
towards the object, through the people (Totten 1851:5-6).
St. Eustatius is a small island by any standards. 
Professor Muller treated this situation as well as the larger 
ones.
In an island of no very great extent, whose coast is of 
an easy access, in most parts, and where it is impossible 
to fortify every one; the best situation for a fortress 
is the middle of the island upon a rising ground; because 
troops may best be sent from thence to any part, to 
oppose the landing of an enemy; but this fortress should 
be pretty large, that in time of need, the inhabitants of 
the country may retire into it with their cattle, and 
other most valuable effects, and help to defend the 
place, till the enemy is obliged to retire, either, for 
want of provision, or having no hopes to get mastery of 
the place (Muller 1755:122-3).
Although by the 18th century Muller suggested a centrally 
located fort on high ground for small islands, this was not 
always the case. In earlier times batteries were commonly
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closer to sea-level, such as the Waterfort. As guns improved, 
and ships began to be more heavily arm^d, batteries moved to 
higher ground. Low batteries retained their value however, as 
they could best damage a ship at the water-line.
Although Fort Oranje is not on high ground in relation to 
the Cultivation Plain, it did set high above the Lower Town 
and Bay. In size it loosely conformed to the ideal for a small 
island. It would not be able to harbour the effects of the 
inhabitants, but it did command the area above them, 
overlooking the sea, and afforded them at least some 
protection.
When locating a fort on an island, care had to be taken 
in deciding upon its precise placement:
If a fortress is built near a river, lake, or sea, it 
must be considered whether it should stand quite close to 
the water side, or at some distance, so as the works may 
not be battered by the ships; whether an enemy may easily 
land thereabouts, and attack it by land, whether ships 
may come close, or the water is shallow. . .When a fortress 
lies so near the water that it may be battered from the 
ships, it is in danger of being destroyed by the 
superiority of their fire; on the contrary, when the 
water is so shallow, that the ships cannot come near 
enough to batter in breach; care must be taken that the 
enemy may not land in their boats, and storm it by land; 
to obstruct which, redoubts or batteries must be built, 
to resist both in front and in flank; and if they can 
land any where beyond the reach of cannon, these redoubts 
or batteries must be fortified all round with a wall and 
good ditch, that they may not be surprized in the rear. . . 
(Muller 1755:123-4).
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Fort Oranje was placed directly on the sea coast. The bay 
beyond did not allow large ships to get extremely close to its 
parapets, but they could easily sail within firing range. In 
this sense, the planners of Statia's defenses somewhat failed. 
There were no large defensive positions on the island which 
were secure from ships cannon and suitably defended against 
assault troops. Although Fort Panga was quite safe from the 
former, and reasonably secured against the latter, it was 
incapable of fending off an extended or determined siege. 
Housing a large number of troops was beyond its limitations, 
and there was no protection against besiegement save for its 
placement on a mountain top.
The main fort did have reasonable capabilities to defend 
against landed troops. Its guns were able to cover the bay, 
where troops were likely to approach from. The ascent from the 
beach was up a narrow path or the cliff itself. Either of 
these routes would have "cost the Expense of much Blood", had 
the Fort's occupants offered stiff resistance (Rodney 1789).
If assailants came from the inland side, having landed 
elsewhere, the Fort was equipped with certain elements 
necessary in repulsing an assault. Although by the 18th 
century some of its original bastions had fallen, it still 
retained two on the side of the Town. A moat was also 
installed further complicating an attackers efforts. It did
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not have the additional systems of progressive defense, as a 
European fort would likely have. It also lacked the open 
spaces in front of its walls which could be of great 
importance. Archaeological evidence shows civilian structures 
to have lain in its path which were likely capable of 
protecting enemy troops and artillery from the Fort's guns.
Part of the Fort's protection from such circumstances were 
in its versions of ''redoubts or batteries" as Muller proposed. 
Although slow in coming, the island eventually had a system of 
batteries which encompassed the island, conforming to the 
ideas set down in island fortification theory. Their only real 
deficiency was in their construction, which did not allow for 
protection from landed troops, only approaching troops and 
ships guns.
Oranje Bay was protected at one time or another by several 
batteries and fortifications. Besides Fort Oranje, the guns of 
the Waterfort, Hollandia, Rotterdam, Royal, Four-Gun, and 
Bouille were all within range of the harbour. This was an 
important element of defending an island which depended upon 
trade. Muller discussed this circumstance:
In a place where there is a harbour, some part or other 
of the fortress should command it if possible; for though 
redoubts and batteries are made to defend its entrance, 
yet if the enemy finds means to destroy some, or passes 
by others, the harbour lies open for the ships to come 
in, without any further obstacle... But if part of the
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fortress commands the harbour, the ships are never secure 
in it till the place is taken, which is all that can be 
expected (Muller 1755:124).
Once the harbour to be protected was identified, further 
thought had to be given as to how it may best be secured:
...it must be carefully considered, on which side the 
fortress is to be placed, both in respect to the landing 
of the goods, and to the defence of the harbour, as 
likewise, where the ship may come as close to the quay as 
possible. In a fortress built to promote and protect 
trade, it must likewise be considered, what kind of goods 
are to be found in or near the place, what might be 
brought by ships from foreign parts, and what might be 
exported, in exchange for those manufactured there, and 
where to be carried to market (Muller 1755:129-130).
Although the island had other bays in which a ship could 
anchor, none were truly entitled to the status of "harbour” 
except for Oranje. The mere presence of the Fort then helped 
to secure the island. Even if it could not withstand an 
assault, the possibility had to be considered by a potential 
attacker. That alone may have been enough to ward off less 
confident aggressors.
The approach to a harbour needed to be secure as well. On 
Statia, small batteries were placed at strategic points where 
ships must pass on their way to the Roadstead. Professor 
Muller agreed with this tactic:
It is true, that the entrance should not be neglected;
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for whenever there is a point of land that commands the 
approach of an enemy, it should be carefully secured by 
some works or other. ... Nothing conduces so much to the 
safety of a place, situated near the sea, or navigable 
river, as those works which keep the enemies [sic] fleet 
at a distance (1755:124-5).
After the most advantageous positions for defenses were 
selected, they had to be properly constructed. Even in the 
right position, a poorly designed or executed fortification 
was of little use. The development of the art of fortification 
in the 17th century had profound effects on the layout of 
subsequent defensive works. This was most true in Europe 
itself, where the writings of the venerated masters were 
closely followed. In the case of the colonial world, however, 
this practice was less rigidly adhered to.
Although the basic elements were transferred to colonial 
engineers, unless they themselves had formally studied 
fortification theory, their creation was often a mixture of 
recommended elements and guesswork. The exception to this 
generality is when European armies or military engineers built 
the works rather than colonials. Even so the final result was 
quite often a simple function of available time, materials, 
skilled labor, topography, and motivation.
In the Caribbean there is an odd mixture of 
fortifications. Some colonies were equipped with structures 
that would have made Vauban or Muller proud, especially a few
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of the larger Spanish colonies. Others had crude forms that 
would scarce have held off a single pirate ship. Most islands 
lay somewhere in between. Their forts contained the basic, 
though rudimentary, forms suggested, and often were 
supplemented by simple batteries such as found on St. 
Eustatius. They "rarely exhibited any of the geometric 
intricacy so typical of contemporary European forts” (Lewis 
1970:15).
Among the most common fortification feature carried to the 
New World was the bastion system. On St. Eustatius, one fort, 
Oranje, followed this basic principle (Figure 3) . Although 
little is known about the early manifestations of the Fort, it 
did have four bastions set onto a square wall by the time of 
Isaac Lamont (ca. 1701), thereby conforming to the basic plan. 
The French had also installed a moat about the walls circa 
1689-1690, perhaps as a direct result of the theories proposed 
by their fellow countryman, Vauban.
The remainder of the defensive works on the island were 
mostly artillery batteries, even the Waterfort. These works 
were open on one side, negating any defensive value against 
landed troops. They did conform, for the most part, to 
standard field batteries of their period, except for being of 
stone rather than earth. Theoretical attention was paid to the 
construction of detached batteries, but mostly in their
placement rather than their actual manifestations.
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Professor Muller suggested the best ways in which a fort 
or battery on a harbour ought to be built. Fort Oranje was so 
located, and should have met certain criteria he set down.
When the water is so deep that ships can come up close to 
the walls, the parapets must be made high, and those that 
can be seen from the main top, should be covered above 
with canvas, planks, or with anything else in time of 
siege, to cover the troop behind them (Muller 1755:123).
In these instances, Fort Oranje was moderately successful. 
It sat high enough above the sea that it had no worry about 
being seen from the main top. Although its parapets were not 
exceptionally high in themselves, that was made up for by the 
height of the Fort above the Bay. Few close-in ships could 
elevate their guns enough to lob shells into Oranje, unless 
carrying mortars. Ships anchoring farther out however, would 
have been able to strike the Fort.
When planning to build a fort, Muller reminded his 
students that three main points had to be first weighed, along 
with the more minor aspects (1755:132). The three encompassed 
the money necessary to build, requirements for the upkeep and 
garrisoning of the fort, and the space necessary for the 
proposed work.
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The proposal must, of course, calculate the necessary 
expenses. On company islands such as Statia, this factor was 
frequently the sole deciding element of whether or not to 
build a new fort. Time after time the governor had to implore 
the West India Company for defense monies. Even when the 
island was no longer controlled by the Company, the government 
seldom was generous with such funds. All too often the 
assistance they received was inadequate, or non-existent. At 
times the islanders themselves raised the money, such as for 
the projects of 1748.
Second, and whilst still planning the budget, the builder 
had to estimate the number of troops which would be required. 
They also had to figure in the quantities and calibers of 
artillery and ammunition that would be needed to ward off a 
siege. A defensive work had to be of an adequate strength to 
repel conventional assaults (Mahan 1836).
The third factor which necessitated forethought was the 
"extent or capacity of the place, with respect to the space 
taken up by the works of fortification" (Muller 1755:132). 
Obviously on an island the size of St. Eustatius, a system the 
size of Brimstone Hill would be unrealistic. Regardless, it 
had to be of large enough proportions to provide cover for the 
troops, facilities for the weaponry, and storage magazines for 
provisions and ammunition (Mahan 1836).
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In addition, new forts had to be built large enough to 
accommodate the nearby town without placing undue strain on 
the availability of room for the town to expand. Included in 
this should have been an open area about the fort that 
afforded no protection to an attacker. In this respect, Fort 
Oranje miserably failed, being within a stone's throw from 
town buildings.
Once the preliminary stages had been dealt with, the 
actual business of construction could begin. The basic shape 
of a fort was preferably square. Onto this were added 
bastions, placed so that all flanks could be covered by 
another bastion (Figure 3). Most often these were on the four 
corners. Sometimes only two bastions would be built, and if 
so, these would be situated on diagonal opposites. Oblong and 
rectangular shaped forts often had dead zones to which the 
enemy could retreat and avoid the defenders fire (Lawrence 
1963:78).
The walls were the most crucial feature of a fort. Not 
only did they have to be designed to maximize their defensive 
capabilities, but also to withstand battering or artillery 
bombardment. Solid core walls were avoided for several 
reasons. A shot striking a solid wall could more easily 
shatter or damage it, for there was little to absorb the 
shock. They were also difficult to maintain, as water
percolation caused constant cracking.
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Walls typically had cores of un-mortared stone. The 
English were sometimes known to use cores of "misshapen lumps 
of stone laid in a mud packing" (Lawrence 1963:94). Earthen 
cores were to be avoided, as the 18th century engineer Watson 
explained:
instead of mortar they use nothing but a loamy earth 
withinside the walls; which is not only unproper, but 
also incapable of making a cement. When a wall is so 
built they plaster it with a thin coat of mortar, and 
whitewash it, which looks very well for a time, but when 
once the mortar cracks and is washed away by the heavy 
rains, the water gets into the loamy earth withinside the 
wall, and swells it so as to bulge the stonework, and 
then all or most of the wall falls down (speaking of West 
African forts, quoted in Lawrence 1963:94).
Faced walls and platforms were then laid over the core 
using stone and mortar, with care taken to make them as water 
tight as possible. These required frequent repair though, as 
the weight of the artillery and the shock waves from their 
firing quickly took its toll on the flooring. Fort Oranje was 
notorious for this problem, it being so severe that segments 
of the wall actually broke away on occasion.
When a fort had high parapets, as was the rule for a true 
fort, embrasures were required from which the cannon could 
fire (Figure 4). The sides of these were "splayed inwards to 
widen the arc of fire" (Lawrence 1963:73). A coastal fort
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normally had most of these directed towards the sea, "because 
trouble on land, though it might come more frequently, could 
not be as dangerous as an attack supported by naval cannon" 
(Lawrence 1963:77). Fort Oranje is a prime example of this 
principle for it is Oranje Bay which most needed their 
protective fire.
Within the fort space was necessary for the garrison and 
commander. Even if they were regularly billeted outside its 
walls some form of barracks would be required in case of 
siege. Often civil and criminal offices, government offices, 
and other vital public administration quarters were located 
within the fort. All of these were to be found within Fort 
Oranje, and many remain there today.
The fort also had to have facilities for supplies in case 
of an extended siege. Munitions and powder would, of course, 
be quite precious in such an event. Powder magazines were 
commonly placed under a bastion, this being a fairly secure 
place. Fort Oranje*s powder magazine somewhat conforms to this 
custom. Unfortunately such subterranean magazines tended to be 
damp, and fouled powder frequently. Prison cells were also 
often found under a bastion, having similar ill effects on 
inmates. Statia*s fort had cells placed there, though these 
were said to be easily escaped due to the deteriorated 
condition of the Fort walls (Attema 1976).
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All forts needed a lookout. Many were equipped with a 
tower from which a better view could be had. Forts atop 
cliffs, such as Oranje, did not need elaborate constructions 
for this task, for they had naturally elevated views. 
Nevertheless a small lookout station was placed above the 
gate. Eventually Fort Panga on Signal Hill would serve as the 
primary observation position for the island. From that post an 
unobscured view was possible in nearly all directions.
The materials with which a fort could be built were as 
variable as the geology of the surrounding area. In the 
Caribbean, as with most colonial settlements, importing large 
quantities of massive building material was not economically 
feasible. Stone was most often locally quarried. When Statians 
requested materials from Holland, they were often quizzed as 
to the availability of local resources (Attema 1976).
Few colonial endeavors used imported stone. In Africa only 
the Portuguese are known to have done this in any quantity 
(Lawrence 1963). It is improbable that such importation from 
Europe would have been justified for Caribbean fortifications. 
On St. Eustatius the stone utilized all appeared to be local. 
Outcrops observed on the slopes of the Quill, by Fort de 
Windt, matched that in several of the batteries and forts. 
This may well have been a quarry site for these works. Other 
batteries used faced or natural cobble, all of which was
available in the immediate area.
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If suitable clay deposits were to be had, brick was made 
on the building site, but in the islands this was not the 
case. Almost without exception brick had to be imported. The 
Dutch were well known for their mastery of the use of brick, 
especially for vaults such as in a cistern. Dutch brick is 
commonly yellow in colour, but this was dependent upon their 
specific clay source (Noel-Hume 1985).
Although stone and cobble was used for the bulk of the 
parapets, brick was normally preferred for fine "jointing and 
edging" (Lawrence 1963:90). Tumble Down Dick Battery is a 
perfect example of this mixture, with stone walls and brick 
lined embrasures. Brick was often preferred to build parapets 
that "line stairs and landings, flat roofs, and the inward 
side of the fortification wherever it was bounded by a sheer 
drop" because it was relatively light compared to most stone 
(Lawrence 1963:92).
Mortar necessary for joining the materials could be made 
from burning sea shell and coral. Many Statian forts have sea 
shell and coral pieces in their mortar, providing evidence 
that this was in fact a common source of mortar on the island. 
Cement, called tarras, for coating the parapet tops, like at 
Bouille and Concordia, could also be made from shell and coral
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sources although this was inferior to that available from 
Europe. Top quality tarras included a volcanic stone quarried 
in the Rhineland. It was imported to Africa through Holland, 
so may have been available on Statia.
The purpose of capping the walls was to waterproof the 
stonework so that moisture could not seep down and cause 
structural damage (Lawrence 1963:90). If possible such final 
touches were done with the imported cement mixes. Evidence of 
the origin of cement on Statian batteries has yet to be 
collected, but may have utilized both sources. Most likely it 
was a primarily from local resources either from the island 
itself, or at least in the Caribbean. The capping on the forts 
appears to match that used on cisterns, and with the 
quantities involved, importation from Europe would have been 
quite expensive unless loaded as ballast. Other necessary 
materials which would have been imported included nails, 
hinges, bars, locks, and other non-locally available supplies.
In colonial situations, the actual construction of a fort 
could be accomplished by a variety of individuals. Most early 
17th century defenses were built by the colonists upon their 
arrival. In the larger enterprises, military officers and 
engineers commonly accompanied the expedition, and would have 
been responsible for the planning and execution of these 
projects. Competency therefore would vary with the individual.
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In colonial Africa, local craftsmen were usually employed 
for the skilled tasks, and the heavy labor supplied by 
soldiers (Lawrence 1963). Later the use of slaves, either 
employed by the military or owned by the company, would 
provide much of the manpower. This pattern might be assumed 
for the Caribbean, although European soldiers likely did most 
of the work on small field batteries. Slave labor would have 
been more expensive to contract than using their own men.
No matter who did the manual labour, they were surely 
supervised by an overseer at some level. A few would have been 
familiar with military engineering, others not. Military 
expeditions of the mid and late 18th century commonly had 
Sappers and Miners accompanying them. If so, these men would 
control the erection of field defenses. If these specially 
trained corpsmen were not in the complement, a handful of 
engineers at least minimally trained could be expected. 
Admirals Rodney and de Grasse both had engineers with their 
fleets.
This did not mean that the crew supervisor was an 
engineer, nor that he knew his business. West African English 
colonial forts were often said to have been built under the 
supervision of untrained engineers, and the result was 
inferior works (Lawrence 1963). The appearance of several of 
the Statian batteries suggests this was an occasional
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circumstance there as well.
Batteries were included in many treatises. Not only were 
these discussed in the fortification manuals, but also in 
those for the artillery. Often their construction was 
undertaken without the assistance of Sappers and Miners, or 
engineers. Artillery officers were therefore encouraged to 
acquaint themselves with the basic principles of building gun 
emplacements.
British forces were often accustomed to leaving this task 
to Royal Engineers. This was discouraged by many experienced 
matrosses, for "certainly none can be so good judges of those 
things as the artillery officers, whose daily practice it is; 
consequently they are the properest people to direct the 
situation and making of batteries on all occasions" (Smith 
1779:22) .
A battery was defined as "any place where cannon or 
mortars are mounted, either to attack the forces of the enemy, 
or batter a fortification..." (Smith 1779:22). As there were 
a variety of purposes for batteries, each developed into a 
specialized affair. At least sixteen types are classified in 
several military dictionaries (Hoyt 1811:361-362; Smith 
1779:22-23; Tousard 1809:1-4). On St. Eustatius, however, this 
assortment was unnecessary.
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Most batteries on the island are forms of "sea-coast" 
variety, which were an adaptation of a siege battery. A 
"proper11 siege battery was of earth, sod, and wood. Parapets 
were suggested that stood up to seven and one-half feet high, 
and eighteen to twenty-four feet thick. Embrasures were 
included for the guns of siege batteries, but coastal 
batteries commonly fired over their lower parapet. Fascines or 
gabion construction was often employed.
Most batteries were three sided, the central wall being 
parallel to the target, and two "cheeks" which "diverge 
equally to the right and left of this vertical plane..." 
(Tousard 18 09:34). Unless the threat of attack from behind was 
expected it was customary to leave the rear open. Wooden or 
stone platforms were included for the gun carriage to rest 
upon.
Remaining batteries on St. Eustatius that approached the 
recommended classic battery might include the Waterfort and 
Fort Rotterdam, though both are of stone. Nearly all are of 
the winged, open backed variety, common to the customary earth 
works. Several Statian batteries utilized brick for gun 
supports, along with stone paved floors. The presence of 
wooden flooring was neither confirmed nor refuted in the 
survey or documents.
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Permanent coastal batteries often tended to be of stone 
rather than earth. Only the former are exhibited by remaining 
Statian sites. This tendency, plus insufficient elevation, was 
among the chief deficiencies in most coastal batteries 
(Tousard 1809:65). Stone and mortar batteries were deplored by 
many fortification experts.
It is almost impossible to perform the service behind 
such breastworks with any kind of security, because one 
single shot, striking into the embrasure, if there are 
any, or the crest of the parapet, will throw a quantity 
of stone into the battery and do more harm than several 
shots (Tousard 1809:65).
For this reason stone walled parapets required additional 
earthen embankments to absorb the shock of projectiles. 
Although erosion has obscured much of the evidence, at least 
two of the island batteries had clear evidence of this 
feature; Tumble Down Dick and Battery Concordia. Others may 
have had this added protection, now missing.
One case is mentioned in the treatises for the 
construction of stone and mortar batteries. It is doubtful 
that the Statian batteries were built as they were for this 
reason though:
For the sake of economy, the battery might be constructed 
without saucissions in the following manner. A small dry 
stone wall about three feet high should be built; then 
the breast-work taluted with good solid sods to its 
proper height... (Tousard 1809:68).
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Few of the batteries on Statia were equipped with 
embrasures. Those that were tended to be Dutch, and pre-dated 
the mid 1700's, with the possible exception of Fort Rotterdam 
whose date is uncertain. The presence or lack of embrasures 
was a function of the height of the parapet, and the type of 
gun used. Mortar batteries for example did not require an 
embrasure regardless of the parapet. Tousard cautioned that 
except "in extraordinary cases embrasures should not be used 
when sea coast carriages may be procured..." (1809:65).
Sea-coast battery parapets were to be as low as necessary 
to permit the chase of the cannon to clear them when trained 
at a zero degree elevation. The elevation of the battery 
itself above sea-level would make up for the low wall. In this 
sense, the vast majority of the Statian batteries conform to 
the model. A great many of their parapets stood less than two 
feet high, which would have put them well below the level of 
the gun. This may have permitted firing at negative angles if 
the carriages were constructed as to allow this.
Island batteries performed two major duties. The first was 
to fend off assailants approaching the island by ship. This 
was the primary function of coastal batteries on any island. 
Most invaders were not so bold as to land directly under a 
battery, so they were seldom required to fire on approaching 
infantry.
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The second use to which they might be put, in which they 
would fight infantry, was as a part of the line of defense for 
a fort. St. Eustatius had no such batteries, with the possible 
exception of Jussac protecting Fort Panga. Other islands did 
construct these batteries though, such as those encountered on 
Martinique by the Marquis de Bouille. In both scenarios the 
battery had to accomplish its task whilst providing security 
for the guns, that they might not be easily dismounted.
The placement of a battery was as important as the 
placement of a fort. The geographical location of a coastal 
battery was chosen in the manner discussed for that of a fort. 
Ideally batteries would be separated only as far as their guns 
could reach. In this manner they could use cross-fire to 
defend one another, and create a difficult opponent. The 
defenses of Oranje Bay were situated so as to allow this. 
Battery Bouille, Fort Oranje, Four-gun Battery, and Fort Royal 
were all in use in the 1780*s, and within each other*s general 
field of coverage.
The same principle applied to having successive batteries 
along the coast. A passing ship should fall under the guns of 
the next battery as soon as it goes beyond the range of the 
last (Tousard 1809:58). The defensive works along the southern 
coast of St. Eustatius, starting with Fort de Windt and ending 
with Tumble Down Dick, provided this kind of protection for
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Oranjestad.
Topographically there were further considerations. Vauban 
stated that a target had to be elevated at least 50 or 60 
yards above a battery (such as a ship) to be secure from 
ricochet shots, the most destructive angle for fire (Vauban 
1691). Later treatises suggested that with the proper distance 
and elevation (about 1,200 yards at 13-14 degrees) ricochets 
could be effective to heights of 100 yards above the firing 
gun (Tousard 1809:5).
Obviously a coastal battery would be, in nearly all cases, 
at the same or a higher level than a ship, allowing the use of 
this type of shot. A greater height was preferable, as that 
would allow the land battery to use ricochets and not the 
ship. A ship's gun could not elevate above a certain limit, 
and still fire a projectile that would bounce in the manner 
sought to destroy the carriages. If they could not return 
ricochets, they could not hope to dismount guns short of a 
direct hit.
The sea-level battery had the same advantages and 
disadvantages as the similarly placed fort (e.g. Vauban 1691; 
Muller 1755). From here it could more easily fire at or below 
the water-line of a ship. It was also more exposed to fire 
from the ship at this elevation. Nonetheless the assets of
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sea-level batteries seldom out-weighed the liabilities.
The elevation above sea-level at which a battery was set 
was normally determined more by the land than the engineer. If 
the luxury of choosing the height was available, tests could 
provide the answer.
To find the most advantageous height for a sea coast 
battery above the sea, it must be observed that the balls 
from this battery should strike the water a two hundred 
yards under an angle of four or five degrees. Let the 
distance from the ship to the battery be the total sine, 
the height of the battery will be the tangent of the 
angle of four or five degrees; it will then be found to 
be fourteen or eighteen yards. Let then the height of our 
sea coast batteries be eighteen yards. If the point blank 
shot misses the ship, our ricochet will have a good 
effect at two hundred yards; whereas their ricochets 
being fired only from two, four, or six yards height, can 
have no effect against the battery (Tousard 1809:59-60).
The optimum distance then was a product of how close ships 
could approach the coast. At 200 yards, 16 to 18 yards high 
was recommended. At 400 yards, the battery could be elevated 
to 24 or 32 yards without losing the advantages of ricochet 
firing. Defenses on Statia tended to be elevated according to 
the natural height of a fortified position rather than the 
ideal placement.
It also had to be remembered that sloping shores below a 
battery could assist the ship gunner. They provided a terrain 
conducive to a ricochet, allowing a ball to bounce uphill to
63
the high batteries. Properly angled topographic features could 
prevent this. The island batteries tended to neglect this 
fact. Some are placed on reasonably safe cliffs, such as 
Nassau, Bouille, Four-gun, Concordia, and St. Louis for 
example. Others, such as Corre Corre and Rotterdam, have 
slopes before them inviting the aim of a shipfs guns. Overall, 
the British and French forts tended to be built on the better 
topographic inclinations. This may be due to professional 
military personnel planning them over the less experienced 
Dutch colonials.
Armament varied greatly in Caribbean batteries. Planners 
advocated large guns with greater range capabilities, plus 
some smaller guns to compliment these (Muller 1780; Hughes 
1969). Tousard suggested each coastal battery be equipped with 
at least two or three 12 pounders. Records and remaining guns 
found in 1990 show that Statian batteries were often armed 
with, at a minimum, Tousard's recommended number of pieces. 
The calibre of the island's guns were less uniform, ranging 
from 6 to 24 pounders. The ammunition on hand should have 
included solid shot for use against the hull, grape to foul 
the rigging and thin the crew, and facilities for hot shot to 
set the ship aflame if possible.
Nearly every inventory taken on the island commented on 
the deplorable condition of many of the forts. This problem
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seems to have been ubiquitous not only in the Caribbean, but 
in other trade colonies as well. An English engineer who 
traveled to Anomabu in 1753 to build a fort, reviewed other 
British forts in the region. He found their "forts are one- 
half tumbling down for want of repairs, and the others not 
worth the name in comparison with the Dutch forts" (John 
Apperley 1753, quoted in Lawrence 1963:93). Although the Dutch 
forts earned his respect in Africa, in the Caribbean they were 
no better than his own country*s.
On St. Eustatius, convincing the Company that money used 
on the upkeep of the forts was well spent was always a 
challenge. This effort was not unique to those dealing with 
the West India Company. The West African Company was just as 
stingy with funding. In 1707 a colonial governor wrote the 
Company to inform them "that your forts are very much out of 
repair, and that there will be no charge to do it but lime and 
the labor of your people..." (quoted in Lawrence 1963:94). 
Nearly identical petitions were sent to the Heren X from 
Statia, offering to supply the labor if they would only send 
supplies.
The forts and batteries of St. Eustatius were a mixed lot. 
Some conformed to the basic specifications set down by 
military theories. Others seemed to have been planned without 
the benefit of defensive experience or knowledge. Armament
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typically stood muster as to type, but was all too frequently 
allowed to deteriorate to the point of uselessness. Supplies 
were commonly scarce. Last of all, the defenses were of little 
use if not manned by properly trained and motivated garrisons, 
as was the case throughout most of the Dutch period.
Chapter 4
Naval Warfare and Island Defense
An island’s existence in the colonial world was 
unseverably linked with the sealanes. Not only were ships the 
only way to conduct commerce, but they were crucial to the 
defense of any island, as well as in offensive maneuvers 
against foreign islands. Without these vessels, no troops 
could be deployed by any country in the Caribbean. George 
Washington said of a navy that "no maritime power near the 
sea-coast can be safe without it" (quoted in Tuchman 1988:46). 
It is impossible to examine island defense without paying 
considerable attention to this realm, for without shipping, 
all islands would be impregnable.
By the 18th century three European countries had come to 
the forefront of naval superiority: Britain, France, and 
Holland (Tuchman 1988:115). It is not coincidental that these 
countries also were dominant in the colonial race, and were in 
constant competition in the Caribbean. The former world naval 
power, Spain, never recovered after the losses in the English 
Channel over a century before, and by this period was of
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little threat on the sea. Her situation was exacerbated by an 
insufficient arms industry, resulting in what ships at sea she 
had mounting outdated guns (Padfield 1973:96).
The development of naval power had taken different courses 
in the three countries. Holland's major emphasis had been on 
shipping suitable to sustain and support trade activity. 
Britain and France had placed more into developing warships 
for protection and assertiveness. Britain especially was 
concerned with maintaining a strong navy, though at times it 
was allowed to fall into disrepair. She herself was an island 
nation, and was dependent upon the "Wooden walls of England" 
for defense against European threats (Tuchman 1988:115).
The strategy employed by the Royal Navy differed 
significantly from their French counterparts in many respects. 
Britain's Royal Navy was often hampered by being led by 
political appointees, not by professional naval officers. 
Ships' crews were usually gang impressed, resulting in the 
navy being full of less than desirable types, with little 
incentive or motivation. Although procurement parties usually 
preyed upon the domain of merchant sailors, a large percentage 
of those impressed had no seamanship skills whatsoever, and 
included scores of drunks, vagrants, and the unskilled 
(Tuchman 1988; Coggins 1969).
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France conversely, chose to officer its navy with 
professionals, though these too were normally recruited solely 
from the upper classes. A naval academy was established for 
the training of officers and the design and construction of 
warships. A corps of 10,000 "cannoniers" were trained to man 
the guns creating formidable opponents for the British Navy 
(Tuchman 1988:116; Padfield 1973:96).
France instituted the "inscription maritime" to man her 
ships with regular seamen. This system proved somewhat more 
efficient than the British version, though often including the 
same classes of sailors. A new fleet was built to counter the 
British buildup, with individual cities donating the funds. 
The ships thusly sponsored were named after the donating city 
(Tuchman 1988) . The largest ship so built was the Ville de 
Paris, with 110 guns.
When preparing an island for defense several factors must 
be taken into consideration, not the least of which is the 
capabilities of an enemy's ships. Although each country had 
minor differences in ship construction methods, this made 
little difference in the long run, for it was commonplace to 
re-man enemy ships and place them into service for the 
captors. After the Seven Years War Britain began to imitate 
French ship design, for it was a well known fact that their 
hulls permited greater speed and maneuverability.
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In first half of the 18th century ships were defined 
according to the "rate" classification. This system of rates, 
in use for several years before, was clarified by British 
Admiral George Anson in an inspection in 1749. At this time 
ships were classed as to their fitness for line duty by their 
armament. The following ranking was then generally agreed upon 
(Coggins 1969; Martin n.d.):
Ships of the Line:
First Rate...... 100 or more guns, usually three gun decks.
Second rate 90-98 guns, usually three gun decks.
Third rate...... 64-80 guns, usually two gun decks. The 74 gun
two deckers would become the most common ship 
of the line.
Cruisers:
Fourth rate.... 50-60 guns, two gun decks.
Frigates:
Fifth rate.... 30-40 guns, usually only one gun deck.
Sixth rate.... 18-24 guns, one gun deck.
Sloops ........8-18 guns, one gun deck.
Although there was still some flexibility in rates, this 
system was used to define a fleet's overall strength and 
capability. Few admirals would venture to engage a rival fleet 
with a superior number of certain rates even though he may
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equal or outgun them with actual armament carried on lower 
rated vessels. There was also continued ambiguity as to the 
definition of certain types of vessels such as a cruiser or 
frigate, and often the function the vessel played to the fleet 
was as important to its rate as its actual armament. By the 
second half of the century a frigate was generally the term 
for a fast ship, often of "cruiser" ranking, whose main 
function was scouting for the fleet and engaging in raiding
activity (Martin n.d.). A "Repeating frigate" was a ship whose 
main function was to relay flag signals and orders up and down 
the line from the commander's vessel. In addition, frigates 
often functioned as messenger ships between stations or fleet 
and shore, and aiding disabled ships during an engagement 
(Coggins 1969:39).
By the start of the American Revolution ships were 
classified more precisely by the number of guns they carried. 
Although the term "ship of the line" would still be employed
to refer to a vessel fit for line service, it was seldom
ranked with a rate. As the number of guns a type of ship 
carried became more uniform, the former rate now turned to the 
actual number. A "74" was a vessel with 74 cannon (excluding 
auxiliary guns). To rate as a "ship of the line" the minimum 
was now a "64". In addition, the ship had to meet certain 
construction requirements (occasionally overlooked) that would 
enable it to both keep up with the main fleet and to withstand
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battering from enemy broadsides.
A warship had several major functions. It was a means of 
defense: a "first wall" in the fortifications of a seafaring 
nation. It acted as a major vehicle for offensive tactics, 
carrying not only its own fire-power, but acting as transports 
for land forces. When disembarking these forces, the troops 
were under the protective guns of ships whenever practical and 
necessary (Anon. 1783).
It also had to be able to bring the largest force possible 
against an enemy, while at the same time achieving this 
without excessive delay. Transport ships bound for the West 
Indies from England could be expected to reach port between 
one and two months after setting sail, provided all went well 
(Duffy 1987) . An unencumbered warship could do better, with an 
average of six knots in fair wind with full sail (Coggins 
1969:132).
Among British ship-builders there was a tradition of 
building ships quite stout, shorter than their French or 
Spanish counterparts, but arming them with an equal number of 
guns. This resulted in a slower moving vessel, but one that 
could equal the enemy in line engagements. The problem of 
speed was later rectified by changes in hull construction, 
copying French designs (Coggins 1969).
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The effectiveness of naval gunnery at this period relied 
more upon shear might than accuracy. In principle it mirrored 
land tactics; the more projectiles in the air at one time, the 
more likely to hit a target. Thus, while even one well aimed 
shot could do more damage to a ship than an entire broadside, 
few gunners were ever able to sufficiently control their 
pieces to the point that a ship could safely venture into 
battle with fewer guns than their opponent.
The H.M.S. Victory, 100 guns (built 1776-7), was the 
largest British warship of the 18th century. It was 22 0 feet 
long, sat 205 feet above water line (including masts) , and had 
a three feet thick hull. It supported four acres of canvas 
sails, enabling it to do ten knots with her crew of 875 
(Tuchman 1987:117-8). Its French counterpart, the Ville de 
Paris, mounted 110 guns. Similar sized vessels were typically 
2 30 long, by 50 feet wide with a 22 foot draft. They were 
normally manned with 850 to 900 sailors.
Typical armament of a British 100 was thirty 32 pounders, 
twenty-eight 24 pounders, thirty 18 or 12 pounders on the 
upper decks, and twelve 12 pounders on the quarter deck and 
forecastle (Coggins 1969:35). After 1779 British ships were 
also armed with around ten carronades. These were short large 
guns which could fire a heavy (68 pound) ball. By 1781 they 
were in service in 492 Royal Navy vessels (Coggins 1969:154).
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Many ships were also equipped with swivel guns. These 
normally fired 1 to 3 pound balls and were mounted on 
bulwarks. Some ships carried Coehorn mortars along with their 
other guns. These could be placed on the "fighting top" (mast 
deck) to lob bombs onto the enemy deck in close action. 
Carronades, swivels, and mortars were not counted among the 
number of a ships guns, though they added considerably to its 
fire-power.
A 74 ship then generally carried an actual 82 carriage 
guns, and a 36 frigate would normally have a total of 44 guns 
(Coggins 1969:35). Also, frequent additions and deletions of 
guns on board by the captain would alter the ship1s actual 
armament while retaining its numerical rating, and the 
switching of calibers for various reasons was not at all 
uncommon.
The most common ship of the line, a 74, carried a crew of 
around 650 in the Royal Navy. By 1783, out of 174 ships of the 
line, 81 were 74's (Coggins 1969:38). Most were armed on two 
decks, typically with twenty-eight 32 pounders, thirty 24 
pounders, and sixteen 9 pounders (Coggins 1969:35). Muller 
proposed these to be increased to twenty-eight 42 pounders, 
twenty-eight 32 pounders, and eighteen 18 pounders (Muller 
1780:60). Heavy timbered construction was also a hallmark of 
the 7 4.
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Next in line to the 74 was the 64. They normally carried 
twenty-six 24 pounders, twenty-six 18 pounders, and twelve 9
pounders. The hull of a 64 was lighter than that of a 74,
giving them the advantage of speed, but a disadvantage in 
broadside engagements. The 64 was virtually abandoned by end 
of 18th century for they could seldom equal the 74 in such 
fights (Coggins 1969:38).
Along with ships of the line a fleet normally contained 
one or more cruiser squadrons. These consisted mainly of 5th 
and 6th rate ships, frigates making up the bulk of those. Most 
British frigates by the Revolution were 32's followed by 28's, , 
441s , and 3 6's in that order (Coggins 1969:39).
An average frigate had 9, 12, or 18 pounders on one deck,
the latter two being most common (Coggins 1969). Carronades or 
lighter guns were often mounted on the quarterdeck to 
supplement their fire-power. Ships below the frigate class 
seldom directly accompanied a battle line fleet. Sloops, 
brigs, brigantines, and schooners normally engaged only in 
auxiliary duties.
As in land operations naval warfare had become formalized. 
It was understood that all participants would follow the 
established methods and rules. Although tactics differed, each 
side knew what to expect and what was expected. Once the
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decision had been made to assemble a fleet and embark it upon 
a campaign, a system of order had to be established. In the 
17th and early 18th centuries this was commonly arranged by 
the commander of the particular expedition, with the 
directives of the Admiralty in mind.
These directives from the Admiralty, over the coarse of the 
18th century, came to be known as the "Fighting Instructions". 
They were issued by the Admiralty to the fleet*s officers 
prior to sailing, and came to be quite formal in specifying 
the pre-determined options for conducting a naval engagement. 
Although originally intended only as general guidelines, they 
often became slavishly followed instructions, whether 
advantageous to a particular situation or not. Only the more 
adventurous captains would follow their own ingenuity, and 
more than one officer used them as his primary excuse for the 
loss of a ship or engagement.
Generally a fleet commander would avoid an engagement, if 
possible, if he felt the opposing fleet had significantly more 
ships than he. Admiral Grivel advised that the "one that has 
the fewest ships must always avoid doubtful engagements..." 
(quoted in Tuchman 1988:117).
The basic battle formation at sea was known as the "line". 
Fighting Instructions etiquette called for parallel lines of
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ships, matching each others maneuvers; van to van, center to 
center, and rear to rear. When on opposite tacks, broadsides 
were difficult, as only one could usually be fired in a pass. 
Therefore, most engagements were fought when the lines were 
running in the same direction (Coggins 1969:132).
A ship of the line had its fire-power concentrated on its 
sides. Little or none at all was in the bow and stern, thus 
necessitating the practice of broadside warfare, and line 
engagements. In addition, the line was the only feasible way 
in which a fleet could all engage the enemy without 
interfering with their fellow ships firing.
As the outcome of an engagement was often a function of 
available fire-power and its appropriate use, control and 
order was essential. The line that could best maintain their 
formation and control their artillery were the most likely to 
emerge victorious, all else being equal.
The attacking battle fleet would form into the line, then 
turn together towards the enemy (bear down) whom by this time 
had also formed into a line. When within a suitable distance, 
the line turned again to form a parallel line to the enemy, 
and broadside exchanges could commence (Coggins 1969:130). 
This maneuver was often poorly executed due to obscured 
signals, and was a most vulnerable point in the attack.
77
In waging line warfare, the main concern of the navy was 
getting into the proper position. Due to wind and wave, this 
was frequently a laborious task. Once there, further 
difficulties could arise in the communication of orders and 
signals, especially in adverse weather, during battle, or at 
night. Signals were normally conveyed by flags hoisted from 
the command ship, each signifying an order detailed in a 
signal book kept by each ship. Repeating ships, usually 
frigates, would hoist the message and run up and down the 
line. Occasionally orders would be communicated by voice from 
ship to ship down the line, but all too often a captain had to 
wait until the ship up-line from his entered into a maneuver 
to determine which had been called for. The result was a 
domino effect movement of the fleet, frequently rendering the 
intended action ineffectual.
In line battle the windward side, or weather gage, was 
normally felt to be the most advantageous for offensive 
maneuvers, and was sought by the attacker. Gaining the weather 
gage allowed greater freedom in movement whilst making the 
enemy struggle to maneuver against the wind. Smoke from guns 
would obscure the fleet to the enemy and make it difficult for 
their ships to see their own commander's signal flags. At the 
same time the wind would clear the windward fleet's decks of 
smoke. It would also tilt the enemy ships enabling shot to hit 
below the water-line. This "hulling” tactic was a favorite of
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the British (Padfield 1973:96).
The windward had adverse effects too. The windward ship 
often had to close its lower gun ports on the enemy's side, 
thereby losing some of their bigger guns, routinely stationed 
on these decks. Water could come through those ports left 
open, hampering the gun crews from easy movement. Aiming the 
gun was made more difficult by the downward tilt, as was the 
reloading process. Recoil, however, was made less strenuous on 
the breeching, as the force was against gravity. Similarly, 
there was less possibility of upending guns than on the lee 
gage.
If damaged, a weather gage ship could easily drift into 
the enemy's fire, unable to defend itself. Having its upper 
deck more exposed, it was also susceptible to heavier 
casualties.
Even with its drawbacks the weather gage was by far the 
most preferred by British captains. It gave them the advantage 
of "choice of time and distance for engaging and...provided 
more opportunities for 'doubling' the enemy's line..." 
(Padfield 1973:96).
On occasion the British tactician would choose the lee 
side. This was normally confined to times of extremely rough
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seas and winds, when the gunports facing the enemy would 
swamped, or when the fleet had superior numbers (Padfield 
1973:96). If the latter were the case, the lee position might 
be chosen to prevent the enemy from breaking off the 
engagement prematurely. To deter breaking off the British 
often tried to implement a melee, whereby some of their ships 
would pass through the enemy line, and form to the rear as 
well as the front (Coggins 1969:130-131).
The lee gage might also be beneficial when the fleet had
fewer vessels. If the outcome looked foreboding, the lee side 
could break off before further damage was sustained. When 
engaging in a "doubtful” foray, Admiral Grivel warns the fleet 
that ”... if [it is] forced to engage, [to] assure itself of 
favorable conditions" (quoted in Tuchman 1988:117). These lee 
gage advantages were well known to the French.
The French fleets often relied on the lee position
(Coggins 1969:128). Here they found it easy to break off the
engagement at will. They could also fire at the enemy when 
bearing down while his guns were unable to return the fire. 
French gunners usually directed their shot into the enemy's 
masts and rigging to impede them from giving chase. The French 
frequently utilized this tactic as they were most often in the 
leeward position, stemming from the British habit of gaining 
the weather gage before entering into an engagement. French
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naval theory could often be summed up in three strategies: 
"circumspection, economy, and defensive war" (Tuchman 
1988:117).
When engaged, ships of the line usually reduced their sail 
to topsail and jibs. This enabled the crew to work the guns 
while giving maneuverability with minimum requirements. In 
single ship to ship or ship to shore actions, sails were 
normally not so reduced, as the single ship could vary coarse 
more often to her better advantage, unlike the fleet line 
(Coggins 1969:132).
Strict adherence to the rules of ship warfare usually led 
to a draw in the battle. Recognized victories were normally a 
factor of breaking one or more of the established principles 
of sea engagements as set down in the Fighting Instructions 
(Coggins 1969:131). Although losses at sea could be defended 
at trial by passages from the Fighting Instructions, by the 
1790*s this was no longer a solid alibi. Philip Broke, a Royal 
Navy gunner, wrote that if an action were lost due to damages 
caused during implementation of a tactical maneuver,
the British commander would have been justly censured for 
losing by his theories a victory which the courage and 
ability of his officers and seamen would have almost 
ensured had they only been boldly led up to an abrupt, 
impetuous attack (1794 quoted in Padfield 1973:132).
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Tactical maneuvers were generally not as likely to give 
victory as "bold” and "impetuous" attacks. If successful, 
these often forced the enemy to break off the engagement or 
surrender. The danger here was, if defeated, the commander had 
no reliable defense for his actions and was likely to be court 
marshalled. It was one of the many risks the ship's captain 
had to take. Without disabling the enemy, no matter how 
brilliant the maneuver, the engagement would likely end in a 
draw.
Ship to shore engagements were substantially different. In 
the defense of an island the first line of fortification was 
the navy. If for some reason this line failed, either from 
defeat in ship to ship action, or from failure to engage at 
all, the island itself had to contend with the enemy ships.
In the case of St. Eustatius the latter situation was the 
rule. Regardless of who held the island, it seldom had 
sufficient ships nearby to fend off an invading fleet. The 
Dutch had too few ships by the 18th century to secure their 
West Indian possessions. When the British fleet arrived off 
the shores in 1781, there were no more than two large Dutch 
warships in the area, hardly a match for the British fleet. 
Similarly, when the French invaded, the British fleet was 
occupied elsewhere, leaving the island to fend for itself.
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In the 17th and 18th centuries there was a widespread 
belief that few shore batteries were capable of fending off a 
naval attack, once a ship had brought its broadside to bear. 
British Royal Engineer Justly Watson, who surveyed the forts 
along the African Coast in 1756, said that "three or four men- 
of-war, of forty guns each, could easily put us off the whole 
Coast” (quoted in Lawrence 1963:93-94).
These beliefs doubtless had an effect upon many such 
encounters, regardless of the reality of the situation. Many 
experts knew better, though. A land battery could build up its 
walls and defenses as much as it chose. It had excellent 
opportunities to erect protected positions for the garrison. 
It provided a stable and sturdy platform for its guns. It 
could mount larger guns, and if larger than the ship, could 
keep it out of firing range of their own position. The ship on 
the other hand had a hull which could not be further 
reinforced. The protection offered the crew was limited. A 
naval gunner had to deal with constant movement in all planes.
In 1809 Louis de Tousard tried to dispel this "prejudice” 
by outlining the capabilities of a properly situated and 
equipped coastal battery. Manned by "officers and soldiers 
with courage, coolness, and animated with the love of their 
country, [the batteries] have nothing to fear from the fire of 
the first rate ships" (Tousard 1809:58). For garrisons such as
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that of Gibraltar or Sebastopol, this was true. Both 
successfully fended off large naval forces with an inferior 
number of guns (Hughes 1969). Each had highly motivated 
gunners, proper fortifications and equipment, and long range 
guns. Unfortunately for the islands, West Indian batteries 
were notoriously lacking in most of these areas.
Some theorists proposed that exposure to fire for a 
seacoast fort was actually far less than for a land fort. 
Ships were in constant movement and could not take prolonged 
and accurate aim against a stationary target. John Muller 
"calculated that a three-decker man-o-war...would have an 
apparent superiority of as much as six guns to one over a land 
battery. Yet the ship had no better than a one-in-three chance 
of hitting the battery..."(Muller 1746, in Browning 1983:69).
The land battery has an immense target to fire upon. A hit 
on any part of the vessel would cause at least some 
debilitation. Tousard calculates a 150 feet long hull to 
present a 2,700 square feet target, "exclusive of sails, 
masts, yards, and cordage" (Tousard 1809:60). The ship 
conversely, has a target confined to the guns of the battery 
itself. Barring the disablement of the gun crew or its 
dismounting, no amount of shots around the piece will be able 
to silence it.
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In the case of small coastal batteries such as Bouille or 
Concordia, even if the walls themselves were the target, there 
was still less than two feet above ground to aim at, not to 
mention the lack of rear walls to facilitate ricochets, a ball 
fired with a small charge from an elevation of 3 to 6 degrees 
(Muller 1780:152). The intent was for the solid shot to skim 
the surface, in the case of shore to ship, so as to hit on or 
near the water line. A similar effect was sought from ship to 
shore so the ball would bounce around within the fort, thereby 
having a greater chance of dismounting a piece. The 
effectiveness of such fire from a ship depended heavily upon 
the locale and situation of the target.
Unlike ships in sea engagements, the battery remains 
stationary whilst the ship is in constant motion. At a speed 
of one knot a ship would travel approximately 100 feet per 
minute. With naval guns having an average maximum training 
angle of 2 0 degrees, the firing range of a broadside would, 
theoretically, be quite limited against a small battery. This 
meant that the ship could generally fire off only one or two 
broadsides per pass at the battery and then have to tack about 
to pass again. Tacking was a time consuming affair, and, if 
within range of the shore batteries, would leave the ship 
quite vulnerable during the process. The shore battery, 
however, would have an opportunity to train its guns and fire 
on the moving ship during all times it was within range.
85
The ship’s gunner had to estimate each shot, unable to use 
the last as a precise indicator of aim due to the vessel1 s 
movement. In addition he had to contend with the rolling of 
the ship "since a single line of it would cause the gunner to 
miss his aim" (Tousard 1809:60). This could also be used to 
his advantage, to gain additional elevation allowing shells to 
be lobbed into an elevated fortification.
If a coastal battery were situated near reefs or shallow 
waters, as was the case for several on St. Eustatius, the 
warship would have to maintain a distance to avoid running 
aground and insure sufficient maneuvering room. This would 
significantly decrease the efficiency of their fire-power, as 
accuracy sharply declined with a corresponding increase in 
distance. Ricochets would also be impeded by the necessity of 
increasing the angle of trajectory on the ships guns.
The ship still had some advantages over land opponents. 
Firing at a moving target, the battery had to constantly 
readjust their training angles, consuming valuable time. 
Almost without exception, a ship prodigiously outgunned a 
battery, especially a ship of the line with a minimum of 32 
guns on a side. An average Caribbean battery was fortunate to 
mount more than a dozen guns. Smaller batteries, such as those 
which ringed Statia, often had fewer than five working guns at 
any one time. If a ship chose to anchor off-shore, their
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superior fire-power would somewhat compensate for their 
increased vulnerability to receiving direct hits. It would 
also allow the ship*s gunners to fire from a relatively 
stationary position, giving better opportunity to actually hit 
the battery1s guns.
Theoretically, a shore battery could mount guns with 
greater ranges than warships. In practice, however, especially 
in the West Indies, this was not true. On St. Eustatius the 
remaining guns suggest batteries were by and large equipped 
with smaller calibers than most ships of the line. In the "Old 
Establishment" the smallest ship of the line, a 64, mounted 
some twenty-six 24 pounders, twenty-six 12 pounders, and 
twelve 9 pounders (Muller 1780:60). The largest gun listed in 
most inventories of Statia is an 18 pounder, but these were by 
far outnumbered by 12 pounders and below. By 1780, many 
British ships may have mounted even larger guns (Muller 1780).
A multiplicity of tests proved the weight of the shot was 
directly proportionate to the amount of damage it could 
produce, especially on thick oaken hulls or stone parapets 
(Muller 1780). A battery on St. Eustatius then would likely be 
outgunned (in caliber) by anything above a 40 gun frigate, and 
outnumbered in artillery, if not calibre, by even the smaller 
armed sloops.
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Ship's gunners were, as a rule, better trained than the 
average West Indian matross. The graduate of the French 
"cannonier" school, or the veteran British gun captain would 
scarce find the "constable, small boy, and black maid" manning 
Fort de Windt in 1780 a formidable opponent, no matter how 
large their guns may have been. The island seldom received 
more than 60 regulars and these of questionable proficiency 
(Hartog 1976) . Last of all was the local militia, more 
concerned with honing their merchant skills than martial ones.
The outcome of ship to shore engagements depended 
principally upon the efficiency of the land battery. Properly 
manned, equipped, and situated, even a small battery could 
fend off a ship of the line. In practice, however, especially 
in the 18th century West Indies, such David and Goliath 
matches commonly ended in the immediate surrender of the 
battery, often without a shot. Whilst Tousard may have felt 
this simply a function of unfounded "prejudice", the 
"constable, boy, and maid" facing a British man-o-war surely 
felt it extremely prudent.
Chapter 5
European Wars in the Caribbean
As with any colony, St. Eustatius* fate was tied up not in 
local occurrences so much as world wide European power 
relations. From the time of first settlement, the island had 
to deal with the effects of distant wars brought to its shores 
regardless of the current domestic situation in the Caribbean. 
Peace was continually disrupted from the 16th century onward.
Following the European discovery of the New World, Spain 
took the leading role. It claimed all territories to the west 
of the Line of the Treaty of Tordesillas, which encompassed 
most everything in the New World. This claim resulted in 
numerous conflicts, as few but the Spanish recognized their 
authority to make such a claim. As other nations moved into 
the new lands, much of these conflicts were carried out 
through piratical and privateering activities. This was 
especially prevalent in the Caribbean where Spanish treasure 
ships sailed for Europe with gold and other valuables stolen 
from the native populations. This in turn was frequently 
purloined by other Europeans to keep it from reaching the
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Spanish Crown. The new supply of wealth enhanced Spanish power 
in Europe, creating fear among her non-allied nations, 
particularly Protestant countries.
The 16th century witnessed numerous conflicts that spread 
into the Caribbean. Between 1521 and 1559 Spain and France 
were continually engaging in privateering. The French were 
especially interested in capturing gold carried in the bi­
annual Spanish flotillas. Sailing in great numbers, the slower 
moving galleons were able to have some protection with the 
accompaniment of armed escorts. Even this could not guarantee 
safety, and more than once Francefs treasury was boosted by 
Spanish gold.
By the 1560's France was supplanted by England as Spain's 
main threat in the Caribbean. They carried on the tradition of 
piratical engagements, as well as stepping up illegal trade 
with Spanish colonies. Among the more famous privateers of 
this period was John Hawkins, with Sir Francis Drake in his 
service. Drake would later make a name for himself in England 
by mastering the art of privateering, and leading his own 
fleets into the Spanish Main. By the late 1560's Sir Francis 
was joined in this profession by Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir 
Anthony Shirley, to name but a few.
Spain's problems intensified in 1568 when the Low
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Countries rebelled and began their struggle for independence. 
The Netherlands then joined into war with Spain and Portugal 
in 1581. Since 1519 they had been under the rule of the 
Spanish King, and now sought sovereignty. A Dutch prince, 
William of Orange, led the revolt and formed the Sea Beggarfs, 
a privateer fleet with which to further harass the Spanish 
(Claypole and Robottom 1980). Spain halted Dutch trade to her 
territories, as well as Portugal's. The increase in 
difficulties for the Dutch trade with Iberia gave them the 
necessary impetus to build up an independent trade to replace 
that which had been lost. Thus the Dutch soon became involved 
in Caribbean affairs through starting up trade with South 
America. Netherlands merchants began to engage in illegal 
trade with Spanish possessions, and tensions began to build 
with the English, with whose business they were now in 
competition. This new relationship soon proved to be quite 
beneficial to both colonists and merchants.
While Spain was dealing with her Dutch affairs, old 
conflicts between England and Spain renewed. Fueled by the new 
rivalry in the Caribbean, the two entered into open war from 
1585 to 1604. This struggle culminated in 1588 when the 
Spanish Armada set sail for England. Spain's fleet, the 
largest the world had yet known, was nearly totally destroyed 
in the ill fated expedition. Although the English navy could 
not claim responsibility, they did claim victory. Spain had
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all but lost clear mastery of the seas. This wounding allowed 
further liberties to be taken in the Caribbean by Spain's 
adversaries in the years to come.
By the start of 17th century, Dutch, French, and English 
ships controlled most of the sea lanes. Spanish colonies began 
to accept foreign trade more willingly, though it was still 
illegal. A common saying of many Spanish colonial officials 
was "Obedezo pero no cumplo" (I obey the law, but I do not 
insist upon it) (Claypole and Robottom 1980:45).
Starting in 1609 Holland and Spain called a truce. Both 
realized the necessity for cooperation to assist the salt 
trade, and agreed to cease open hostilities for the time 
being. Although no longer officially at war, both countries, 
as well as all others in the Caribbean, were engaged in 
ongoing wars with Carib and Arowak natives throughout this 
time.
At the end of the truce, in 1621, the Dutch West India 
Company was formed. Although set up as a commercial 
enterprise, one of the Company's main objectives was to renew 
the fight with Spain in the Indies. The Company even went so 
far as to outfit their own privateer fleet to diminish Spanish 
competition in the Caribbean.
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In 1628 the Company fleet, under Piet Heyn, consisted of 
31 ships mounting over 700 guns (Cochran 1961). They lay in 
wait for the Spanish flotilla, and when off the northern coast 
of Cuba, ascended on the treasure fleet. The prize was the 
capture of the entire flotilla. Fifty percent of the booty 
went to Company stockholders, and the Spanish Crown executed 
the Unfortunate flotillas* admiral (Cochran 1961). From this 
time until 1648, the Dutch succeeded in forcing the Spanish 
out of the sea lanes, save for the continuance of the bi­
annual convoy and occasional brave souls. At the same time 
England and Spain renewed old enmities. England had begun to 
colonize the Caribbean in the 1620*s, in part to prepare for 
another major conflict with Spain.
By 1640 the Dutch were at war with the Portuguese in 
Northern Brazil, a prime resource area for commodities desired 
in Europe. Two years later the English Civil War broke out, 
effectively withdrawing English power from the Caribbean for 
the next few years, and allowing the Spanish a slight reprieve 
from the ongoing privateering. This was further alleviated 
when France made peace with Spain in 1648. In this year Spain 
recognized St. Eustatius, St. Maarten, Saba, Aruba, Curacao, 
and Bonaire as Dutch possessions in the Treaty of Munster, 
which ended the war begun in 1621. This marked the first time 
Spain publicly acknowledged the right of other nations to 
colonize in the Indies.
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Although most European nations were now temporarily at 
peace, England was still embroiled in her own internal 
conflict. In 1649 most of the English West Indian islands 
chose not to side with Commonwealth, but Charles II, now in 
exile. Within two years few of the islands were under control 
of the new government in England. To subdue these Royalist 
colonies, Oliver Cromwell sent Commonwealth forces in 1651. In 
the process twelve Dutch ships were confiscated at Barbados, 
angering many Netherlanders and turning sympathy to the 
colonists who had succumbed to Cromwell*s forces. In the 
agreement signed, the "Barbados Charter", articles allowed the 
colonists control over their own financial affairs, though 
Parliament had to approve their decisions. This would soon 
prove to be a rare occurrence, especially when dealing with 
trade with surrounding colonies, including the affronted Dutch 
merchants. Then, in 1651, the Commonwealth Parliament passed 
the Navigation Act which controlled free trade. This was seen 
as in direct conflict to the Barbados Charter by many 
islanders, and only served to fortify sentiment against the 
English government by all involved.
After the implementation of the Navigation Act, England 
knew it must have the actual power to enforce its will. They 
began to build up their navy, but no sooner had this begun 
than war broke out. The Dutch felt the Navigation Act to be 
unfair and harmful to their economic well-being, not to
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mention the capture of their property in English ports 
throughout the Caribbean. Thus began the First Dutch War 
(1652-1654).
The majority of the war touched the Caribbean only in a 
secondary manner. Most battles were fought in the European 
theatre, but that did not preclude privateering raids in the 
islands. Damage and suffering in the Indies was caused not so 
much through cannon and musket as by the severing of free 
shipping. Islands that depended upon Dutch merchants for 
supplies and transportation of their own produce now had to 
fend for themselves. Those hit hardest were the English 
colonists, but with the official declaration of war with 
Holland, the Royalists began to give their support to the 
Commonwealth (Claypole and Robottom 1980). These hardships 
would continue for the islanders until the signing of the 
Treaty of Westminster.
Weakened from the war with England, in 1654 the Portuguese 
were able to force the Dutch out of the last of their holdings 
in Brazil. England also implemented her "Western Design" 
whereby Spain's recognition would be sought for her Caribbean 
colonies. This was to be accomplished through might rather 
than diplomacy, and soon English ships began attacking Spanish 
colonies in the Caribbean.
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Among the prizes won was the island of Jamaica. This was 
immediately fortified for use as a base for further 
operations. From here, starting in 1657, the English recruited 
buccaneers to help harass Spanish shipping. By 1660 the naval 
build-up began in 1651 had added some 200 ships to the English 
fleet. They were now in a prime position to impose their will 
through naval power over the country that had once sent an 
Armada towards her own shores. More importantly for her own 
coffers was the possibility of superceding Holland in the 
lucrative Caribbean trade. By the 1660*s that country had 
become a major supplier of all colonial nations in the Indies.
In 1660 Charles II was restored to the throne and England 
passed another Navigation Act. This was followed by the 
Staples Act of 1662. The first act required certain goods to 
be exported only to England or English colonies. The second 
required foreign goods to pass through English ports before 
going elsewhere, so a duty could be collected. This was 
extremely damaging to the Dutch trade, and was a burden to 
those with whom they conducted business. In addition, the 
"Company of Royal Adventures Trading into Africa" was 
established to break Holland's slave trade (Claypole and 
Robottom 1980).
These acts soon renewed hostilities between the English 
and Dutch, including privateer raids such as on St. Eustatius
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in 1663 by the English pirate Robert Holmes. As acquisition of 
territory was not an objective in this conflict, most raids 
were simple sackings and lootings, the perpetrators then 
leaving their victims to rebuild their lives until the next 
parley.
By the middle of the decade this hostility led the Dutch 
and English into the Second Dutch War (1665-1667) in which 
France allied with Holland. Privateering raids increased in 
the Caribbean and St. Eustatius was only one of several ports 
to feel its affects. In retaliation to Dutch attacks on 
shipping and English ports, in July 1665, English buccaneers 
under Colonel Edward Morgan united briefly to sack the Dutch 
Lesser Antilles. They had planned to pillage Curacao, but 
after destroying St. Eustatius and Saba began to fight amongst 
themselves, sparing the third target. This type of behavior 
was widespread among the pirate fraternity. Fortunately for 
the Caribbean colonies, pirate bands from differing nations 
seldom succeeded in working together as a single entity, 
thereby reducing their overall potential threat. Even those 
from the same homeland often found it difficult to remain 
united for any extended period.
Upon the entry in 1666 of France into the war, the pirate 
bands were quickly driven from the sea by the French fleet. 
Buccaneers defending St. Kitts sailed off in the midst of
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battle in order to plunder Spanish settlements, retaining 
little or no loyalty to any cause but their own private lusts 
(Claypole and Robottom 1980) . Many of the islands fared little 
better with the French in their waters, and suffered pillaging 
from ships flying King Louis* colours as well.
The debacle off St. Kitts convinced the English that 
utilizing pirates was unpredictable, and so they sent the 
Royal Navy and troops to the Caribbean in 1667. With less 
opportunistic champions, England was able to retake several of 
the islands she had lost in the past two years. Later that 
year peace was restored with the Treaty of Breda. All colonies 
were returned to their pre-war owners, save for Tobago and 
Surinam, which were traded to the Netherlands by England in 
exchange for New York. The treaty also ended Dutch trade 
supremacy in the Caribbean, at least for the time being.
England soon won another victory in her colonial 
enterprises. In 1670 Spain recognized England’s right to 
charter Caribbean colonies. Sixteen years after embarking on 
the "Western Design", the task was accomplished. In return 
England agreed to cancel all "Letters of Marque" effectively 
putting and end to "legal" pirate activity in the Caribbean 
sea. Also in that year France sent a fleet to drive Dutch 
traders from her colonies in the West Indies. This was 
accomplished to some degree but only amidst the strong
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protests of her own colonies and the Netherlands. Illegal 
trade continued nonetheless.
The efforts of France to oust Holland from her colonies 
lead Europe into yet another Dutch War, the third of that 
century between England and Holland. From 1672 to 1683 war 
raged between four countries who had formed new alliances with 
former adversaries. This time France and England were pitted 
against the Netherlands and Spain. France was soon on her own 
when England dropped out of the fighting in 1673, about the 
same time that Spain began to assist Holland.
Even though England was no longer actively involved, the 
Dutch were forced to recall their entire fleet from the 
Caribbean back to European waters in 1674. The Netherlands and 
France continued the war until 1678, when Holland capitulated 
and agreed to pull out of (officially anyway) French ports. In 
the treaty most captured islands were returned, St. Eustatius 
included. The failure of the Dutch navy was also mirrored in 
her mercantile ranks: the Dutch West India Company went into 
bankruptcy. Not to be ruined by this, Dutch merchants 
registered their ships in Denmark and Brandenburg, both 
neutral countries, or smuggled goods to continue their 
commerce (Claypole and Robottom 1980).
France, however, had not finished with their wars.
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Fighting continued with Spain after the Dutch surrender. In 
1679 the French fleet began new attacks on Spanish colonies, 
with 11 ships, plus the aide of "f libustiers" (French 
pirates). After several more years Spain and France called a 
truce in 1683. France had in the meantime, successfully looted 
numerous Spanish colonies.
Although the wars had officially ended in 1683, and even 
earlier than that by nearly a decade for some of the involved 
nations, pirates continued to haunt the waters of the West 
Indies. Disregarding whether they carried Letters of Marque or 
not, the pirates sustained their patterns of pillaging and 
theft on any and all ships unlucky enough to become their 
quarry. To put an end to this menace England sent a fleet to 
the Caribbean once again in 1685. They met with mixed success, 
but did diminish the threat of piracy on the high seas.
Back in Europe the winds of war were stirring once again. 
Louis XIV of France besieged Phillipsburg in the fall of 1688, 
starting the Nine Years War (1688-1697) also called King 
William's War and the War of the League of Augsburg. The 
Netherlands took advantage of the chaos and seized territories 
along the lower Rhine. Not to be left out William of Orange, 
King of England, ordered his fleet to attack the French. Spain 
then entered the foray and allied with England and the 
Netherlands against France. Before long the conflict spilt
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into the Caribbean once again, and troops soon were invading 
foreign islands, including Statia. The war accomplished 
little, and drug on until its end in 1697 with the Treaty of 
Ryswick. At the close of 17th century England and France were 
firmly colonized in the Caribbean, Spain's colonies were 
considerably weakened, and Dutch power had been crippled.
International relations fared no better during the 18th 
century. During the period from 1702 to 1814 no less than 
seven wars were waged in the Caribbean area. Most of these had 
their beginning in European affairs, and as the wars of the 
previous century, quickly advanced into the West Indies. There 
were numerous reasons for the continual disagreements in 
Europe and of these a great many were based on grievances 
concerning the New World. Amongst these disputes were the 
competition between England and France for the South American 
trade, export rights and the expansion of markets (including 
the Caribbean trade), and the control of North America 
(Claypole and Robottom 1980). Added to this were old rivalries 
within Europe itself, as well as other parts of the globe such 
as Africa and India, where Europeans were carving out their 
empires.
The wars of the 18th century in the Caribbean differed 
somewhat from those of Continental Europe and North America. 
Traditional battle was difficult in the West Indies. Land
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engagements were generally impractical as few islands were 
large enough to allow two or more armies to maneuver in the 
accustomed manner of warfare. Most campaigns were therefore 
based on beach landings and assaults of fortified positions. 
It was very rare that ground forces were able to fight in 
regular lines of battle on open fields.
Another factor in the West Indian campaigns was the 
available troops commanders had to work with. Due to the 
limitations of support and transportation, most armies were 
small by European standards. Seldom were there sufficient 
troops engaged to claim decisive victories. Most land battles 
were merely a part of an overall campaign tied to naval 
forces. Proper battles could not be conducted hopping from 
small island to small island, and therefore most Caribbean 
wars were primarily fought at sea.
Troops that were stationed in the West Indies were quite 
expensive to maintain, and added to the dilemma. Supplies had 
to be shipped, inflating the costs. Disease ran rampant among 
the soldiers, being the number one cause of mortality. Morale 
of the troops was always amongst the lowest in the services, 
with some regiments in England absolutely refusing to board 
ships once they learned they were to be sent to the West 
Indies (Duffy 1987). All this resulted in a strategy of 
raiding enemy territory rather than extended occupations.
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Although this often had the desired military effect, it was 
not always so. "These Englishmen are mad; they march through 
a country and think they have conquered it" (Marquis de 
Lafayette, quoted in Martin 1830).
Just one year into the new century another general 
European war broke out. Carlos II, King of Spain, had been in 
poor health for some time. Upon his death the throne of Spain 
would go to one of several candidates, any of whom would 
create a powerful alliance with another country, causing all 
involved to fear the possible consequences. Louis XIV of 
France was both a son and husband of Spanish princesses, as 
was Leopold I, Emperor of Austria. Had either one received 
Spain, war would certainly break out with the other European 
nations.
An agreement was reached between Louis, Leopold, and 
William III in which the throne would go to Leopold's 
grandson, but he suddenly died in 1699. In an effort to avoid 
war, negotiations were renewed, and Archduke Charles, 
Leopold's second son was chosen as the new heir. Carlos then 
passed away in 1700, but named his successor as Philip, Duke 
of Angou, grandson of Louis, rather than Archduke Charles. 
Louis XIV accepted the throne for Philip V.
Soon after Louis sent troops into the Spanish occupied
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Netherlands to stop English trade there, and acknowledged the 
son of the exiled James II as King of England upon James1 
death in 1701. These actions soon brought together England, 
Austria, and the Netherlands into the "Grand Alliance" to 
counter the new threat. The following year William III died 
leaving Queen Anne, daughter of James II, as monarch (Plumb et 
al. 1978).
The actions of France and Spain brought England officially 
into the war in 1702. The French, already in the Netherlands, 
were also fighting in the Rhineland and Italy. The war 
escalated in 1703 upon the entrance of Bavaria and Cologne on 
the side of France, and Savoy and Portugal with the Grand 
Alliance. The Duke of Marlborough lead the army against France 
and her allies, but employed a unique strategy. Rather than 
conduct siege warfare, the standard up to his time, he sought 
out the enemy to engage them in field, and thereby 
accomplished the same effect of isolating their 
fortifications. His techniques would have a long term effect 
on warfare for the remainder of the century.
Although the vast majority of the war was fought on 
European soil and waters, both sides sent fleets and troops to 
the Caribbean. The French were based at Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, whilst the British were quartered in Jamaica and 
Antigua. One large sea engagement was fought in the Caribbean,
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but little else took place militarily. Privateering, however, 
was another matter.
As neither alliance could really afford large scale 
operation in the Caribbean, both issued Letters of Marque to 
allow patriots and opportunists to fight for their countries. 
The colonies were quite aggressive, raiding one another's 
islands to destroy the competition. They were much less 
concerned with the throne of Spain than the sugar plantations 
on neighboring islands cutting into their own profits. As the 
acquisition of these plantations would only harm their economy 
by increasing the supply, their strategy mirrored that of 
Marlborough: attack and destroy. All sides engaged in this 
activity of raiding and destruction in the West Indies. Among 
the casualties was St. Eustatius, raided in 1703, 17 09, and 
1713.
Peace finally came with the Treaty of Utrecht signed on 
April 13, 1713. Britain gained tremendous trade privileges and 
territory from France and Spain. This had been their greatest 
international victory since Cromwell's wars, and would not be 
equalled until the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 (Plumb 
et al. 1978).
Peace, though strained, would prevail from this time until 
1739. During these years British smuggling activity greatly
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increased in the Caribbean. The Dutch and French also stepped 
up illegal commerce, but to a lesser degree than the English 
for the time being. Spain recruited her own privateers 
(guarda-costas) to check this growing illicit menace and soon 
the situation would again escalate.
Spain's guarda-costas were succeeding in their mission. 
Numerous English ships were captured, most guilty of 
smuggling, some only accused. On October 19th, 1739, Britain 
proclaimed a state of war with Spain. The declaration cited 
among the grievances "that for several years unjust seizures 
and depredations" had been committed against their vessels. 
These actions often involved "great cruelties" and that "the 
British colours had been most ignominiously insulted" (Southey 
1968) . The situation was in direct violation of the treaties 
of 1667 and 1670, and that the seizure of English holdings in 
"Spanish dominions...[was] contrary to the express 
stipulations of the treaties between the two crowns" (Southey 
1968:273). Thus began the "War for Jenkin's Ear". The British 
fleet was sent into the Caribbean but little was decisively 
accomplished. By 1744 the war was ended.
In the meantime war had resumed in Europe. Ghosts from the 
Spanish War of Succession were recalled when the question of 
the heir to the Austrian throne was asked. Frederick II of 
Prussia decided to add Silesia province to his holdings when
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the new Empress of Austria, Maria Theresa, took the throne 
that he desired to claim (Plumb et al. 1978) . War quickly
ensued and soon engulfed most of Europe yet again. The War of 
Austrian Succession (1740-1748) would put Britain with 
Austria, and France with Prussia and Spain, which was already 
at war with England in the Caribbean.
The British had already sent troops to the West Indies but 
due to their new commitments in Europe, they recalled most of 
their military by 1745. That same year an uprising in Scotland 
was launched for "Bonnie Prince Charlie", under French 
encouragement. In addition, the British were involved with 
French-Canadian campaigns, which meant some front had to be 
neglected, and the Caribbean was it.
Fighting did not, however, cease in the islands. As in the 
war at the beginning of the century, privateers on all sides 
once again took Letters of Marque and plied their trade. 
English and French planters hoped to devastate one another's 
sugar plantations to keep the prices up in Europe, exactly as 
they had done some forty years earlier. Once again territory 
acquisition would not be to their benefit.
The war came to an end in 1748. The Treaty of Aix-La- 
Chapelle, while ceasing hostilities, ignored Spain and 
Britain's argument which had began in 1739. Several Caribbean
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islands were declared neutral, and two colonies were traded. 
Britain did gain some slave trading rights but the Spanish 
question went, by and large, unresolved. As a consequence 
smuggling and illegal trade in the Caribbean continued much as 
before.
With scarcely enough time to recover, Europe went back to 
war in 1756. France and England were quarrelling over their 
colonies and trade relations once again, as was the 
predominant pattern throughout the century.
Hostilities began at a small French outpost along the Ohio 
River in North America. A British force, under Virginia 
Colonel George Washington, failed in an attack on Fort 
Duquesne in 1754. England then sent troops under General 
Edward Braddock and they too were defeated. France reinforced 
their Canadian defenses, and the British sent a fleet to 
attempt to stop this.
Knowing war was imminent Britain persuaded Prussia and 
Russia to ally with them. France likewise joined with Austria, 
Prussia's enemy, and secured Holland's word of neutrality. 
Fighting in earnest began in May of 1756 with the French 
attack on Minorica. This was quickly followed by France 
sending fleets to capture several British colonies. In 1758 
the British captured Goree in West Africa, effectively
108
severing the slave supply to the West Indies (Plumb et al. 
1978).
The war entered the Caribbean in 1759 when the British 
sent a fleet and troops. This time the West Indian military 
policy was to capture the islands rather than simply sack 
them, in addition, unlike many previous campaigns, sufficient 
numbers were sent to secure the islands for they were a 
crucial link to the North American colonies. The following 
year Britain succeeded in pushing France out of India securing 
yet another portion of the globe for her empire.
The unresolved Spanish grievances with Britain pulled them 
into the war in 1761 allied to France. Regardless, Britain's 
string of victories continued with the capture of all but one 
of the French islands in the Indies, along with several 
Spanish possessions. Not able to continue, France and her 
allies capitulated in 1763. The resulting treaty, the "Peace 
of Paris" granted Britain some of her largest concessions ever 
won from an enemy. King George II returned some of the 
Caribbean islands in exchange for North American possessions, 
keeping several neutral and French islands in the Caribbean 
for Britain. He also received Florida from Spain, to whom he 
returned Havana. Trade relationships were also set down for 
areas in Central America, Africa, and India.
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The wars of the first half of the 18th century caused 
great hardships for the colonies in the Caribbean. Trade was 
often disrupted, supplies were scarce at times, and 
transportation of their produce was difficult, all effecting 
their economies. Even with all the wars and resulting 
treaties, little really had changed in the West Indies. The 
only real change was that Britain's world wide power had grown 
tremendously.
Although Britain had gained numerous trading advantages 
from the Seven Years War, the costs of that venture, plus an 
unquenched desire for continued trade and economic expansion, 
led to another series of tax laws. From 17 67 into the 1770's 
Britain passed a series of acts which created tension between 
her and her colonies. The laws imposed new taxes and sought to 
gain tighter control of the colonial economy. The islands of 
St. Kitts and Nevis had their own version of the Boston Tea 
Party when they burned stamped paper in the streets in protest 
of the Stamp Act. The same political maneuvers that fueled the 
unrest in the American colonies were at work in the Caribbean, 
leading to the British West Indies sympathizing with the 
American colonies. This attitude prevailed until outright war 
erupted, when most islanders realigned with Britain (Claypole 
and Robottom 1980) . This was mostly out of a need for British 
protection of trade goods and secure markets. It did not mean 
that illicit trade with the American colonies would cease.
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Some unscrupulous English merchants even supplied military 
stores used by the rebel forces (Rodney 1789).
The American problem came to a head in April of 1775 when 
colonial militia and British regulars skirmished at Lexington, 
Massachusetts, beginning a war that was to last until 1783. 
From the start, the Caribbean, and especially St. Eustatius, 
played a vital role as a supply base for the rebel colonies.
As with the previous conflicts the war soon spread to 
encompass most of the major European nations, either directly 
or indirectly. In 1778 France and Spain allied with the 
American colonies. On April 28, 1780 the Spanish sent a convoy 
of 10,000 troops and 11 ships of the line from Cadiz to the 
West Indies. There they joined with France's force under de 
Guichen off Guadeloupe on June 9. Unfortunately for the new 
coalition, most of Spanish force was disabled with disease and 
useless. Not only hampered by this, the Spanish Admiral 
refused to engage in combined actions with the allies, and 
eventually returned to Cuba.
Compounding matters in the Caribbean, on the 2 0th of 
December, 1780 Britain declared war on the Netherlands due to 
their role in the American war (4th Dutch War, 1780-1784) . 
That year several European nations, led by Russia, signed an 
"Armed neutrality" pact, whereby they would fight British
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ships that attempted to search them for illegal goods destined 
for America. Not only supporting fronts in America, Britain 
had to spread her forces between there, Canada, the West 
Indies, and India. Finding his troops needed bolstering, 
George III called on several German states to supply regiments 
involving even more of Europe.
In the Caribbean, American privateers attacked British 
islands from Dutch, Danish, and French bases. Realizing the 
importance of the Caribbean connection, Britain sent Admiral 
Sir George Bridges Rodney to the West Indies immediately after 
the declaration of war with Holland. Rodney's naval noose was 
quite successful, and the fleet took several Dutch 
possessions, including St. Eustatius on February 3, 1781. The 
strangulation of the Indies supply route was too late, 
however, for by October of that year the war would, in 
essence, end in North America.
After the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown the 
Caribbean theater escalated, with both French and Spanish 
fleets in the area. Beginning in 1781 the French began 
evicting British garrisons from captured islands. St. 
Eustatius was so purged on November 25. The French retook many 
Dutch islands, as well as occupying some British islands. Led 
by the Marquis de Bouille, a force of 8,000 besieged the 
"Gibraltar of the West Indies", Brimstone Hill, on St. Kitts,
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which fell within a month.
On their way to St. Kitts, several French warships stopped 
in Oranje Bay. The French field artillery was on board "the 
Caton and Lion Brittanique (a transport taken from the 
English), ...which anchored at St. Eustatius" (Gossencourt
n.d., in Shea 1971:95). On February 12, 1782 other French
transports anchored in the road at Statia and on the 13th 
sailed on for Nevis to resupply the troops beginning their 
siege of Brimstone Hill (Gossencourt n.d., in Shea 1971:103).
One account of the campaign may have been written by 
Admiral de Grasse himself (according to the 1827 editors of 
the anonymous publication). The unknown officer's rendition 
tells of the initial landing consisting of the infantry. The 
assault quickly followed, and "by night Brimstone Hill was 
invested. The artillery was landed next day; and mortar 
batteries soon established; but when a breach was to be made 
the first battery of 24 of the Caton was taken for the 
service" (Anonymous 1783, in Shea 1971:166). The French 
officer called this "the most difficult [siege] in America" 
(Anonymous 1783, in Shea 1971:166).
Although British land forces were defeated on numerous 
islands, the naval forces fared considerably better. After a 
series of small engagements, the Battle of the Saints took
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place. The British fleet scattered the French and Spanish, 
effectively stopping further attacks in the Caribbean until 
the signing of the peace treaty in 1783.
The siege at Yorktown may have effectively ended the 
American Revolution, but formal peace was not entered into 
until 1783. That year the Treaty of Versailles was signed and 
American independence recognized. In the European war, most 
islands captured in the West Indies were returned to their
pre-war owners, and the French gained the right to trade in
Swedish ports (Plumb et al. 1978) .
Following the loss of their colonies, Britain made it
illegal for her remaining subjects to trade with North 
America. This prohibition caused great difficulty to British 
Caribbean colonies: they lost both a major export market and 
supplier at the same stroke. As before, illegal trade quickly 
began to fill the warehouses on both sides. The Royal Navy was 
sent to check the continued smuggling soon after the treaty 
had been finalized. Eventually enforcement let up and by 1794, 
American ships were allowed in British West Indies ports.
During the American rebellion France had financed a great 
deal of the war costs. This, combined with other economic and 
political hardships, led to a revolution in France in 1789. In 
an age old tradition, other European nations were soon
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involved. Austria and Prussia declared their support to Louis 
XVI. Jacobean elements then executed Louis XVI and Marie 
Antoinette. In 1793 Revolutionary France declared war with 
Spain and Britain (Plumb et al. 1978).
Prior to this France had been having difficulties in the 
Caribbean with slave revolts, and emancipated their slaves on 
St. Dominique in 1793 (Claypole and Robottom 1980). After the 
declaration of war, British troops were sent to St. Dominique 
from Jamaica, whilst Spanish troops invaded the French side of 
the island. French planters considered them allies against the 
Jacobin French and the black army. Several islands then became 
entangled in slave revolts and wars with ex-slaves, not to 
mention the European conflict now encompassing them again.
Napoleon then rose to power with the rejection of 
Jacobean rule. He soon defeated the Austrian and Prussian 
forces, bringing them into alliance with France. By 1795 Spain 
made peace with France, and Britain lost their assistance in 
the Caribbean. Nevertheless Britain succeeded in taking all of 
the important French sugar islands, except St. Dominique and 
Guadeloupe.
France then decided to escalate the conflict by invading 
the Netherlands. This caused the Dutch to give their West 
Indian colonies to Britain rather than surrender them to
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France. French troops also moved into the Rhineland, and 
northern Italy.
The black army on St. Dominique defeated both French and 
British troops by 1798, and went on to fight the "coloureds”, 
blacks that were not ex-slaves, massacring over 10,000 of them 
(Claypole and Robottom 1980). This same year France invaded 
Egypt, but Horatio Nelson defeated the French fleet in the 
battle of the Nile. Napoleon escaped the British forces in 
Egypt and declared himself First Consul in France in 1799.
After his return, Napoleon wished to restore the slave 
system to St. Dominique. An imminent invasion of French troops 
was expected in the Caribbean, causing most islands to refit 
their defenses. St.Eustatius, under the British commander 
Richard Blunt, also revamped their batteries at this time. 
Before the expected invasion occurred however, the Peace of 
Amiens was negotiated, ceasing open hostilities in 1802. St. 
Eustatius reverted to Dutch control.
The Peace of Amiens was destined to be short lived. In 
1803 the French invaded the Caribbean to gain a base from 
which to enlarge their holdings in the area, as well as in 
North America. Louisiana had already been taken from Spain, 
and France wished to obtain more. St. Dominique was retaken, 
and the black army dispersed (Claypole and Robottom 1980).
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A general European war erupted again and Britain allied 
with Austria and Russia against France. France invaded Prussia 
and annexed Spain and Italy. Except for Britain, all succumbed 
to Napoleon*s strong and well seasoned army. The French navy 
did not share in the victories, however, as they were severely 
crippled at Trafalgar. By 1810 St. Eustatius was again under 
British control.
British blockades of neutral nations brought the United 
States into the conflict in 1812 (Plumb et al. 1978). Prussia, 
Russia, and Austria then allied with Britain, whilst uprisings 
occurred in Germany, Italy, and Spain, against Napoleonic 
occupation. In 1813 combined European armies defeated 
Napoleon, and entered Paris by 1814. The Treaty of Paris was 
signed and Napoleon exiled. Britain gained numerous 
territories, including holdings in the Caribbean.
The wars had not yet ended though. Napoleon escaped from 
exile on Elba and resurrected his army. A combined force of 
British, Dutch, and other allies defeated Napoleon for the 
final time at Waterloo in 1815. By 1816 Statia, along with 
other captured territories, was returned to the Netherlands. 
From that time on the island's security was not significantly 
threatened.
Chapter 6
Warfare in the Caribbean
Warfare in the Caribbean required certain alterations to 
the conventional style practiced in Europe. Large land masses 
were virtually non-existent, and traditional army movements 
were impractical. The only tactical maneuvers that could be 
retained intact were those of the navy, with the exception of 
occasional actions against islands that were not commonplace 
in European waters.
War in the West Indies had to be fought either entirely at 
sea, or by smaller armies hopping from island to island. The 
size of the land masses, and the reliance on wind patterns, 
required strategic sacrifices. Island taking campaigns, as a 
rule, " had to be fought from windward to leeward in the age 
of sail..." (Duffy 1987:64). It was for this reason, and not 
military planning, that the campaigns of 1793/4 started with 
the windward islands. Commanders of expeditions in the 
Caribbean would describe warfare there "as a matter of tides, 
currents, and winds, and these determined the order of. . . 
objectives" once a general strategy had been chosen (Duffy
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1987:219).
Whilst having necessary limitations on the size of an 
invasion force one could carry, it was some comfort to know 
that the small islands seldom had sizable garrisons to fend 
off the larger forces that were landed from ships. Normally it 
was not difficult to outnumber the opponent in such cases. 
These maneuvers, though, were entirely dependent "on a good 
understanding between the sea and land services" (Admiral 
Harvey, 1796/7 campaign, quoted in Duffy 1987:274).
This cooperation between the army and navy was essential 
in island warfare, for without it, no land troops could move. 
The distance between friendly ports or the homeland was often 
inconvenient. Several campaigns had to wait on transports and 
supplies from overseas, but this is common to all wars,
anywhere. The separation of islands from the occupier's mother 
country gave attackers some advantages, though. The same
elements prevented the defenders from rapidly receiving
reinforcements and supplies. This factor often kept St.
Eustatius low on ammunition, powder, and soldiers in time of 
need.
These impediments required fleets to carry sufficient 
artillery trains and plentiful provisions. Re-supply was not 
always possible for an extended period of time, and often a
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campaign's outcome depended upon who was better able to wait 
it out (Duffy 1987).
Not only distances and geography had an effect on campaign 
planning. Although weather is an important element in all 
warfare strategy, in the West Indies it took on added burdens. 
Campaigns had to be adjusted to avoid the rainy and hurricane 
seasons. Poor weather, or disease brought on by the damp 
conditions, could quickly decimate an army in the islands.
Winds and currents strictly controlled the movements of a 
seaborne expedition. Gales often blew portions of a landing 
force off course, weakening the available troop supply as they 
fought the elements to get back into position. One example of 
such an occurrence was in the British invasion of Surinam. A 
full one-fourth of the troops meant to land at the Surinam 
River were delayed for four days, being blown off-course 
(Duffy 1987:315).
Storms and rough seas were always a hazard. Landing craft 
overturned drowning troops, whilst others were often dashed 
against the shore, disabling soldiers before ever having seen 
an enemy, such as the French experienced at Jenkin's Bay. 
Seasickness caused by rough seas on land troops lessened their 
effectiveness. The hazards of amphibious assaults were many, 
and frequent.
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Weather and positioning also had a hand in the evacuation 
of troops from islands where they had no reasonable hope of 
successfully defending themselves. No available transport 
ships could easily doom a garrison. Poor weather could prevent 
their escape altogether, even if ships were available. It was 
for this reason Cornwallis' troops were trapped at Yorktown.
Once an island had been targeted for assault, other 
considerations had to reckoned with. As with any amphibious 
assault "in West Indian operations, the first concern was to 
find a safe anchorage for the fleet" (Duffy 1987:90). The sea 
floor at the landing site was quite important.
Reefs and shallows often kept ships from getting within 
firing range to lend support to troops in long boats. This 
enabled coastal batteries the opportunity to shell the 
approaching enemy, virtually helpless until reaching shore.
Once the ships had found secure anchorage, small craft, 
either longboats or small sail crafts, had to be brought 
alongside for the troops. A suitable approach for landing then 
had to be located. Coral reefs could crush the long boats, as 
happened at Jenkin's Bay. Mud bogged down the disembarking 
soldiers, as happened to the British landing on the Orinoco. 
The best landing site was a gentle sandy beach.
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Multiple landings were often planned to "disperse and 
distract the defenders" (Bouille, in Duffy 1987). This tactic 
was employed by Bouille both at St. Eustatius in 1781, and in 
his attack on Martinique in the 1793/4 campaign. The 1796/7 
campaign had an assault on Trinidad that utilized a one and 
one-half mile long beach-head at three points to divide and 
confuse the defenders (Duffy 1987).
If it were a large island, troops would commonly go along 
the coasts taking sea batteries from the rear, as most were 
open backed as were those on Statia. At the same time another 
force would besiege the central fortifications (Duffy 1987). 
Once again, this tactic was used by the French both at St. 
Eustatius and Martinique.
If necessary, before or during the invasion, local guides 
were sought and detailed information about the fortifications 
was gathered by the use of spies and reconnaissance missions. 
The approach to a town was always carefully considered before 
setting out. Most of the larger islands had the approach 
covered by successive batteries, as was suggested in several 
manuals of fortification theory (Muller 1755). A good example 
of such a defense is seen at Fort Royal on Martinique (Duffy 
1987:68).
Landings could be either day or night. Normally a night
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landing was chosen when surprise was to be a main factor in 
the assault. It was this tactic that won St. Eustatius for the 
French in 1781. If a day landing was chosen, it was preferable 
to go in under the guns of the navy. Hopefully these would be 
able to silence or at least cripple any coastal batteries in 
range of the landing site.
Batteries were generally placed at all beaches where 
landings would be feasible. Many batteries in the Caribbean 
were poorly manned and armed, as Bouille found at Martinique 
in the 1793/4 campaign (Bouille's papers cited in Duffy 
1987:68) . Records indicate this was also generally the case of 
the batteries on St. Eustatius. Several guns mounted in 
Martinique batteries had been salvaged from a sunken warship 
and had not been fired in years (Bouille, in Duffy 1987).
The coastal battery ideally had both solid and grape or 
canister shot in their magazine: the solid to fire at the
ship, the grape and canister for the disembarking troops.
The ship's guns often took the place of the conventional land 
forces use of a "battering train". Although expeditions 
normally carried land artillery, these were often not able to 
be engaged until after the infantry had secured the beachhead. 
Local conditions determined their ability to be landed at all.
On occasion the invading troops were able to leave their
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own artillery on board, and turn captured guns on the 
defenders. The French found this to be the case at Brimstone 
Hill. The English had left eight 24 pounders, two 13 inch 
mortars, 1,500 shells, and 6,000 cannon balls on St. Kitts 
that had been left below Brimstone for lack of help from the 
islanders in hauling them up to the fort (James 1926:327) . The 
French trained the captured mortars against the British fleet 
in the bay, forcing the ships to leave and abandon the 
besieged troops there. With that the British garrison lost the 
support of an estimated 22 war ships (Anonymous 1783:170).
Most islands and principle towns had some sort of fort. If 
this could not be immediately taken, siegecraft was employed 
until the fort surrendered or the invaders were repelled. It 
was by this method that the British finally lost the great 
fortress on St. Kitts after a month's siege.
As large numbers of infantry were seldom practical to 
transport and deploy, more reliance had to be given to the use 
of small, preferably elite, forces utilizing the element of 
surprise. Cavalry was almost always impractical to deploy, 
either from the size or topography of the islands, or from the 
difficulties involved in transporting and landing equestrian 
units.
In island warfare, traditional tactics had to be altered.
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British General Grey in the 1793/4 campaign on Martinique:
ordered the troops always to form in line two deep, and 
to march in file since the roads would be so narrow. . . 
[He also] stressed the efficacy of attacking with the 
bayonet, particularly in view of the character of their 
opposition, (blacks, mulattoes, and few regulars). In his 
'Further Orders' he explained why only bayonets should be 
used in night attacks: it concealed the position and
numbers of the attackers from their enemy, who usually 
fired at where-ever they saw or heard fire and 
consequently ended by firing on each other and falling 
easy prey (cited in Duffy 1987:65).
General Grey customarily attacked the most difficult 
objectives first. In the 1795/6 campaign, General Abercromby 
tried to take the easy ones first, and only then go on to the 
more difficult. Not having the reliable elite forces Grey had, 
he felt this tactic more prudent. He later changed this tactic 
and went for the stronger objectives first (1796/7 campaigns). 
That way his troops were still fresh and at their strongest: 
he had learned the effects of the Indies on European soldiers.
The nature of island campaigns, especially on small 
islands such as St Eustatius, meant supplies often ran short. 
Fresh water was frequently difficult to obtain, especially for 
large bodies of men. Drinking from ponds and rivers inflated 
the already high sickness rate. European troops often had 
great difficulty adjusting to the West Indian climate.
Morale was almost always low in the Caribbean campaigns
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(Buckley 1979). There was a high desertion rate among the 
soldiers due to poor conditions and isolation. Problems 
getting supplies on time only exacerbated the dilemma. For 
these reasons the European West India troops often had a low 
level of motivation. General Abercromby wrote to Dundas that 
the "Officers commanding working parties will in a particular 
manner attend to their duty and not allow the men either to be 
idle or slovenly" (May 22, 1796, in Duffy 1987:232).
Plundering was also an ongoing problem. At the Port of 
Spain assault, troops stopped to drink a cache of new rum they 
found in a plantation house near the beach, and were too drunk 
to be of any further use. Another group of fusiliers abandoned 
their mission of capturing smaller fortifications during an 
assault to pillage the town they passed through (Duffy 
1987:281). This was especially a problem with non-regular 
troops and local recruits. As looting was felt to deteriorate 
the discipline of an army, it could be punishable with summary 
execution. Looting, however, was differentiated from the 
"capture" of enemy goods as Rodney had done on St. Eustatius 
in a previous war.
The lessons of the first half of the 18 th century 
eventually caused military planners to revamp their Caribbean 
policies. Troops were dying of disease in astronomical 
proportions in the West Indies and were becoming more and more
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difficult to replace from Europe. Beginning in 1795 changes 
were sought that would alleviate the problems.
To curb the disease rate, the British began to furnish the 
island troops with prefabricated barracks and hospitals. This 
helped to keep them out of unhealthy billets they commonly 
encountered in island towns. More attention was paid to the 
placement of the barracks, with higher ground being preferred. 
It was also found to be beneficial to distance the barracks 
from towns, to slow the spread of illnesses.
Another lesson learned concerned the way in which battles 
were best fought in the islands. As many British commanders 
had discovered in the American wars, the rules were often 
different in the New World than on the Continent. It was found 
to be much more effective to utilize the natural protection 
that vegetation and topography offered in the islands, 
particularly when engagements were between unequal forces. 
Guerilla warfare was common in the islands, particularly when 
dealing with slave insurrections, or native born West Indian 
troops.
European regiments had become quite decimated from losses 
to disease and the drain of manpower to the Napoleonic wars. 
Therefore, in 1795, the British began large scale recruitment 
of black West Indian troops (Buckley 1979). These men were
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felt to be better suited to the climate and as having immunity 
to many of the diseases there. It was said that "negro troops 
were better adapted to the requirements of fighting in the 
mountainous interiors" of the islands. They were "nimbler, 
lighter-dressed and equipped, and could sustain hardship 
longer than European line infantry" (Duffy 1987:363).
After several years of service, British commander Dundas 
wrote to Trigge that this had in fact been the case. He stated 
that black soldiers "are undoubtedly better calculated for 
those duties which are so apt to impair the health of European 
troops when engaged in active service in the West Indies" 
(October 1801, quoted in Duffy 1987:365).
The government in England found this solution to be quite 
beneficial. It was less expensive to raise local troops than 
to transport European troops to the area. Soldiers from the 
home country also had to be replaced every two years, but the 
West Indian regiments did not (Duffy 1987:363). In addition, 
every black soldier recruited in the Caribbean meant one more 
white soldier could be sent to aide in the wars against 
Napoleon raging elsewhere.
Many colonial administrators, however, were opposed to the 
raising of black troops. Most were recruited from slave 
segments of the population, for that element was where most
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blacks in the islands resided (Buckley 1979). Fear of future 
slave uprisings was prevalent among the colonists, and few 
wished their slaves to receive military training.
It also worked to break down the existing economic and 
social systems. The labor pool was endangered, for later ort 
slaves enlisting in an army regiment were granted freedom. 
Former slaves becoming British Army regulars could also 
dramatically change their social status, and undermine the 
established hierarchy in the island culture.
For these reasons, most island colonies only allowed 
temporary units to be raised when the system was first 
introduced. They were to stay upon their home island, and not 
be sent on campaigns elsewhere. This resistance was held up 
until 1797, when regular units were firmly established by the 
home government that were above the authority of the colonial 
administrator.
To implement their plan of raising black army troops, the 
British government began by purchasing slaves from plantations 
(Buckley 1979; Duffy 1987). One problem they encountered when 
acquiring recruits in this manner was the quality of men they 
received. Planters would only sell their worst slaves to the 
military. This led to an inferior force at first, but that 
would be overcome somewhat with the implementation of
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emancipation offers, as well as new procurement strategies.
General Abercromby set a policy of buying recruits 
directly from slavers. This method did take longer to get the 
men into fighting order. Normally they had to be taught 
English and be somewhat allowed to mentally and physically 
adjust to their new environment. The result, however, was well 
worth the effort, for better quality troops were attained in 
the long run. The government soon became the single largest 
purchaser of slaves in the British West Indies.
Whilst black regiments were in use, they were still vastly 
outnumbered by European troops. In an effort to conserve the 
regiments commanders felt to be more valuable in the event of 
a battle with Napoleonic forces, differential stationing and 
deployment was utilized for the regiments. Commanders were 
often ordered to use the West Indian troops whenever possible, 
to preserve the white regiments as reserves for the European 
theater. Often these troops were sent to the Caribbean during 
the "healthy season" and withdrew when the season changed.
White and black troops were found to have different 
disease resistances and climate necessities. These 
requirements turned out to be beneficial for both were 
healthiest where the other was least healthy. Blacks retained 
their health in the lower, warmer areas, whereas the Europeans
130
thrived in the higher, cooler regions of the islands. This 
compatibility led to a strategic segregation of the troops. 
The system worked fairly well, for the mortality rates of all 
troops dropped, although by 1803 the white disease and 
mortality rate was still two times that of black soldiers 
(Duffy 1987:365). Black troops though, continued to suffer 
from high rates of foot injury and disease. Generally they 
wore no shoes, thought to be an advantage for light infantry 
in the islands.
By 1797 the use of West Indian regiments resulted in a 
black constituency in the region of nearly one-third of the 
total regulars in Caribbean garrisons (Duffy 1987:362). The 
presence of black troops also meant one-third of the white 
West Indian army could be re-routed to fight Napoleon in 
Europe. Like the British, the French also greatly increased 
their available manpower by using blacks from the islands.
The end of the 1790's wars saw no less than nine West 
Indian regiments in the British army. They comprised some 
4,400 men in the Windward and Leeward islands at that time 
(Duffy 1987:365). The use of British black West Indian troops 
would peak in 1807, with some 8,000 regulars (Duffy 1987:367).
Chapter 7
The Military History of St. Eustatius
The island of St. Eustatius endured numerous invasions, 
raids, sackings, and naval blockades. From the time the island 
first became of any note, it was a pawn in the economic and 
political power struggles of colonial Europeans. Between 1636 
and 1816, this tiny rock in the Caribbean sea "changed hands 
no less than twenty-two times" (Hartog 1976:23).
The first military activity took place on St. Eustatius 
with its initial European occupation. A French squadron landed 
on the island in 1629 to seek a safe haven from an anticipated 
Spanish attack. They quickly prepared a fort from which to 
defend themselves, but the attack evidently never came. Soon 
after, the French enterprise was abandoned, as was the island, 
until the first permanent colonist were to arrive in 163 6.
After achieving success as a producer and, more 
importantly, a shipper of goods the island became a target for 
pirates, privateers, and armies. As early as 1627 a Royal 
Patent declared St. Eustatius to be property of England
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(Attema 1976), though this was not considered valid by any 
save the English themselves. Accordingly, English privateers 
and pirates felt justified in relieving the inhabitants of 
their goods. The first recorded incident was the sacking of 
the island in 1663 by the English pirate Robert Holmes and his 
crew. They were content with those goods presently at hand, 
and left soon after.
The events leading up to the hostilities had caused the 
islanders to reasonably arm themselves, although the generally 
peaceful early years of the colony may have led to a false 
sense of security. This was compounded by the arrival of a 
Dutch fleet under Admiral De Ruyter on May 14, 1665. This
presence eased the worries of the islanders, for word had 
already arrived that the Netherlands was at war with England. 
Three days after the fleet arrived, a hurricane arose and 
forced it to retreat to Bermuda. With this departure, the 
island now lay open, defended only by Fort Oranje.
Another English privateer to sack the island did not 
follow Holmes' pattern. Edward Morgan, along with a 
conglomeration of privateers and pirates, invaded the island 
on the 23rd of July, 1665. As England and the Netherlands were 
now embroiled in the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Morgan carried a 
Letter of Marque from the English crown and was given the rank 
of Colonel, making this a legal military action.
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A year later France joined in the war and the island 
underwent another change of owners. In November 1666, the 
Dutch attempted to retake Statia from the occupying English 
privateers. Their efforts proved fruitless for on the 17th of 
that month "through trickery French forces moved in and drove 
the Dutch away" (Kandle 1985:33). The island was secured from 
Morgan's men with little difficulty (Attema 1976). The French 
subsequently thoroughly sacked the island. They would remain 
in possession of St. Eustatius until mid 1668 when it was 
returned to the Dutch.
The start of the Third Dutch War meant yet another 
invasion. In 1672 the English from the Leeward islands retook 
Statia (Goslinga 1971). Shortly, on June 8, 1673 the Dutch 
returned and burned the fort because the Statians had sided 
with the English during the 1672 attack (Attema 1976). When 
they left, the English resumed control and held it until 1679 
when the Netherlands regained it by treaty.
Following the Third Dutch War the island remained under 
control of the Netherlands for nearly ten years. This ended 
when the French took over on the 6th of April 1689. France and 
England were once again at war, and as Holland was allied with 
the latter, they were attacked by the former. French troops 
landed and encamped below Signal Hill (Attema 1976). The
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following morning they plundered their quarry and took 
control. Although they had thoroughly destroyed the town, they 
preserved the Fort which they occupied (Hartog 197 6) .
A little more than a year later, on the 28th of July 1690, 
a joint English and Dutch force retook the island. The English 
kept control of it until 1697 when they returned it under 
articles of the Treaty of Ryswick.
Several wars took place amongst Europeans during the 18th 
century which were profoundly felt in the Caribbean. 
Miraculously, St. Eustatius would remain in Dutch hands for 
over three quarters of that century, regardless of the wars 
being fought in the seas around her.
That did not mean, however, that the island was left 
unmolested. The wars being fought at this time were not those 
of conquering territory and occupations. They were wars fought 
mainly at sea or in Europe. Eighteenth century land warfare 
was difficult to "properly" conduct on small islands. The 
result was a series of raids by privateers with Letters of 
Marque to make their activities technically legal.
The Spanish War of Succession pitted France and Holland 
against each other once again, France being allied with Spain, 
and Holland with Britain and Austria. Between 17 02 and 1713,
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Statia was attacked on no less than three separate occasions 
by French filibusters. The first came in 1703. After the 
island had sufficiently recovered, a second attack came in 
1709. On November 25th the filibusters landed at Tumble Down
Dick Bay (Attema 1976:24). There was a battery there by this
time but, though apparently less than ten years old, it was 
already deteriorated to the point of being out of service. The 
invaders marched overland and briefly occupied Ft. Oranje. The 
Fort commander was said to be "tranquilly smoking his pipe"
upon their arrival (Hartog 1976:33).
The French supposedly wanted to fire off a cannon in 
celebration of their easy victory, but none were in shape to 
be fired (Hartog 1976). The island was sacked one more time 
during this war, in 1713, by French pirates under Jean Jaques 
Cassard. Cassard took control of the island, but his brief 
reign lasted only from the 24th to the 27th of January 1713 
(Hartog 1976:170).
After the peace of the Treaty of Utrecht, St. Eustatius 
was allowed a period of rest. Their next military concern came 
with the tension that would erupt into the War of Austrian 
Succession. A few years before this, in 1737, Commander Isaac 
Faesch and the leaders of the colony instituted a new tax in 
order to repair the defenses. The Heren sent some 30,000 
bricks from Holland for that project (Attema 1976). Among the
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projects planned was a restoration of Tumble Down Dick 
Battery, but Faesch was unable to renovate it as he had hoped. 
Fortunately for the islanders, this war did not result in the 
same intense raiding the last had. Though economically 
effected, they were not invaded, as the Netherlands did not 
officially enter the war.
At the close of the War of Austrian Succession, Statian 
citizens and merchants felt it would be in their best interest 
to refortify the island. Accordingly/ starting in 1748, they 
voluntarily raised funds for the construction of improved 
defenses (Attema 1976). Several new batteries were laid out, 
including the New Fort II, or Hollandia, and the first Nassau, 
which would become Fort Royal, high above the bay.
A few years later, in the mid-1750's, another major war 
was anticipated. The new Statian commander, Jan de Windt, set 
about improving the island's defenses once again. In addition 
to repairing the existing batteries, he constructed Fort de 
Windt, from pre-existing "entrenchments" on Back-Off Bay, 
facing St. Kitts. With the outbreak of the Seven Years War in 
1756, these fortification projects continued with intensified 
apprehensions, and the main fort was renovated as well.
Throughout this conflict Dutch traders prospered, as they 
had found there was great profit in supplying stores to
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warring nations. Statia served as a military supply center for 
the French during the Seven Years War and, as the Dutch had an 
insufficient navy, the French navy offered to protect it 
(Hartog 1976). Thus they incurred the wrath of the British, 
and a naval battle ensued, but once again, the island escaped 
without suffering a land attack.
In the years that followed, the major military concern of 
the island was confined to smuggling activity. This would 
quickly change with a declaration of independence by Britain's 
North American colonies. When independence was asserted in 
177 6, St. Eustatius was already deeply involved in supplying 
the colonies with goods, contrary to both British and Dutch 
law. Preparations for a conflict had begun in the colonies as 
early as 1774, with fighting breaking out the following year.
Due to the smuggling, Sir Joseph Yorke, ambassador to the 
Netherlands, informed the Dutch that "English warships were 
ordered henceforth to show 'more vigilance and less reserve' 
in their attentions to St. Eustatius" (Tuchman 1988:9). Making 
matters even worse was a century old treaty between Britain 
and Holland (Plumb et al. 1978). George III went so far as to 
request troops from Holland to assist in the rebellion, but he 
was refused.
In January of 1776 George III wrote: "every intelligence
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confirms that principally St. Eustatius, but also all the 
other islands are to furnish the Americans with gunpowder this 
winter" (Tuchman 1988:10). The King was correct. Ships 
regularly docked at ports or unloaded in secluded rivers in 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania carrying cargoes of 
powder from 1,000 to 4,000 pounds each, and at least one ship 
transported as much as 49,000 pounds (Tuchman 1988:20).
Although naval patrols were increased the flow could not 
be stopped. The same month the King wrote his concerns, 
British warships pursued merchant vessels into Oranje Bay and, 
in the words of the current governor Abraham Heyliger, enacted 
"irregularities so flagrant that they must be considered as a 
total violation of all the laws of all civilized nations" 
(Schulte 1982:38).
Then, on the 16th of November 1776, Fort Oranje fired a 
return salute to an armed ship in the bay, the Andrew Doria, 
which was flying the new American flag. This act, no matter 
what the intent, was considered "a flagrant insult to His 
Majesty's colours" by the British Ministry (quoted in Tuchman 
1988:16). This would have serious repercussions in the years 
to come.
The island was, by this time, under the governorship of 
Johannes de Graaff, having been in charge only nine weeks at
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the time of the salute. Himself a merchant, he did nothing to 
suppress the illicit trade, against orders from his superiors 
in Holland. In fact de Graaff appears to have been quite 
sympathetic to the Americans. Statia*s warehouses were "opened 
without reserve to all American vessels" stated British 
Captain Colpoys in St. Kitts (Clark 1976 VII:500). At the same 
time an American agent on Statia, Abraham Van Bibber, wrote:
I am on the best terms with H.E. the Governour. . .Our Flag 
flys current every day in the road...The Governour is 
daily expressing the greatest desire and intention to 
protect a trade with us here (November 19, 1776, quoted 
in Tuchman 1988:13-14).
Following the lead of their governor the majority of 
Statians welcomed the Americans, doubly so realizing the 
potential profits to be made in supplying the rebellion. The 
Captain of the Andrew Doria, Isaiah Robinson, was, as Van 
Bibber put it, "most graciously received by his Honour [the 
Governour] and all ranks of people...Tories sneak and shrink 
before the Americans here" (quoted in Tuchman 1988:16).
Yet another incident pushed Britain and the Netherlands 
closer to open conflict. A British merchant ship, the May, was 
captured off St. Eustatius by an American ship, the Baltimore 
Hero. It was claimed by some that the capture had taken place 
within the range of Statia*s artillery. The Baltimore Hero was 
afterwards allowed to anchor in the Road of Oranje Bay, and
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both acts irritated the British. The Governor of St. Kitts, 
Craister Greathead, vehemently protested but was ignored by de 
Graaff. De Graaff did deny to his own superiors in Holland 
that the capture was within range of his guns. A related 
earlier incident further fueled the fire, when the guns of the 
Fort prevented a British ship from seizing an American 
merchant offshore (Tuchman 1988).
Throughout the War for American Independence, St.
Eustatius continued its illegal trade in arms, ammunition, and 
naval stores to the rebellious colonies. In an attempt to 
avoid notice, powder was often transported in barrels marked 
as non-illegal goods such as tea, rice, molasses, etc. The
trade was quite profitable, as shown by a 120% profit margin 
on the sale of gunpowder in 1776 (Hartog 1976) . It is no 
surprise that Statian merchants were unwilling to give up the
trade. Smuggling of arms and powder, "...manufactured in
Sweden, in the Southern Netherlands (present day Belgium), and 
in West Friesland and Zeeland (The Netherlands)..." continued 
in prodigious volume, being shipped to St. Eustatius out of 
Ostend and Amsterdam (Hartog 1976:66).
This led to an increase in British seizures of merchant 
ships, and because of it, Dutch anger. Ever since the 1774 
British law against the transport of military goods to the 
colonies, the Royal Navy had continually been seizing their
141
ships, building tensions to near the breaking point.
The point finally came to a head on the 20th of December 
1780. Rather than being dismissed as the British had 
requested, de Graaff was allowed to return to St. Eustatius 
and resume his governorship. Britain could tolerate no more of 
this kind of treatment, and declared war on Holland, starting 
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.
Although privateering raids had been taking place for some 
time between the colonies in the West Indies, especially since 
the entrance of France into the war in 1778, no major military 
actions had touched Statia. Upon the declaration of war, this 
relative safety would abruptly end when Admiral Sir George 
Brydges Rodney sailed into the Caribbean with the British 
Royal Navy.
Admiral Rodney was ordered by the Lords of the Admiralty 
to "attack and subdue Dutch possessions in the Caribbean" 
(Rodney 1789:v). The King instructed Rodney, suggesting that
The Islands which present themselves as the first Objects 
of Attack are St. Eustatius and St. Martin's, neither of 
which it is supposed are capable of making any 
considerable Resistance against such a Land and Sea Force 
as you and the General can send against them, if the 
attack be suddenly made, and carried on with that Vigour 
and Intrepidity which your high Characters leave no Room 
to doubt will be exerted upon such an occasion (Rodney 
1789:6).
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St. Eustatius accordingly was chosen as his first target. 
He well knew that "In peace St. Eustatius had prospered; in 
war it grew fat on the proceeds of contraband trade" (Rodney 
1789:v-vi). Rodney sent Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood's 
squadron of seven ships to encircle the island and prevent any 
vessels in the bay from escaping.
The unsuspecting island had not yet even learned of its 
entrance into the war. British intelligence reported that the 
"Dutch governour was ignorant that his country was at war and 
the island was unprepared for defence" (Rodney 1789:vi). To 
supplement what meager defenses they did have, there were two 
Dutch warships in the vicinity. The first, a 64 gun ship of 
the line with 418 men, was commanded by Rear Admiral Willem 
Crull. It had left with a convoy shortly before Hood's 
squadron arrived. The second, a 38 gun frigate, the Mars, had 
250 or so sailors under Frederik Sigismund graaf van Bylandt, 
and lay anchored, unprepared for action, in the bay. Upon the 
approach of Hood's squadron, the Mars prudently surrendered. 
It was allowed to fire a broadside for the sake of honour, but 
was not able to fire any guns in the defense of the island. 
Hood was congratulated by his superior for he had "most 
effectively performed the service" (Rodney 1789:8).
On Saturday, the 3rd of February 1781, the remainder of 
Rodney's fleet arrived off St. Eustatius, anchoring around 3
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p.m. The British fleet consisted of fourteen to sixteen ships 
of the line, three to five frigates, three galleons, and 
upwards of 120 smaller support vessels (Rodney 1789; Spinney 
1969; Hartog 1976; Attema 1976). In addition, they carried at 
least three full regiments of foot, marines, and assorted 
soldiers, numbering about 3,000 men.
The island on the other hand reportedly had sixty regular 
garrison troops stationed there, along with some all but 
useless civilian militia units. Rodney's intelligence reports 
correctly informed him that there were no more than 100 
regulars, but also that there were some 2,000 American sailors 
on the island. In addition there were 82 mounted artillery 
pieces reported by Rodney on Statia at his arrival: Hood's 
largest ship alone, the Barfleur, carried 90 guns, not to 
mention the over 300 guns on his squadrons' other warships. 
With the arrival of the fleet, Statia's artillery had less of 
a chance than the Spartans of Leonidas at Thermopylae.
Admiral Rodney had several other advantages as well. The 
first and foremost was he was sailing into Dutch waters before 
most islands had learnt of their entrance into the war. 
Secondly, with his sizeable fleet, he would encounter little 
resistance from the meagerly defended islands. The British had 
by this time some twenty or more ships of the line in the 
Caribbean alone, whereas the Netherlands could only boast some
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eleven of comparable size in their entire fleet (Tuchman 
1988). The French fleet, Rodney's only real rival, was not 
within striking distance.
Upon the arrival of the main fleet, the Men-o-War ships 
were stationed offshore at each of the islands small batteries 
(Rodney 1789) . The positions were out-manned by as much as 3 00 
to 1, and severely out-gunned. The fleet deployed "in a line 
from Gallows Bay, south of the Orange Bay, to the Diamond Rock 
on the north side of this bay" (Hartog 1976:85). The land 
troops were prepared for disembarkation. Admiral Rodney and 
General Vaughan, knowing their upperhand, "in order to save 
the Effusion of human Blood, thought it necessary to send the 
Dutch Governour [a] Summons...", via Lieutenant-Colonel James 
Cockburn and another officer, with "...which he instantly 
complied" (letter by Rodney February 4, 1781, in Rodney
1789:8). Within a few days, seeing the predicament their 
sister island was in, Saba and St. Maarten sent word they 
would surrender as well.
The American sailors on Statia had offered to help defend 
the island, but the Governor felt it more wise to surrender. 
The British troops "secured" most of them, though in a letter 
dated the 10th of February "still a considerable Number remain 
lurking on the Mountains. Hunger will soon compel them to 
surrender at Discretion" (Rodney 1789:13). Rodney also
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immediately manned the Mars with British sailors, which was 
armed with 18 pounder naval guns, and renamed it the Prince 
Edward. This frigate may be the one fired upon by the 
Gibraltar and the Prince William, the only shots fired by the 
fleet during the invasion. Both captains were later arrested 
for firing without orders (Spinney 1969). In addition, the 
British refitted five other armed vessels captured in the 
roadstead, each having from 14 to 26 guns (Rodney 1789) .
Not wanting anything to escape his trap, Rodney quickly 
dispatched a squadron to pursue the convoy under Admiral 
Crull. The fast British warships soon overtook the slower 
merchants, and a battle ensued. In the cannonade, Admiral 
Crull was inadvertently killed, an event the British Admiral 
regretted. Eighteenth century warfare etiquette frowned upon 
the slaying of the Upper Ranks. Rodney also allowed the Dutch 
flag to remain flying over the Fort, and was rewarded by this 
deception with the capture of another 150 ships. Among this 
number were 50 armed American merchant vessels that 
unknowingly sailed into his grasp.
Upon landing, Rodney found just what he had expected and 
hoped for: warehouses packed full of stores. He wrote back to 
England that "All the Magazines and Storehouses are filled, 
and even the Beach covered with Tobacco and Sugar..." (Rodney 
1789:9). The magazines he found to be "filled with Provisions,
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Naval and other Store, intended for the use of his Majesty's 
Enemies and Rebel Subjects..." (Rodney 1789:29). Other letters 
he sent indicated that the stores included numerous weapons, 
gunpowder, ammunition, and naval stores of all kinds, some of 
which his fleet was in great need of a short time before, when 
he had been told by Statian merchants there were none of these 
on the island.
Rodney's furor at the suppliers of the rebels was 
compounded by the fact that a good many were Britons from 
nearby St. Kitts. Rodney felt he had done a great service to 
his country by stopping the island's trade: "I am fully
convinced our possessing St. Eustatius will be the Means of 
cutting off entirely the Enemy from Supplies in this Part of 
the World (Rodney 1789:28). He went on to state Statia's 
warehouses had "...been more detrimental to England than all 
the forces of her enemies, and alone had contributed to the 
continuance of the American war" (quoted in Tuchman 1988:96). 
Fortunately for the colonies, no sooner had Rodney closed this 
port than other British islands unscrupulously began to make 
deals to supply their American purchasers.
Activities such as this led Rodney to hold little 
compassion for the Statians, British subjects or not. He 
justified his treatment by believing that "This Island has 
long been an Asylum for Men guilty of every Crime and a
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Recepticle for the Outcast of every Nation" (Rodney 1789:29). 
In fact, it was the British on the island he probably detested 
the most: "English merchants, base enough from lucrative
motives to support the enemies of Great Britain, will for 
their treason justly merit their own ruin..." and that "they 
deserve scourging and they shall be scourged" (quoted in 
Tuchman 1988:105). All the stores were closed up, and "a 
military man was posted in the capital at every fifteen paces" 
(Hartog 1976:94). He also allowed his men to dismantle "many 
new houses...in order to build barracks for the soldiers" 
(Attema 1976:40).
Rodney knew the value of the island would eventually bring 
the French. He set out to properly fortify it, and wrote on 
the 24 th of March 1781 that "The Fortifications for its 
Protection, are almost complete" (1789:47). By the 8th of 
April the task was finished, as he stated "I shall leave it in 
a very few days to the Care of General Vaughan and its 
Garrison (it is now fortified) and shall join the Fleet off 
Martinique" (Rodney 1789:64). The British commanders believed 
they had now sufficiently refortified the island, and left as 
its garrison two regiments of foot, the 13th and the 15th, as 
well as at least parts of the 35th and 90th regiments. These 
men and their new defenses were felt sufficient to safe-guard 
against any attack the French might mount. In an act of hubris 
that would come back to haunt them, they deemed Statia the
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"newest of the British Gibraltars", not unlike similarly fated 
Brimstone Hill on nearby St. Kitts.
The expected arrival of the French fleet was borne out. 
They were first sighted by the British on April 28, 1781 with 
a reported twenty ships of the line (Rodney 1789). Admiral de 
Grasse, aboard his flagship the Ville de Paris, was 
accompanied by land troops numbering in the thousands. This 
began a series of naval engagements and island assaults which 
would keep the British navy busy in the West Indies, and 
hinder relief to British forces trapped in Yorktown, Virginia.
On the 4th of May, the Russel arrived at St. Eustatius and 
reported to Admiral Rodney on board the Sandwich. They 
informed him of the details known about the approaching French 
fleet. Soon after he set out to join his fleet with Hoods, 
whom he met between Antigua and St. Kitts.
The French fleet then sailed on to Yorktown, leaving 
Rodney's fleet in the Indies. There they engaged Graves' fleet 
to assist the siege of Cornwallis' army. Following his 
surrender on October 19, the French fleet sailed back to the 
Indies on November the 4th, 1781.
Admiral de Grasse was under orders to continue the war in 
the Indies by attacking whatever British targets he could,
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especially those weakened by the passing of the hurricanes 
that season. Believing Jamaica would be the first objective, 
the British focused their attention there, foolishly thinking 
St. Eustatius to be sufficiently fortified and garrisoned to 
defend itself without the navy. This assumption was quickly 
proven false, and it was in fact the island which was chosen 
as the first target for the French forces.
On the 15th of November, the French expedition readied for 
the upcoming assault on St. Eustatius. Eight ships were loaded 
with nearly 1200 men, under the command of the Chevalier de 
Girardin. The squadron then sailed with utmost secrecy to the 
British occupied island. Their intended quarry was to be taken 
by surprise, especially knowing that the British claimed it 
was now so well defended. In order to convince the enemy that 
they were preparing to assault a larger island, "a number of 
pilots from the harbour of St. Pierre" were taken on board in 
public view to supply the British informants with misleading 
information (Connecticut Gazette 1782). This would give the 
impression that the squadron was planning to meet the main 
French fleet due to arrive in these waters soon. After sunset 
on the 25th of November, at approximately 9 p.m. , the squadron 
anchored off of St. Eustatius.
The following account of the French invasion is one of the 
most complete to be found. It was first printed in the
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Martinique Gazette on December 6, 1781. This rendition is from 
a reprint of the Connecticut Gazette on January 25, 1782:
The sloops, with each a frigate's long-boats attending, 
anchored with much difficulty at the mouth of Jenkin's 
Bay, situated to the N.W. of the island, whilst the 
frigates lay too at a little distance. Count Dillon, who 
was on board the Diligent, with the chasseurs of his 
regiment, landed the first. The surf running high, the 
boats were dashed against the rocks, and some soldiers 
were drowned. Our intrepid General, with a part of the 
Irish brigade, made good his landing after some time, 
with great risque and danger; his own boat was overset, 
but every person on board was saved. A safer landing 
place was afterwards discovered, where part of the troops 
disembarked with great difficulty. Those first landed 
took possession of the heights, after climbing up a rock 
of between 700 and 800 feet, almost perpendicular height, 
the only way by which they could penetrate the island; 
this was overcome by our troops, Mons. de Bouille 
himself, with great eagerness and intrepidity, setting 
the example. An hour before day only 400 were landed, and 
we had no expectation of effecting the landing any more, 
most of the boats having been dashed to pieces.
Our only resource was now in victory, and we had to 
attack an enemy greatly superior in numbers. Nothing 
could discourage M. de Bouille, he instantly took his 
measures, and marched at the head of his troops who were 
full of ardour and courage. At half after four in the 
morning, being still at the distance of a league and a 
half from the fort, we hastened our march.
Count Dillon received orders to march immediately with 
the Irish brigade to the barracks, to send a detachment 
to seize the batteries, on the right of the town, and 
another to surprize the Governor in his own house. Mons. 
de Fresne, Major of the Royal Contois, with 100 
chasseurs, taken from his own regiment and that of 
Auxerrois, was ordered to attack the fort, and to scale 
the walls if he could not enter at the gate. Mr. le 
Vicomte de Damas was ordered to support him with the 
remainder of the troops.
Count Dillon reached the barracks at six o' clock in 
the morning, and found a part of the garrison exercising 
on the parade. The enemy, imposed upon by the uniform of
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the Irish brigade,1 were soon undeceived by a fire from 
the latter within pistol shot. Governor Cockburne, on his 
way to the parade, was taken prisoner at the same time, 
by the Chevalieur O*Conner, Captain of the chasseurs of 
Walsh. The Chevalieur Fresne pushed on to the fort, into 
which the enemy were throwing themselves in great 
numbers; he reached the drawbridge at the moment they 
were attempting to raise it; Mons. de la Motte, second 
Captain of the chasseurs of Auxerrois, rushed forward on 
the bridge, and by a well timed well directed fire, 
obliged the enemy to let go the chains. This vigorous 
attack, deserving the greatest encomiums, was the signal 
of victory. The enemy were pursued into the fort by the 
chasseurs of the Comtois. The Chevalieur de Fresne 
ordered the bridge to be raised, and the whole garrison 
threw down their arms. All the prisoners paraded in the 
fort, and we found on examination, that we had lost only 
10 men in killed, drowned, or wounded. The enemy lost 
32....
The garrison at St. Eustatia was composed of the 13th 
and 15th British Regiments, consisting of 691 men, and 
all the prisoners taken amounted to 776, viz. two Lieut. 
Colonels, 7 Captains, 33 Lieutenants, Ensigns, and 
Quartermasters, 702 non-commissioned officers, privates, 
and matrosses, and 3 2 sailors. The Count de Bouille, 
nephew to the General, sailed on the 28 th from St.
Eustasia, in the Corvette Eagle, to carry the news of 
this success of our arms to the King, and to present to 
his Majesty the four standards of the 13th and 15th
regiments....
The English cannot have forgot the doctrine held out by 
General Vaughan, Col. Cockburne himself, and other 
officers, that St. Eustatia, with a garrison of 1000 men,
could defend itself against 10,000. What will they say,
when they learn that the new Gibraltar was conquered by 
400 Frenchmen? They must confess their Generals are bad 
calculators, and that intrepidity supplies the place of
1 The Irish Brigade was uniformed with red regimental coats, 
faced in yellow. These uniforms were all but identical to several 
British regiments. In addition, the brigade was made up of Irish 
and British mercenaries, which compounded the British soldiers 
confusion at first sighting.
2 Matrosses were artillery personnel. Attema (1976:42) has 
confused these troops with bedding material, and proposes the 
ludicrous situation of the French troops carrying mattresses up the 
cliffs at Jenkin's bay, across the island, and laying them in the 
moat at Fort Oranje.
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numbers.
The article goes on to describe the taking of St. Martin, 
and the surrender of Saba that same day. Although the islands 
were said to be returned to the "laws of Holland" and the flag 
of the "United Provinces was hoisted on the fort", the islands 
remained in French control with the new military commander 
being "M. Fitzmaurice, Captain Commandant of the battalion of 
Walsh". Masseur de Geoffry was appointed "Aid-Major to the 
town and Fort Orange" on St. Eustatius (Connecticut Gazette 
January 25, 1782).
Eventually Lieutenant-Colonel James Cockburne (of the 35th 
Foot) returned to England and was court martialed. He was 
found "guilty of culpable neglect in not taking the necessary 
precautions for the defence of the island, notwithstanding he 
had received the fullest intelligence of an intended attack" 
(Gossencourt n.d., in Shea 1971:93).
Following their British predecessors lead, the French 
forces refortified: "Monsieur de Bouille at the same time put 
the place in a respectable situation, and left a sufficient 
garrison for its defence" (Connecticut Gazette, January 25 
1782) . The British prisoners were taken to Martinique. The 
British were unable to mount an offensive against the island 
for the remainder of the war.
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After the cessation of hostilities France returned St. 
Eustatius to the Netherlands on February 7, 1784. For the next 
eleven years the island prospered and recovered from the 
damages of late war. In the meantime France had undergone a 
revolution of her own, starting in 1789. The country, then 
still involved in internal strife, compounded it by declaring 
war in 1792 on several other European nations. The Netherlands 
were annexed by France, and as a result on April 14, 1795 St. 
Eustatius came under French rule once again.
Revolutionary France soon destroyed the islands economy, 
which never completely recovered. Bloody excesses with the 
guillotine eventually caused the fanatical Jacobin rebels to 
be expelled, and the leadership was replaced by the army, with 
Napoleon Bonaparte at the head. Under Napoleon's rule the 
external wars intensified and were extended into the 
Caribbean. Fearing attack from her numerous enemies, France 
once again prepared the island for defense.
In the early months of 1801 British convoys sailed for the 
Leeward Islands carrying some 5,400 of His Majesty's troops. 
The commanders of the forces in the Indies were Lieutenant 
General Thomas Trigge, with two and a half regiments already 
in Barbados, and Rear Admiral John Thomas Duckworth. Among the 
newly transported troops were two battalions of the 68th Foot,
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the 64th, the 1st Royals, the regiment of Castries 
(emigrants), and 113 0 recruits from Ireland and England 
(Southey 1968). Not waiting for the full complement, Trigge 
began operations in late February, utilizing local garrisons, 
as well as the 3rd, 11th, and 68th regiments, the 8th West 
India, and 100 artillerists, and being joined by the 2nd West 
India, newly arrived from Trinidad (Duffy 1987). After easily 
capturing St. Bartholomew the expedition turned south for St. 
Martin, arriving on the 2 3rd of March (Southey 1968) . Parts of 
the 3rd, 8th West India, 64th, and 100 sailors landed, 
followed several hours later by the 1st Royals, 2nd West 
India, 11th Foot, and 100 more sailors (Duffy 1987). The 
British then marched to Marigot, the French town, and Fort 
Amsterdam at Phillipsburg, in the Dutch sector. After engaging 
in several skirmishes, both sides of the island surrendered to 
the British.
The captured island being garrisoned, the British forces 
proceeded on their expedition, easily taking several more 
islands. Realizing that the size of the British force was too 
great to repel, the French evacuated their troops from the 
islands of St. Eustatius and Saba on the 16th of April, 
"carrying with them as much plunder as their vessels could 
stow" (Southey 1968:88). This included several pieces of 
artillery from Statia1s batteries. The French troops were 
transported to Guadeloupe to reinforce the garrison there.
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Learning of the evacuation, British troops stationed at 
nearby St. Kitts were dispatched on board the sloop Arab to 
secure St. Eustatius for Great Britain. Lieutenant Colonel 
Blunt of the 3rd Foot arrived with 100 of the "buffs",3 
accompanied by Lieutenant Brown and 10 of the artillery corps 
(Southey 1968). The island formally capitulated on the 21st of 
April followed on the 22nd by Saba. Their surrender marked the 
last of the Dutch islands to be captured. In late April of 
18 02, a truce agreement was reached, and by November of that 
year St. Eustatius, along with the other captured islands, was 
restored to its pre-war owners, the Dutch.
During the following years the Napoleonic wars flared up 
again, causing the island to fear for its safety. In 1810 this 
danger appeared eminent and the fortifications were readied 
once again. The expected British expeditions in the area came 
that year, with several islands being captured, including St. 
Martin in mid-February. Immediately following that island's 
unconditional surrender, the British forces moved on to St. 
Eustatius. In command of this force was Vice-Admiral Sir A. 
Cochrane who received the following letter from W.C. Fahie 
concerning the action:
3 The "buffs" was the name given to the 3rd Regiment of 
Foot (East Kent), derived from the shade of their uniform 
facings.
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His Majesty's ship Abercrombie, at anchor in 
the road of St. Eustatia, the 22nd Feb. 1810
Sir,
The measures which it became necessary to adopt 
for the internal government of the Dutch quarter of 
the island of St. Martin, in consequence of its 
unconditional surrender to His Majesty's arms, 
having been completed on the evening of the 2 0th 
instant, I sailed from thence at daylight on the 
following morning, and at twelve o'clock on the 
same day anchored in this road. On the appearance 
of the Abercrombie off the road, Captain Dowers, of 
His Majesty's brig the Ringdove (who had been sent 
forward with a joint summons from Brigadier-General 
Harcourt and myself, addressed to the governor), 
joined us with his answer, together with the terms 
on which he offered to capitulate; but as they were 
in some points inadmissable, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stewart and Captain Dowers were sent on shore to 
meet the Dutch commissioners, and I have the 
satisfaction to inform you, that before night the 
articles of capitulation were framed and ratified 
on both sides, and the grenadier company of the 
25th regiment landed to occupy the principle fort.4 
Entire possession of the island was given to us at 
nine o'clock this morning, and the Dutch garrison 
marched out with the honours of war and embarked.
Though the island of St. Eustatia is of little 
value itself, the acquisition of it is important, 
as it finally expels the enemy's flag from the 
archipelago; and, I am assured, Sir, that it will 
be to you, as it is to me, a source of peculiar 
satisfaction, that I have been able to carry your 
orders into complete execution without the loss of 
a single life.
I have, &c.
Vice-Admiral Sir A. Cochrane. W.C. FAHIE
(reproduced in Southey 1968:489, vol. III). Saba likewise 
surrendered at 4 a.m.
4 The 25th regiment, from which the grenadier company 
was detached, was part of the 2nd brigade, under Brigadier- 
General Barrow.
157
St. Eustatius remained in the hands of the British 
throughout the remainder of the Napoleonic wars. British 
forces in the Caribbean were kept strong enough to discourage 
enemy land forces from retaking the island, though some small 
naval engagements did take place in Caribbean waters. Most of 
the war, however, was fought on European soil. Following the 
final defeat of the French forces at Waterloo, a treaty was 
signed with all parties involved. The Netherlands, by the end 
of the war a British ally, were allowed to take possession of
the island on the 1st of February 1816.
An inventory indicated that Fort Oranje and four other 
batteries were still in use when the Dutch returned (Attema 
1976). Among the other four was Fort Panga, and probably
Battery Bouille, as suggested by a British artillery button 
located there during the survey of 1990.
By the end of the Napoleonic wars St. Eustatius lost its 
attraction as a military target. Its formerly crucial role in 
trade and supply had dwindled to an insignificant amount, and 
the island offered no natural resources worthy of coveting. 
Its only potential military value was as a naval base, being 
in a central location, but its total dependence on other
islands for supplies made this of little strategic value. 
Several other islands had better accommodations for such 
installations.
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Even though it no longer had a great deal to fear from 
foreign attack, the island remained nominally fortified 
throughout the first half of the 19th century. Most small 
batteries surrounding the island were abandoned after 1816, 
some being partially dismantled to salvage brick. Fort Panga 
was occupied until destroyed by a hurricane in 1819 (Hartog 
1976) . In 1829 the Fort was still garrisoned by twenty-one men 
of the Jager (Riflemen) Battalion, but by this time the walls 
were falling into ruin, and the parade ground was completely 
overgrown (Attema 1976). In 1834 the walls were rebuilt, and 
the gate house was renovated into quarters for the commander. 
The guns of the fort fired another salute that year, to Prince 
Hendrik, who visited on board the warship Maas (Hartog 1976). 
This was among the Fort's last cannonades, for by 184 6 it was 
abandoned by the regular military.
At the abandonment of Fort Oranje, no fortifications were 
maintained on a regular basis. The island did have a militia 
unit throughout the 19th century. On occasion they drilled on 
the Fort grounds. A photo of the "Statia Militia" around 1890 
(see Hartog 1976:39) shows the unit to be infantry, equipped 
with what may be surplus from the United States Army.
By the early 20th century, parts of the old Fort were in 
use by the police and night watch of the island. The bell in
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the gate-house was rung on the hour by the night-watch 
stationed there, who communicated with another watch in the 
Lower Town below the Fort (Lampe, personal communication, 
1990).
Chapter 8
The Fortifications Survey
The defensive fortifications of St. Eustatius were 
archaeologically surveyed during the summer of 1990 (Figure 
5) . The survey crew was normally limited to the researcher, 
with occasional assistance from various members of the field 
school. As a result, most batteries were mapped using only 
compass and tape measure. Such independent mapping naturally 
presented some difficulties, but all resulting plans were made 
to be as accurate as possible. Several other batteries were 
mapped with from two to three persons, and two more were 
mapped using an alidade (Battery Nassau, and Battery 
Concordia, by the field school). One map (the Waterfort) was 
compiled with an alidade by J.D. Hartley and an assistant in 
1988, and updated in this survey after Hurricane Hugo 
apparently uncovered additional wall sections. Fort Oranje and 
Fort de Windt were not re-mapped. Both have been reconstructed 
and maps already existed.
Several historic maps of the island exist (Figures 6-12). 
Most denote at least some of the defenses in existence at the
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time of compilation, though there are omissions. These maps 
were used as the principle source of information to guide the 
field research.
Plans of six batteries and Fort Oranje appear on a copy of 
field sketches given to the researcher whilst on the island by 
Mr. Franz Lampe (Figure 13) . Although the plans are not scaled 
nor are any dimensions given, they do note the distance of 
each site from Fort Oranje, as well as its elevation. A 
comparison of these elevations with information from the 
Cadastrial Survey map show they may be in error. The date of 
this document is unknown, although it may date from the 2nd 
quarter of the 19th century. The names used for Fort Panga and 
Battery Jussac (Vigis and Redoutte) are similar to those on 
the circa 1830 map, possibly indicating a date of this general 
period or shortly after. Notations are in English.
After returning to the United States, preliminary survey 
notes of the island compiled in 1981 by J.B. Hauster Jr. and 
the William and Mary field school crew were given to the 
researcher. These contained roughly measured sketches of 
several of the batteries which were used to compliment the 
information gathered in the 1990 season. Unfortunately, they 
were not available on the island during the fortification 
survey.
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At the time field maps were made of the batteries, limited 
artifact collections were undertaken at most sites. With the 
exception of Battery Concordia (Fort Amsterdam on the 
Netherlands Antilles, Cadastrial Survey Department map), no 
excavations took place. Battery Concordia (SE81) underwent 
partial excavation for one week by the College of William and 
Mary field school. A separate report has been prepared on this 
excavation by Dr. Norman Barka of the College of William and 
Mary, for restoration purposes by the people of St. Eustatius.
Surface artifacts at all sites, and excavated artifacts 
from SE81, were collected and are stored in the William and 
Mary archaeological field school laboratory on St. Eustatius. 
A small number of items were sent to be conserved at the 
College of William and Mary. Unfortunately, the collections 
were not able to be thoroughly analyzed before the end of the 
field season. Hopefully future researchers will compile and 
study this information to further understand the sites.
St. Eustatius was fortified starting with the first 
European occupation. When French ships landed on its shores in 
1629, they immediately set about the construction of a fort, 
later to be the site of Fort Oranje. This fort or its 
successors, would remain the principle defensive structure on 
the island for the following three centuries.
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In the early years Fort Oranje was the only permanently 
fortified position. Whenever a threat posed itself to the 
island*s security, temporary batteries would be constructed. 
When "alarm threatened, entrenchments were thrown up at the 
most vulnerable spots and gradually simple forts developed in 
this way. Most of them were open on the side facing inland" 
(Hartog 1976:23). Presumably this entailed the construction of 
loose stone and earth breastworks capable of supporting a few 
artillery pieces.
The areas chosen for such temporary defenses would likely 
be, as Hartog suggests, those places most accessible by 
approaching ships. Among these would be to the north of Oranje 
Bay, near Billy's Gut, to the south at Back-Off Bay, Tumble 
Down Dick Bay, parts of Corre Corre Bay, and Concordia Bay. 
Other places have acceptable beaches for landing, but are 
considered less critical for defensive purposes due to the 
topography from the shore to the town. Bays such as Jenkin's 
and Venus have areas for landing, but present a difficult 
overland trek before encountering the town.
Although the island had several vulnerable landing sites, 
throughout the 17th century this fact was largely overlooked. 
It was believed that the only viable approach would be from 
Oranje Bay, and with the Fort at the cliff-top, the island was 
considered reasonably secure. The De Rochefort 1666
description of the island states:
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This Island is the strongest, as to situation, of all the 
Caribbies, for there is but one good descent which may be 
easily defended; so that a few men might keep off a great 
Army: But besides this natural Fortification, there is in 
it a Strong Fort which commands the best Haven, the Guns 
of it carrying a good distance into the Sea (quoted in 
Handle 1985:27).
For the remainder of the 17th century, two additional 
fortifications are mentioned, both pertaining to the period 
1686-1689. A letter to the Heren X from the island's governor 
suggests a position on Gilboa hill by 1688 (Attema 
1976:23,52). The second fortification attributed to this 
period is the Waterfort, or Fort Amsterdam (SE94) (Attema 
1976:23).
The early years of the 18th century saw a decline in the 
fortifications. Several governors such as Isaac Lamont, 
reported back to Holland about the deplorable state of the 
existing forts. Within the first decade of the new century 
perhaps as many as three batteries had been constructed.
The French Jesuit Labat mentioned a fort "off a place known as 
1'Interloppe" sometime before 1705 (Eaden 1970:210 quoted in 
Handle 1985:46). Assumedly this reference refers to either the 
battery at Tumble Down Dick or the Waterfort.
A document of 1709 names a total of four fortifications in
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use. They were Fort Oranje, Battery Dollijn, the New Fort (I) 
(probably the Waterfort), and Battery Tumble Down Dick (Attema 
1976:23). Of these several were already once again in various 
states of degradation, Tumble Down Dick being virtually 
useless. By the 1720's the Waterfort also had a diminished 
defensive role and was allowed to be partially converted into 
a slave depot (Hartog 1976:26; Attema 1976:29).
Commander Isaac Faesch found the situation no better. A 
letter from him dated June 27, 1737 to the WIC reported the 
forts in such bad condition that cattle and civilians freely 
meandered in and out (Attema 1976:24). To upgrade security, 
new taxes to repair the forts were imposed in that year. A 
shipment of 30,000 bricks for this purpose was then sent from 
Holland (Attema 1976:24). The Heren requested in return a 
report as to the necessity and disposition of the brick.
Rising tensions in the West Indies, combined with the 
growing importance of the island, led to further fortification 
projects by mid 1700's. Two governors are credited for this 
boost to the defenses: "Commanders Johannes Heyliger (1743- 
1752) and Jan de Windt (1753-1775)" (Hartog 1976:26). The two 
apparently both rebuilt and strengthened the older, permanent 
defenses and temporary entrenchments, and constructed new 
ones. This task was not eased by the lack of interest the West 
India Company continually showed in the island's security
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(Attema 1976). Repeated letters to the Heren requested 
additional assistance and supplies. If and when such aide was 
sent, it was frequently found to be inadequate.
In 1748 the citizens of Statia provided monies for the
building of "some coastal forts ('waterforten1) by the
'Manchenillebomen1 (manchineel trees) - a place below the 
neglected New Fort between Tommelendijk and Fort Orange"
(Attema 1976:24). This perhaps refers to the "New Fort" (II) 
or Hollandia. There was also a proposed battery to be built 
"at Hillegatspoint, to the east of Dollijn, from which ships 
arriving to the south of the island could be attacked. This 
stronghold was to have the name Zeelandia and was to have 8 
cannons" (Attema 1976:24). Although sources disagree as to the 
date of this battery's appearance, it would come to be known 
as Nassau. Nassau was the name chosen in 1748 for another 
proposed fort, one "on a hilltop, which could cover Fort 
Orange, the Village..., the approaches, and the whole plain" 
(Attema 1976:24). The most likely site for such a fort would 
be atop the "Horseshoe" mountain, where Fort Royal is located.
Five forts were said to be presently in use after 1750. 
Fort Oranje was, as it would always remain, the principle 
defensive work. In addition there was the Waterfort, the
batteries of Nassau and "Tietschy" (speculated by at least one 
author to be Tumble Down Dick) , and a battery at Back-Off Bay,
later to become Fort de Windt (Hartog 1976:44).
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Whether this "Nassau" is the battery at Kay Bay or a 
hilltop fortification above Billy's Gut is uncertain. Hartog 
states that this same Nassau was destroyed by the hurricane of 
1772 along with Fort de Windt, and was rebuilt, after which it 
was used as a military hospital (Hartog 1976:44). If this is 
true it would eliminate this Nassau as being atop the 
"Horseshoe" mountain, an inconvenient place for a hospital.
The Dutch attempts at fortification, with the possible 
exception of Fort Oranje itself, apparently "were not 
systematically planned and were built without any engineering 
aid from the Netherlands West India Company... St. Eustatius 
surrendered twenty-two times without striking a blow because 
the island was considered untenable" (Hartog 1976:27). 
Although this feeling may have prevented resistance to 
attacks, there is little doubt that Fort Oranje was laid out 
by an engineer that was familiar with fortification 
principles. The Fort and batteries would not have been built 
if some did not believe it defensible.
Comparatively little military assistance came from the 
homeland. The West Indies were never a popular location with 
troops of most European nations, and few sent their more 
valued regiments. On St. Eustatius, the Dutch "garrison
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numbered at the most fifty-odd men of a low standard" in the 
years before start of the American Revolution (Hartog 197 6). 
Soldiers were often of the lowest social orders, a 
conglomeration of nationalities owing allegiance to none in 
particular. This was not unique to the islands owned by the 
Netherlands. The scenario was quite similar on the French and 
British islands (Hartog 1976:28). Only in times of war were 
some of the better European regiments deployed in the 
Caribbean, and these often not without grumbling from 
commanders and privates alike. In essence, the West Indian 
defenses were manned by a small number of qualified, 
professional soldiers, and a larger number of "vagrants" and 
mercenaries of all ages with "a liking for adventure" (Hartog 
1976:28).
Along with the "professional" military, the garrisons were 
supplemented by local militia. These units commonly drilled at 
least one day a month, and included most male citizens from 16 
to 60 (Martin 183 0). This was the situation on St. Eustatius 
where there was both a "mounted and unmounted civil guard" 
(Hartog 1976:28). It must be assumed the mounted guard served 
a social function as much or more so than a military one, for 
cavalry tactics would be of little use on the island. Some 
residents, such as the Jewish population, were exempted from 
martial duties (Hartog 197 6). No mention is made if those 
excused had to pay fines or extra taxes, as was the case in
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some other colonies.
An inventory of military stores on January 17, 1753 found 
little had improved since the last report. It listed in part, 
"8 pairs of shackles for what they are worth...14 six-pounder 
cannons, two of them useless without gun-carriages...[and] 
three dilapidated ware-houses [for military use]" (Attema 
1976:19-20). The inventory excerpts do not list a great deal 
of equipment in good order, and "the majority of comments 
about the guns are complaints about their poor condition" 
(Attema 1976:20).
It should be remembered that the commander had little need 
to comment about adequate equipment to the Company. In fact, 
the less said the more likely he would be to receive his 
requested supplies. The commander had to rely upon Holland for 
nearly all weapons and military supplies at this time, so it 
might not be wise to lull the Heren into a sense of false 
security for the island. The batteries, according to multiple 
letters from the various Commanders, were notoriously short of 
ammunition when under Company jurisdiction. It was not 
uncommon to receive weapons without powder or shot, or to 
receive shot that would not fit the guns on hand. The 1776 
inventory did record several hundred round shot on hand by 
that time, but this may have been the exception to the rule 
(Plate I) . Unfortunately only parts of this inventory could be
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included in this study. It was translated by the researcher 
from photographs, and many words were illegible, especially to 
one not fluent in Dutch.
The fault with the state of the defenses cannot, however, 
be laid entirely upon the Company. The aforementioned factors, 
plus a tendency to favour profit oriented pursuits, or perhaps 
even simply a general apathy, all worked to allow the Statian 
defenses to continually fall into ruins after each renovation. 
Inventory after inventory cite the dilapidated condition of 
the existing defense works. Although this would be compounded 
by poor supplies and funding from the Netherlands, the fact 
remains that the island's inhabitants themselves neglected 
their own fortifications until imminent danger was perceived.
Planters and merchants seldom gave thought to the upkeep 
of the defenses in times of peace and prosperity, and commonly 
fell prey to invaders too quickly for sufficient preparation 
in times of war. This pattern was typical throughout the 
Caribbean. The French, British, Spanish, and Dutch were all 
guilty of such neglect and shared in the habit of letting 
forts go into ruins, only repairing them when in immediate 
danger. The problem did not lie with Statia alone. Such was 
the state of the defenses when Admiral G.B. Rodney arrived 
with his fleet in February of 1781:
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The Upper Town is upon a steep clift, at least seventy 
foot perpendicular. You ascend to it by a zig zag road, 
very difficult, steep & must have cost the Expense of 
much Blood, had the enemy defended it. In the whole 
island they had about 82 pieces of Cannon Mounted, but as 
Trade had totally engrossed their Minds, their 
Fortifications had been Neglected. Though the revenue 
belonging to their West India Company was upwards of 
seventy thousand pounds a year, neat, they could not be 
induced to afford any part of it towards fortifying their 
Island (Rodney 1789:v).
Rodney also reported there to be "2,000 American sailors" 
on St. Eustatius at his arrival, whom he said offered their 
services in its defense to the Governor (Rodney 1789). The 
Governor refused their help, preferring to surrender and 
presumably thereby spare the warehouse district and town. Most 
of the sailors surrendered in the next few weeks.
Prior to the arrival of the British fleet, the Mars, a 3 8 
gun, 3 00 man Dutch warship under Count Bylandt, arrived in 
Oranje Bay. Its presence "allayed their Fears of Hostilities" 
(Rodney 1789:8) and probably contributed to the continued 
neglect of the land batteries, the majority of which were 
ineffective in 1781 (Hartog 1976). By this period ships were 
trusted more than land forts in the defense of an island. 
Unfortunately for the Statian population, the Dutch navy did 
not have a strong presence in the West Indies.
Under British occupation, from February 3 to November 25, 
1781, the island was brought up to a state of fortified
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defense it had never experienced before. Within this period of 
less than a year, several sites vulnerable to landings were 
refortified or fortified for the first time, so far as is 
known. Mentions of earlier earth entrenchments at various 
sites are made, but few with stated locations.
Among the defensive works attributed to the British 
occupiers are the batteries at Concordia Bay, Compagnie Bay 
(St. Louis), and Corre Corre Bay. Other possible sites 
included "the North point (probably Venus Bay) and Coculusbay" 
(Cocoluch Bay) (Attema 1976:42). Although not mentioned in the 
literature, Four-gun Battery and Battery Bouille may have been 
of British origin, being completed by the French.
Attema supplies a list of named forts during the 1781 
British period (1976:55, note 17). Of the list only two can be 
presently identified with known batteries: Frederick, which 
has retained that name, and Lisburne, which is SE8, Fort de 
Windt. The remaining names, Gloucester, Townshend, Vaughan, 
Camberlind, Rodney, Bernick, Charlotte, Amburt (?) , and 
Cunningham presumably were applied to batteries either 
currently unknown, or now known only by other names. In 
addition Fort Oranje was renamed Fort George, and Fort Royal 
was repaired and may have been called by that name by the 
British.
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Rodney's correspondence, along with French statements of 
their capture of the island, suggest that it was the British 
that began fortifications on most if not all sites of 
defensive works of this period. Although popularly attributed 
to the French, they may well have had their foundations with 
the British, if not the Dutch even earlier.
Although he does not actually admit to their role in 
securing their prize, Rodney hinted in his correspondence that 
there were in fact Royal Engineers with the fleet (Rodney 
1789). Their activities in the renewed fortification of the 
island is unknown. If they surveyed the situation on Statia at 
all, it may be that they were more influential in determining 
the placement of the batteries than their actual construction. 
If not, the asymmetrical and irregular structures that 
resulted do little to testify to the ability of his engineers.
France and Britain had carried the American War into the 
Caribbean from the beginning. Soon after the naval battle off 
Cape Henry, the French fleet sailed back to the West Indies. 
Although the British expected French attacks, they had placed 
their confidences on the probability that an attack would come 
on their larger island holdings before ones such as St. 
Eustatius. The French took advantage of this assumption, and 
in a surprise attack captured Statia on November 25, 1781. The
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commander of this expedition was Francois Claude Amour, the 
Marquis de Bouille.
Under the direction of the Marquis de Bouille, the French 
military garrison, with the cooperation of the "commander and 
councilors", began a program of re-fortification for the small 
but coveted island (Hartog 1976:97). Old Dutch defenses were 
refurbished, recently built British batteries were 
strengthened, and new works were constructed. The French had 
no intention of losing their newly gained prize back to the 
British, from whom they had so easily won it.
It is claimed that at this time Battery Bouille was 
constructed, as well as Fort Panga atop Signal Hill (Attema 
197 6) . Whether or not they were in fact the originators of 
defensive positions at these sites is unknown. Both locations 
would have been logical positions for the British to occupy in 
the nine months before the French, not to mention the Dutch 
before that. Signal Hill affords an excellent view of the 
approaches to the island, and if not previously fortified, 
must certainly have been occasionally used as a look-out, 
especially during times of open hostilities or piratical 
activity. Archaeological investigation at these sites may 
clarify some questions.
Regardless of what nationality founded the many batteries
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now surrounding the island, by the year after the forced 
departure of the British, the governor, Johannes de Graaff, 
felt reasonably secure. In 1782, with the French still 
present, he wrote to the Netherlands and informed them that 
the island was now "in a formidable state of defence" (quoted 
in Hartog 1976:97).
The French military planners also wished to improve the 
support systems necessary for the coastal batteries. As 
suggested in theoretical manuals of defense (e.g. Vauban 1691; 
Muller 1755) they constructed communication lines from the 
batteries to the town and Fort, and between each other. This 
consisted chiefly of a roadway connecting all the batteries. 
The sixteen feet wide road was built at the expense of 
landowners upon whose property the fortifications were 
situated (Hartog 1976:97). Unfortunately, these roads were not 
clearly visible on the ground during the 1990 survey.
Two maps attributable to this occupation period neglect to 
depict the roads, save for the main thoroughfares. Even these 
are less complete in the 1781-1795 maps than the pre-war maps 
of 1742 and 1775. It would not be surprising to find that many 
of these roads were less than the French engineers had hoped 
for, if they were completed at all, due to the fact that the 
cost came from the pockets of the planters rather than from a 
general tax base.
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Although not mentioned in the records, it would seem 
likely that the French also repaired the several barracks 
associated with the batteries. In addition they garrisoned 
some troops in the Dutch Reformed Church, as the British had 
done before them (Hartog 1976). Several private residences 
were also used to billet the garrison, including Simon 
Doncker's home, where Admiral Rodney is said to have set up 
his headquarters. Today this houses the St. Eustatius 
Historical Society Museum, where the visitor may view hammock 
hooks still in place, said to have been from the British 
occupation.
The French left the island in 1784 and it reverted back to 
Dutch rule. The wars ended, the batteries were once again left 
to the elements and quickly fell into disrepair. After the 
French wars began the island came back under their control in 
1795. From this time to the end of the Napoleonic wars the 
batteries were re-equipped and repaired every few years as new 
conquerors took the island, or fear of attack swept the 
population.
Plans from this period exist for the reconstruction of 
Battery Amsterdam (the Waterfort) and Battery Bouille, along 
with the building of a new battery, Monplaisant. It does not 
appear any of these projects were carried out. In fact, no new 
defensive works are known to have been built after the French
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withdrew in 1784, nor are major changes suspected to have 
taken place to the smaller defenses after this time (other 
than the replacement of guns). Fortification inventories from 
the early 19 th century do not appear in the published 
literature. If additional inventories and documents do 
survive, they would be exceptionally beneficial for this 
study.
Fort Oranje
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Fort Oranje is located on the cliffs overlooking Oranje 
Bay, above the Lower Town, on the edge of Oranjestad. It now 
houses several of the island's civil administration buildings 
and the post office.
Fort Oranje is the earliest and largest defensive work on 
St. Eustatius. It remained, from its inception, the main 
fortification on the island, and appears on all known maps. It 
was built atop the coastal cliff on the Caribbean side of 
Statia at about 110 feet above sea level. It commands the 
roadstead of Oranje Bay, the main access route to the Upper 
Town, and the warehouse section along the beach.
The present fort, now reconstructed, was built on or very 
near the site of the French fort of 1629. This original 
defensive work was credited by "the French writer Dutertre, 
[to] a French squadron under Francois de Rotondy, sieur de 
Cahusau" (Attema 1976:17). The squadron is believed to have 
landed on St. Eustatius in August of 1629. Expecting an attack 
by Spanish forces, they hastily constructed a small fort. 
Later accounts of the site suggest it may not have been a 
substantial work, for it was immediately rebuilt upon 
reoccupation. In practice with techniques of the period for 
field defenses, it was perhaps an earth and wooden walled
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fortification, or piled stone. The use of earth would have 
been the most sensible construction method for a hastily 
erected, temporary fortification, as this almost certainly was 
intended. Stone breastworks were capable of causing greater 
casualties to the defenders if shelled (Tousard 1809). No 
archaeological evidence of the French fort of 1629 has yet 
been discovered.
Soon after their initial occupation, the French abandoned 
the island and their fort. On April 25, 163 6 colonists from
Zeeland settled on St. Eustatius, and immediately set about 
building their own fort. Traditionally, the Dutch fort was 
built from the remains of the French fort. Initially it was 
armed with "a pair of cannons provided by the Company" (Attema 
1976:17). Within a short time the Zeelanders had "rebuilt it, 
mounted sixteen cannon, and called it Fort Oranje (Hartog 
1976:21). As with the French fort, no archaeological remains 
of this period have yet been identified.
Although modest in size and fire power compared to its 
contemporaries in Europe, Fort Oranje was an impressive 
military installation in the early 17th century West Indies. 
Built "on a cliff 150 steps high" Jan Snouck wrote to the 
Zeeland chamber in April 1636, the "fort called Orange" sat 
guarding the approach to the island (quoted and translated in 
Attema 1976:17). Although situated on a small island, it did
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not pass the attention of other nations. A soldier of Spain 
recorded it in 1640, carefully noting the sixteen iron cannon 
it contained (Attema 1976:20).
The first decades of the island were concerned with 
building a successful colony. In this period St. Eustatius was 
relatively secure, as it had little to be coveted. This 
changed by mid century as the planters prospered and the 
colony gained wealth.
By 1665 the Fort had 2 0 cannon and 131 small arms on hand 
(Attema 1976:20). Added to this was a shipment of 700 pounds 
of powder sent by Admiral De Ruyter that year (Kandle 1985). 
A Dutch fleet then arrived, and was to provide some additional 
protection. Storms forced it to sail on May 17 leaving the 
fort to defend itself.
The year of 1665 witnessed another of the many European 
conflicts that spread into the Caribbean. Combined with the 
political hostilities of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Statia*s 
now prosperous planters easily attracted piratical invaders. 
Under the legal protection of a privateer, such a group under 
Thomas Morgan attacked the Fort in July, and captured the 
island for England. Little or no resistance was offered from 
the fort. The following year Fort Oranje fell to the French, 
in much the same manner. The French reportedly severely
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ransacked the island, though no mention is made as to the
specific fate of Fort Oranje.
The island was returned to Dutch hands in 1667, only to be 
captured again in 1672. An English party took the Fort and 
island, followed soon after by the French. Many of the 
inhabitants of Statia, probably remembering the French conduct 
in 1666, supported their English captors, which would 
nonetheless tie the millstone about their necks. The following 
year a Dutch squadron reclaimed the Fort and island. The Dutch 
who had supported the English were shipped to Curacao, and the 
English to St. Kitts (Kandle 1985:41). Fort Oranje and the
Upper Town was then razed by the Dutch and the island
abandoned.
No sooner had they left, than the English deported to St. 
Kitts and elsewhere returned. They rebuilt Fort Oranje and 
parts of the Town in 1673. The new Fort would remain out of 
Dutch hands until 1678. It is unknown to what extent the Fort 
was destroyed by the Dutch, or what, if any, alterations the 
English made in its reconstruction.
In the following decade renewed hostilities led the 
defenders of St. Eustatius to give thought to the Fort once 
again. An impending French attack in April 1689 caused them to 
"frantically begin to strengthen the Fort "which had very weak
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walls" (Attema 1976:21). A description of these efforts is 
summed up by Attema (1976:21):
Heavy beams were placed on top of the walls ready to roll 
down on attacking Frenchmen. Also, 400 pack-cloth sacks 
were sewn together, filled with 10 pounds of earth and 
stacked two high on beams and walls to serve as a breast­
work.
The improvements may suggest the walls of the Fort were 
not yet the masonry construction found there today. The 
preparations, however, were not fruitful for the Fort 
surrendered to the French. The town was somewhat destroyed but 
the Fort was spared.
During the French occupation of 1689-1690, the Fort was 
again repaired and upgraded. At this time a dry moat was 
constructed, in accordance with fortification principles 
espoused by the French master Vauban (1691). In addition a 
palisade was erected, adding further evidence to suggest that 
the 17th century period Fort bore little resemblance to the 
18th century fort now reconstructed.
The beginning of the new century also was a new beginning 
for the Fort. In 1701 Isaac Lamont took control as commander. 
His disappointment in the condition of the Fort was reflected 
in his correspondence with the Heren. His initial inspection 
revealed the following:
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The walls of Fort Orange, built from piles of stones half 
man height threatened to collapse. The four bastions- 
Nassou point, the small Bocke point (de kleine 
Bockepunt), the large Orange point, and Sea-side point- 
had been made out of stamped down earth, in which the 
wheels of the gun-carriages were continually sticking, 
making it impossible to carry out any gun-drill... The 
Fort consisted of an entrance gate, four bastions 
containing the severely deteriorated guns, a dilapidated 
powder-house, guard's quarters..., a house used for 
church services but temporarily serving as barracks, 
three water tanks, one of which leaked and the 
commander's house that was so dilapidated that it was no 
longer habitable (Attema 1976:22).
The new commander therefore petitioned the West India 
Company to renovate the Fort using "good quality flat stones", 
planks, beams, rafters, and tiles", as well as 30,000 bricks 
for the cisterns. Lamont, however, was replaced by 1704 
without the renovation being implemented.
It is clear that the Fort was a f our-bastioned 
construction by sometime in the 17th century. At what date it 
took on this plan is unknown, but it may well have been from 
the first half of the century. It was probably similar to the 
simple square four-bastioned forts common to the era (Figure 
3) .
Lamont's successor, Jan Simonsz Doncker, found the 
situation had worsened. The Bockepunt bastion threatened to 
fall into the sea from erosion, not to mention the 
deteriorated condition of the remainder of the Fort. Even so, 
no significant repairs were undertaken before. Isaac Lamont
took over again from July to December 1709.
193
Although it was Lamont that had requested the repair of 
the Fort, it was also he that is blamed for its loss on the 
morning of November 25, 1709. The previous night a French
force landed on St. Eustatius. A letter of May 20, 1710 to the 
Heren X from Jan Simonsz Doncker points to Lamont's own 
carelessness for the easy French victory that morning.
Although perhaps embellished (or even fabricated) for
political reasons, the story is as follows:
He [Lamont] had entered the Fort very early in the 
morning, still in slippers and dressing-gown and smoking 
his pipe, and left the entrance-gate open. Whilst talking 
to the guard he heard shots in the village, saw the 
approach of the enemy and fled (Attema 1976:23).
Following the attack the French destroyed the Fort once
more. They also spiked the cannon vents, and laid waste to the 
gun powder. Although here the literature is silent, it is 
assumed the Fort was at least partially repaired after the 
1709 attack when Doncker took over again.
The next major phase of Fort Oranje began in 1737. In that 
year a tax was levied for the repair of the islands defenses. 
The commander, Isaac Faesch, had another dry moat dug around 
the Fort in 1738, "but the palisades which also should have 
been placed were too dear" (Attema 1976:25). The damaged
194
cisterns were not repaired until circa 174 0. In 1741 a new 
bridge and palisade were built, bringing the Fort back into a 
respectable, and formidable, appearance. Wooden planks, 
Bristol lime, and Flushing lime and cement now complimented 
the native materials making up the defenses (Attema 1976:25).
Rising tensions in European politics lead to another 
inspection of the defenses of Statia on February 8, 1755.
Echoing its previous history, the Fort had again fallen into 
disrepair. Jan de Windt, the commander of that period, wrote 
that the "bastions were so undermined that they threatened to 
collapse with cannons and all" (Attema 1976:25). Ever since 
Doncker1s administration the Bockepunt had threatened to fall 
away and by 1765 it had done so, though exactly when is 
unknown. De Windtfs letter may indicate the event took place 
between 1755 and 1765, although his references could have been 
to any of the walls, all of which were apparently unsound.
Between 1757 and 1762 records cited by Attema (1976) show 
the Fort received a new bridge, a new commander's house, 
cistern repairs, and repairs to the prison. This was followed 
in 1765 with a new Gunner's house (the "constable") with two 
new prisons underneath, one for criminal and one for civil 
offenders. There were also repairs to the barracks, though at 
least on occasion some troops continued to be billeted in the 
nearby church (Hartog 1976). Along with those newly
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constructed or repaired, the Fort at this time contained 
"rooms for non-commissioned officers and gunners, a kitchen, 
a room for the valet of the commander, gun-rooms...[and] the 
town hall (Hartog 1976:44).
Fort Oranje grew to maturity during the period from the 
Seven Years War to the start of the American Revolution. It 
took on the shape of its now reconstructed form, being rebuilt 
from predominately stone and brick materials. With the loss of 
the Bockepunt and one other bastion, the plan now supported 
only two bastions rather than four. This design change, 
visible on the oldest surviving plan made sometime after 17 65 
(Figure 14), would greatly decrease the effectiveness of the 
fort's defensive capabilities. The loss of the bastions would 
leave areas of the wall unprotected by cross-fire (Figure 15).
After the end of the Seven Years War little thought was 
given to the upkeep of the defenses, including Fort Oranje. By 
the third quarter of the century, the American situation had 
deteriorated to the point of impending war. St. Eustatius, now 
a major trade center, became entangled in this conflict early 
on, as a supplier of weapons and powder to the Americans. Even 
so the Fort was not renovated in the event of an invasion. A 
letter of May 1776 from the Commander's secretary, Alexander 
le Jeune, described the situation:
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Estimated Artillery Coverage 
Fort Oranje (1765 plan)
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The two roomed stone building (probably formerly the 
constable's [gunner's] house...) was particularly 
dangerous; weapons were left lying around and the powder 
was stored in the cellar underneath. ...Next to this 
building were five wooden ones, including the house of 
the commander of the Fort and the constable [gunner] , 
also with a cellar underneath it. There was also a house 
for the sergeant, a square wooden building for the 
corporals, a guard room, and a kitchen for the officers 
and men (in Attema 1976:4 0-41).
All the buildings within the Fort were reported to be 
deteriorated. Several of the cannon were in a similar 
condition. An inventory of April 6, 1775 records a wooden
gunner's house had been constructed "half in and half out of 
the Fort" (Attema 1976:41). These wooden buildings would prove 
quite dangerous, for a letter of July 23, 1777 described the 
conditions at the powder-house:
...an open barrel of gunpowder stood near the door. 
Whenever shots were fired the powder-house was open 
because it was so damp inside. Powder-filled paper 
cartridges could not be kept inside because they became 
too damp to use within eight days. Cartridges had to be 
filled in between shots and brought quickly to the 
appropriate place (from a letter paraphrased in Attema 
1976:41 from H.M. Evertsz to le Jeune).
The problem of dampness experienced in the powder-house 
also extended to other equipment. An inventory of Commandant 
Ravene reveals that the old cast iron guns (used in the famed 
Andrew Doria salute) had to be "condemned and [were] 
substituted by bronze ones in 1778" (Hartog 1976:77). The 
effects of the salt air and moisture from the sea would
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habitually be a problem for the maintenance of ferrous guns 
and equipment.
During inquiries following the salute incident, Statia's 
commander, Johannes de Graaff, declared that he fully realized 
the deplorable state of the Fort. When pressed as to why he 
had not remedied the situation, he replied that the West India 
Company funds for such projects were insufficient.
Along with descriptions and a drawing a building in the 
Fort (Plate II) , a 1775 inventory listed the armament on hand. 
There were six 12 pounders, two 9 pounders, two 8 pounders, 
fourteen 6 pounders, and three 3 pounders with serviceable 
carriages. Another group of two 12 pounders, six 6 pounders, 
two 3 pounders, and one 8 pounder sat useless, without a gun- 
carriage (Plate I) . A partial listing of the ammunition 
inventoried includes 500 "Blinde" cartridges (dummy's for 
salutes and etc.), 500 ball cartridges, 350 pounds of fuse, 34 
flintlocks (12 out of service), 3,000 musket balls, and 3,000 
pounds of gun-powder (Plate I).
At his arrival in 1780, ship's officer C. de Jong found 
the artillery situation worse than before. He took an 
inventory of the island's defenses, and at Fort Oranje 
reported that of 25 cannon present there, "less than 5" were 
"in working order" (Attema 1976:41). The garrison at that time
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was said to consist of "50 of the worst men in the service of 
the West India Company" (Attema 1976:41).
Among the surviving records concerning the garrison of 
this period is a muster roll of 1775 detailing the national 
origin of each soldier. Five were from the island itself, and 
another two from the Netherlands. The remainder, some 38 
individuals, were from Germany, Austria, Denmark, England, 
France, Scotland, the Southern Netherlands (Belgium), Sweden, 
and Switzerland. Among the garrison was to be found the 
Commander, one sergeant, one constable (gunner), four 
corporals, two constable mates (gunner's mates), twenty-three 
soldiers, and two drummers. The position and rank of the 
remainder are unknown.
The American War of Independence quickly drew the island 
into the affair as a supplier. Accordingly, in February 1781, 
Admiral Sir George Bridges Rodney sailed to St. Eustatius and 
captured the supply center for Britain. Fort Oranje 
surrendered without a fight and was rechristened Fort George 
by the new garrison of 650 British troops. Lieutenant Colonel 
Cockburne, of the 35th Foot, and Lieutenant Colonel Stafford 
were placed in immediate command, with Admiral Rodney and 
General Vaughn as their superiors overall.
As the British highly relied on sea power, and could see
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from their own capture of the Fort, that Oranje was not very 
formidable, they did little to repair it. Instead, they began 
constructing a series of coastal batteries to ward off any 
invasion attempts.
The loss of the island through an attack on the Fort in 
November of that year resulted in a court martial trial for 
Cockburne. During these proceedings it was mentioned that in 
1781 the Fort still had problems with weak walls. On one 
occasion, during a morning gun drill and firing, part of the 
parapet crumbled and fell over the side of the cliff (Attema 
1976:42). The dry moat was filled with vegetation, supposedly 
thought to be a deterrent to its crossing in an attack. The 
attack did come, with a French expedition. One author cites 
this force brought along "mattresses...to cover the thorns and 
so cross the moat!" (Attema 1976:42). The French army did 
indeed bring along matrosses for the attack. However, it seems 
doubtful that artillerymen, known as "matrosses" in the 18th 
century, would have agreed to this uncomfortable duty.
Although detailed accounts of the French taking of the 
Fort survive, there is no specific mention of its fate during 
their occupation. What is known is that the French continued 
to fortify the coasts with additional batteries, as well as 
rebuilding lookout posts on Signal Hill. It would seem logical 
that they also repaired Fort Oranje during their occupation,
though to what extent is not known.
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St. Eustatius was restored to the Dutch after the war, and 
on March 4, 1785 another inventory was taken (Attema 1976) . It 
was concluded that the walls could no longer support the 
larger caliber guns. Their weight and recoil when fired too 
often damaged the parapet, and sent pieces to the beach below. 
Accordingly, in or shortly after 1786, new iron cannon were 
installed in the Fort, all of smaller caliber (FO-1 through 
FO-11) . Most appear to be 3 pounders, except for the three in 
the monument, which may be 4 pounders or have been altered.
A plan of the Fort dated to 1787 survives, and shows it 
retained its basic pre-war appearance (Figure 16) . The 
inventory of 1785, and another in 1791, both suggest that the 
Fort was no longer a reliable source of protection for the 
island although its history might indicate it never had been.
Little is recorded about the history of Fort Oranje after 
the 1780's. The island fell under French control again in 
1795, and remained so until 1801. At that time the French 
removed some of the cannon on the island, but, as the 1786 
Dutch cannon remain to this day at Oranje, it is assumed they 
were too small a caliber to be of great interest to the 
French. Knowing the island would be under British hands after 
they evacuated, they apparently felt these guns would pose
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little threat in the event that they might eventually attempt 
to recapture the island, although they may have spiked the 
vents.
The early 19th century also has little to remark about the 
Fort. In 1816 the Reverend G.B. Bosch visited the island, and 
reported the garrison buildings and council house still 
present, though sorely in need of repair (Attema 1976:43). The 
garrison of the Fort was reduced to 21 men of the 'Jaegers* 
Battalion by 1829, "but this number steadily decreased, 
according to Teenstra. . .11 (Attema 1976:43).
M.D. Teenstra, another visitor to the island, reported 
further deterioration between 1829 and 1834. He saw crumbling 
walls and the entire interior overgrown with vegetation 
(Teenstra 1836/7, cited in Attema 1976). This state of affairs 
led to a limited renovation in 1834. The walls were repaired 
and the gate house remodeled into quarters for the commander 
(Hartog 1964, cited in Attema 1976). Nevertheless, Fort Oranje 
was abandoned as a military post in 1846.
The Fort continued to be used for a variety of purposes 
for the next century. Occasional militia drills were held on 
its grounds. It served as an administration center, as well as 
a night-watch post in the earlier years of the 20th century 
(Lampe, personal communication 1990). A revived interest in
2 06
the Fort came with the Bicentennial of the American 
Revolution. At that time groups from the United States and the 
Netherlands raised funds to restore the Fort to its 18th 
century appearance. Before this was completed, a map was drawn 
up in 1973 (in Attema 1976:plate 15).
As the fort stands today, it is of stone, mortar and 
brick. The restoration raised the walls considerably, as 
noticed from photographs taken in the 19301s-1960's . The lower 
walls over which the cannon could fire may have been the 19th 
century appearance. The brick embrasured walls are said to 
reflect its 18th century style, as embrasures are denoted on 
the earlier maps. The principal gun platform is elevated 
slightly above the main floor. The whole is paved with stone. 
The buildings stand restored, and in 1990 continued their 
existence as administration housing, the Post Office, and a 
draw for tourism.
Fort Oranje, situated as it was above the best access to 
the island, had the potential to be a formidable obstacle to 
attempts at invasion or piracy. In the 17th century it could 
have been at its peak effectiveness, but the rise of the use 
of large warships diminished that as sea powers developed.
Its placement was both an asset and a liability. On the 
cliff it was difficult to assault from the Lower Town. It
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could command the bay with its guns, and could, if reasonably 
prepared, equipped, and motivated, have put up a respectable 
fight against moderate assaults from the land side. Fort 
Oranje was often plagued by problems with its equipment and 
armament, but the Fort itself, had the human factor not been 
so neglectful, may have stopped several of the invasion 
attempts, especially those of the privateers and pirates.
Gilboa Hill
208
A fortification atop Gilboa Hill (elevation 582 feet), on 
the Northwest side of the island is mentioned during the 17th 
century. Little is known about the possibility of a defensive 
work at this site. The area of Gilboa was not visited during 
the 1990 field season due to its remote location, a lack of 
information with which to direct the search, and a lack of 
time. Two residents of St. Eustatius were questioned about 
this site, both of whom have in the past been in the area. 
Neither one could remember any such remains, although one said 
it could be possible there was a platform on the hill, as well 
as sketchy reports of cannon scattered on that side of the 
island. The 1981 survey visited the area, and found no 
artifacts or features whatsoever on Gilboa (Haviser fieldnotes 
1981).
Attema states that a fort was built atop Gilboa during the 
command of Lukas Schorer (1686-1689) "overlooking 
Tommelendijkbay on the north side of the island, giving 
command of the plain" (1976:23). Gilboa Hill is on the other 
side of the island from Tumble Down Dick, overlooking Venus 
and Zeelandia Bays, and no cannon of that time could 
reasonably "command the plain" from Gilboa. Attema*s 
description of the location, save for the name, could only 
plausibly be a battery placed somewhere on the Horseshoe
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mountain up to Cul-de-Sac, which overlooks both Tumble Down 
Dick Bay and the plain.
However, a letter dated April 17, 1688 from Schorer to the 
Heren X in Amsterdam specifically mentions a battery on Gilboa 
(Attema 1976:52, note 12). If in fact a defensive work was 
placed on Gilboa, it would in all likelihood have been a 
simple gun platform. The placement of a military installation 
at this spot would have had value as a lookout post, but 
little as a defensive position. Only further research and 
field survey will help to clarify these questions.
210
The Waterfort 8E94
Fort Amsterdam, Lands Battery 
Nieuwe Fort (New Fort I)
After Fort Oranje, the second known defensive work built 
on St. Eustatius was the Waterfort, also called Fort Amsterdam 
on occasion. The Waterfort, as the name implies, lies on the 
beach at near sea level (approximately 10-15 feet), on the 
north end of Oranje Bay (Figure 17).
The placement of this fort at sea level was deliberate, 
and well intentioned. Fort Oranje commanded the Bay from 
above. It could easily lob projectiles onto enemy vessels, 
but, due to its elevation, could not fire accurately at or 
below the water-line of ships close to shore. The Waterfort 
conversely, with its guns barely above sea level could readily 
ricochet projectiles off the water and strike a ship where it 
would most severely disable it. Such "point-blank" firing was 
in fact the preferred method of disabling a ship.
The exact date of the Waterfort's construction is unclear. 
Hartog states simply that the date is unknown (1976:26). 
Attema believes it to have been constructed during the command 
of Lukas Schorer, between 1686 and 1689, and having been armed 
with 16 cannon (Attema 1976:23). This time frame is also 
echoed by Kandle who states the Waterfort was "built sometime
The Waterfort (Amsterdam) SE94 
E= Probable Embrasure 
B= Possible building foundation 
JD Hartley 1988 
Updated BPH 1990
Feet
Stone floor
Figure 17
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during the close of the 17th century..." (1985:107).
Isaac Lamont proposed the building of new fortifications 
in 1701. No mention is made of the Waterfort at this time, 
either as a proposal or as a fort already present. He did 
suggest the building of new fortifications up the coast from 
the Bay, but these may be in reference to the Tumble Down Dick 
site.
Later mention is made of a "New Fort", in a 17 09 
inventory. It was located "between Tommelendijk and Fort 
Orange", as is the Waterfort, and was reportedly in ruins by 
1753 (Attema 1976:23). This information, combined with the 
location of the "Nieuwe Fort" on the map of 1742 suggest that 
the Waterfort is the same as the "Nieuwe Fort" (here termed 
New Fort I), and it was in existence before 1709.
The Waterfort, then, may have been built anytime between 
about 1686 and the first decade of the 18th century. 
Archaeological excavations or further documentary research in 
the Netherlands may further clarify the date of its first 
appearance.
The Waterfort was an open walled fortification with 
embrasures facing the sea and bay (Figures 17, 18, and 19). 
Both surviving historic plans of the fort indicate seven
/Cicwfti
Figure 18 The F aterfort,  1721 (Attema 1976: PL. 7)
Figure 19 The Waterfort, 1728 
(Attema 1976: PL. 8)
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embrasures. A 1988 mapping of the site indicated eight 
embrasures. The 1990 survey, after Hurricane Hugo uncovered 
buried portions of the walls, found the remains of ten 
possible embrasures. If these are in fact embrasures, they may 
represent a remodeling of the fort after 1726, perhaps as a 
part of the 1748 projects. It is not stated whether or not 
there were any associated structures until after 1724, when 
its function significantly altered.
Militarily, little is said about the Waterfort in the 
earlier years of its existence. Through neglect and apathy, it 
soon fell into disrepair as a defensive work. By the 172 0 fs it 
had begun to be used for mercantile purposes, and was then 
converted to a more lucrative task: a slave depot.
In 1724 a barracks was built (Figure 18) within the fort 
for the quartering of in-transit slaves (Hartog 1976:26). The 
barracks was expanded in 172 6 to lodge more slaves (Figure 
19) . The 1726 enlargement accommodated some 450 individuals 
(Hartog 1976:50).
On April 22, 1726 Commander Lindesay wrote 11 ...as the
Heren can see from the accompanying drawings...[he had built] 
a two-story house,...to give the slaves more comfort" (quoted 
in Attema 1976:29). Although he states this would give the 
slaves more comfort, he also pointed out it could now house
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some "400-450 slaves...The men have the ground floor, and the 
women, girls, and boys above..." (quoted in Attema 1976:29). 
The new barracks was "54 feet long by 21 feet wide (about 18 
by 7 meters) and two stories high" (Attema 1976:29).
The slave trade declined on St. Eustatius by about 1740 or 
1750 and the use of the Waterfort as a depot may have ceased. 
Although the massive stone walls were still present by mid­
century, its main function in that period is assumed to have 
been mercantile, for space in the Lower Town was valuable. 
Commander Johannes de Windt wrote of the Waterfort on April 
12, 1754. He reported it to be in ruins and no longer having 
any artillery present whatsoever (Attema 1976:25 and p. 52, 
note 25).
Within twenty years the fort apparently experienced a 
revival. The muster of 1775 lists "Fort Amsterdam" ("Lands 
Battery" now as well) as garrisoned by one corporal and one 
soldier. Further evidence comes from Alexander le Jeune, who 
wrote to the Amsterdam Chamber in May of 1776 concerning Fort 
Amsterdam:
A house situated there was divided into two by a thin 
wall. One part was lived in by the constable, whilst the 
other served as the powder-house, containing more than 
100,000 pounds of powder. Ten paces away was the kitchen, 
where open fires were used. The wooden roof of the 
powder-house was rotten, and the windows were closed up 
with sun-dried and very flammable linen. Seeing that a 
public footpath went past the storage place where whites
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and negroes walked with pipes, cigars, and open lanterns, 
the danger of a fatal fire was a very real one 
(paraphrased in Attema 1976:41).
The inventory of 1776 shows this battery to have as strong 
an arsenal as Fort Oranje, if not more so. There were nine 18 
pounders and one 12 pounder on carriages, apparently with a 
full 1,800 18 pounder round-shots among the other munitions. 
Only two cannon were sitting idle without carriages, both 6 
pounders (Plate I).
The Waterfort is again mentioned in 1780 by De Jong. He 
found "one small brick building and ten cannons" (Attema 
1976:41). After this report no additional references in the 
inventories are found concerning the site as a defensive work.
One plan of the late 18th or early 19th century does exist 
for this site. Apparently drawn up at the same time as one for 
the proposed work at Bouille, it is entitled "Plan en Profil 
op wat wyse de gedemoileerde Batterye Amsterdam diend herbouwd 
en Versterkt te worden" (Figure 20). It depicts walls 
conforming to the remains of the Waterfort. Behind is a 
building, presumably the barracks. Four additional buildings 
are to the east. Sixteen cannon of 24 pounder calibre were 
indicated.
North of the main battery, on a higher topographical
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level, is another battery with two buildings. This plan is 
like that of Fort Rotterdam, and in a similar location. It was 
marked as having (or to have) six cannon of 13 pounder size 
(?), six mortars, and two howitzers. It was connected to the 
lower section by a stairway.
The profile has some distinct differences from the remains 
found at the Waterfort, even if the plan is in basic 
agreement. As the plan for rebuilding Bouille and constructing 
Montplaisant was apparently not carried out, this may also be 
a proposed plan not carried to completion. The presence of 
Rotterdam could suggest it was, although the suspicion of a 
date for Rotterdam pre-dating this document could also mean 
existing works were to be renovated.
Few surface artifacts and no cannon were found within the 
fort. The area is often used for recreational activities, and 
most surface objects reflected this present use. Some 
scattered ceramic shards were located. A 1981 visit to the 
site located a brown gunflint, suspected to be French. A 
second gunflint was seen in the bay off-shore in 1990. An 
unidentified early 19th century British military button was 
noted east of the fort in disturbed soil behind the present 
"Dance Pavilion".
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Tumble Down Dick SE99
Tommelendijk
Tumble Down Dick battery was placed on the beach at the 
end of a valley formed by Pisga and Pilot Hill. The battery 
gives command of Tumble Down Dick Bay, traditionally a popular 
landing of smugglers, slavers, and pirates. The beach was well 
suited for landing small craft. Although not necessarily an 
"easy" overland access to Oranjestad, it provided a way onto 
the island whilst at the same time affording reasonable 
concealment.
The battery was built sometime between 1701 and 1709,
probably after 1704. Its construction was first proposed by
Commander Isaac Lamont in 1701. His letter to the Heren X 
suggested a new fort "on the west of the island at the foot of 
the Little Mountains" to ward of smugglers (Attema 1976:23). 
Although this reference could have been to a different 
fortification, it seems most likely to describe Tumble Down 
Dick. Attema implies he wished two defenses, one at Tumble 
Down Dick and one "at the foot of the Little Mountains" 
(Attema 1976:23). Armament of this unnamed battery was to be 
8 cannon.
According to the map of ca. 1840 (Figure 11) the "Little
Mountains" are those known as Pisga and the area of Little
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Mountain on the 1963 Netherlands Antilles Cadastral Survey 
Department map. Whether the "Little Mountains" site was or was 
not Tumble Down Dick, it is clear that Lamont wished a battery 
built on this bay. Later documents insinuate this project had 
not been realized before Lamont*s replacement in 1704.
Although the exact date of its inception is vague, the 
battery was in place by 1709, for by that year it had already 
fallen into disrepair. An "inspection" found "cannons and gun- 
carriages partly buried under the ground" (Attema 1976:23) . In 
addition it was so prodigiously vegetated that some of the 
cannon were unable to be located (letter from I. Lamont, 
September 22, 1709, Attema 1976:52, note 15). The fort
apparently was not repaired by the returned Commander Lamont, 
and on November 25th French pirates landed there and went 
overland to take Fort Oranje and plunder the island.
During the leadership of Isaac Faesch (1737-1740) the 
desire to completely rebuild Tumble Down Dick resurfaced. The 
difficulty in attaining sufficient funds from the Company 
remained however, and he was unable to accomplish what he 
wished. In a letter dated March 29, 1740 he reported nothing 
greater than the re-bricking of eight gun platforms and the 
strengthening of the walls (Attema 1976:24).
Also in 1740, Tumble Down Dick received a new guard-house
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"consisting of three rooms" (Hartog 1976:26). A plan of the 
battery, dated March 29, 1740 indicates the barracks was of 
upright wood or cane, with a thatched roof (Figure 21) . 
Unfortunately, all traces of the barracks, an indigo 
processing area, walls running up the valley, and a 
considerable portion of the battery walls were destroyed from 
construction by the oil terminal (Figure 22) . A wall has been 
erected to the north of the remaining wall which mirrors the 
battery's style. Another modern retaining wall behind the 
battery is also reminiscent of the original construction 
techniques.
Tumble Down Dick appears in inventories at least three 
more times. In the January 17, 1753 listing it had 12 cannons, 
of 8 and 6 pounder size. The muster roll of 1775 shows a 
compliment consisting of two corporals ancl one soldier. The 
August 14, 1776 inventory shows the battery had lost two guns, 
down to 10 cannon (Plate I) . These consisted of three 12 
pounders and six 6 pounders with their carriages, and one 12 
pounder without a carriage. Ammunition on hand consisted of 
100 cannon-balls. No further mentions appear in the records.
The ground plan of Tumble Down Dick is somewhat irregular. 
There is a wall facing the beach with several angles, none of 
which are for apparent topographical reasons. They may perhaps 
represent an unskilled attempt at providing flanking cover for
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the central area of the parapet. If so, they would likely have 
failed miserably.
The walls are a mixture of cut stone, faced stone, and 
rounded cobble. These are mortared into approximately nine 
courses. One embrasure incorporates brick on one of its wall 
sections. The uppermost course (in certain sections) and the 
embrasures were most commonly laid with the worked stone. The 
parapet was capped with concrete and small cobble. Writing in 
the concrete prove at least some of the capping is not 
original. There is a slight slant towards the sea on the top 
of the parapet.
The base of the wall interior has areas of an exposed 
footing. This is of the same stone as the walls. The exterior 
has unmodified cobble cemented onto the bottom half of the 
original faced stone wall. This addition was then covered in 
soil to form an embankment (Figure 23). This feature has the 
appearance of being a later modification. Although the use of 
stone for filler was unadvisable, the soil embankment would 
have improved the batteries defensive capability (Tousard 
1809). The soil would act as an absorbent for the impact of 
incoming shells, diminishing their destructive potential. This 
addition may have been from the renovations of Faesch, but 
could have also been from improvements done in the 1780*s, 
when that technique was more appreciated.
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The battery has been stabilized and reinforced with new 
stone and concrete. To what extent is unknown, but it appears 
limited to re-capping sections of the parapet and sealing the 
eroding ends of fallen sections.
During the 1990 survey, a natural phenomenon was detected 
which would have had significant importance to the battery and 
potential invaders. The present oil terminal jetty extends 
approximately one mile from the shore. Officials at the 
terminal allowed the surveyors access to this terminal. From 
this, it was possible to detect wind patterns on the bay that 
would affect a ship's ability to maneuver and land at Tumble 
Down Dick.
On the day of the survey, a wind was blowing from the 
direction of Oranje Bay. Between Oranje Bay and the battery 
lies Pilot Hill. This height effectively serves to deflect the 
winds, creating a calm zone on Tumble Down Dick Bay, from the 
beach to approximately one-eighth of one mile out to sea. This 
"dead zone" would prove disastrous to an attacking sailing 
ship if they were unfortunate enough to get into it. The 
resulting lack of maneuverability would enable the shore 
battery ample opportunity to disable or sink the vessel, 
whilst preventing the ship from quick escape.
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This same effect however, if the battery were ineffective, 
as was the case in the 1709 French pirate landing, would 
facilitate the approach to shore by long boats. Wind and rough 
seas were the cause of several such boats being lost by the 
1781 French invasion at Jenkin's Bay. The hill would also 
serve to conceal landings at this spot, although their vessel 
would lie within sight of Fort Oranje.
The battery at Tumble Down Dick would also suffer from the 
visual impediments caused by both Pilot Hill and Pisga. The 
placement of the battery, flanked on both fronts, prevents the 
garrison from detecting approaching vessels close in to shore 
until they are already within firing range at some points. 
Observers at Fort Oranje could presumably alert the battery on 
such occasions.
The site has been heavily disturbed and modified. Only two 
artifacts were found, both ceramic shards dating to the 18th 
century. An earlier survey of the vicinity found a few 
scattered shards of porcelain and pearlware (Haviser 1981). 
Four cannon were inventoried at Tumble Down Dick, SE99-TDD-1 
to SE99-TDD-4. Two are probably 12 pounders and two 6 
pounders. Varying degrees of deterioration and incongruities 
with standard bore sizes makes these designations dubious.
Fortunately the site was mapped prior to some destruction,
although not before the loss of the barracks area, the "oude 
indigothiere" ("former" indigo-processing area) , and the walls 
seen to the extreme right of the 1740 map. This map was 
reconstructed from field survey notes of J.B. Haviser (Figure
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Battery Dollijn SE71
la Hayes Battery, la Bayes Battery
Battery Dollijn is located at "White Hook, the place where 
the enemy usually passed" (Hartog 1976:26). It is situated in 
a low, vegetated area on the slope above the beach, around 50 
feet above sea level. Although Hartog (1976:2 6) first mentions 
Dollijn with the construction efforts of Heyliger and de Windt 
(circa 1740's), it seems to be an earlier site. Its first 
appearance in documents show it to have been in place by 1709 
(Attema 1976:23). It appears on the 1742 as "Dolien" (Figure 
6) , and again on the 1775 copy (Figure 7) . Hartog suggests the 
name may be a corruption of "D'Olinda, a Netherlands colony in 
Brazil" (1976:26).
As White Hook is located on a slight protrusion, this 
position offered protection of the approach to Oranje Bay from 
the southeast. Most ships coming in from Europe or islands 
east of St. Eustatius would pass this point due to both wind 
and current patterns on the Caribbean side of St. Eustatius.
The low, irregular walls are now situated directly upon 
the bluff edge above the beach. A large gut runs down to the 
shore to the immediate northwest of the battery, and has 
eroded away part of the original wall. The site was prepared 
by excavating a depression to place the battery within,
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somewhat conforming to the cliff edge (Figure 25) . Erosion has 
taken a heavy toll on Dollijn, and the entire site is under 
imminent threat of destruction. Several portions of the wall 
have already fallen into the sea and several portions mapped 
in the 1990 survey were precariously perched on the edge. A 
comparison with the 1981 survey by Haviser shows a significant 
part of the site has been lost within the last nine years.
The battery was constructed of native stone, both worked 
and rubble, mortar, and brick. The ground plan is irregular, 
and seems to have followed the cliff edge more than any 
organized system. The walls were equipped with embrasures at 
several points. The northern most parapet, stands some 2.5 
feet high from the exterior. It is of stone and mortar with 
some brick remaining. Moving southward, mortared rubble is all 
that remains until a better preserved area of parapet is once 
again encountered, this of faced stone and mortar with yellow 
Dutch brick "lining". The floor beneath, in front of the 
embrasure, is laid with yellow brick in triangular formation, 
to serve as a gun carriage platform. The parapet at this point 
stands approximately 3 feet high. Fallen wall segments 
measured up to 4.2 feet in original height, but would have 
been slightly lower when set within a footing and abutted by 
flooring (Figure 26).
Dollijn appears infrequently in the records. On January
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17, 1753 an accounting of the armament found 6 cannon. These 
consisted of 12, 6, and 3 pounders (Attema 1976:25). Future 
inventories, including that of 1776 are silent concerning 
Dollijn, leading to the conclusion that by this time it had 
been abandoned. However, the battery reappears around 1781, 
now under the name of La Hayes battery.
It is probable that during either the British or French 
occupations of 1781-1784 that this defense was resurrected. It 
would have afforded the new defenders a battery with a minimum 
of effort as opposed to beginning a new construction 
altogether.
The irregular shaped battery appears in the legend of the 
circa 1781-1784 French map as number three, ,fBatterie de la 
Baye" (Figure 8). Whether this spelling was intentional or a 
corruption from "Haye" is unknown, but most references of this 
period prefer the latter. It again appears on Faden's 1795 map 
for the Marquis de Bouille, this time as 11 la Hayes Battery1* 
(Figure 9) . Both maps indicate its irregular form to 
distinguish it from the more typical ”U" shaped battery.
By the mid 19th century Dollijn had disappeared from the 
maps, not even mentioned as a "vervallen battery*1. Neither the 
1830, 1840, nor 1847 maps indicate its position (Figures 10- 
12). It may be that it had become lost to memory as well as
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sight early in the 19th century. It is easily overlooked, 
situated in an excavated depression where vegetation and 
erosion obscure its low walls to all but those who 
inadvertently stumble upon it.
No identifiable military artifacts nor cannon were located 
during the survey. Domestic artifacts were few, but included 
ceramic shards and wine bottle fragments. All artifacts 
appeared from field inspection to date in the 18th century.
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Fort Royal (Royale) SE96
Fort Nassau
Fort Royal, on the southern end of Horseshoe Mountain, was 
originally built by the Dutch as Fort Nassau (Hartog 1976:26). 
Its location allowed a command of the northern-most sections 
of the bay and town. The elevation is approximately 270 feet
above mean sea level, although the 19th century sketch gives
it as 375 feet (Figure 13).
This Fort Nassau was probably that suggested in the
defense projects of 1748. At that time it was proposed to 
construct a battery "on a hilltop, which could cover Fort 
Orange, the Village... the approaches, and the whole plain" 
(Attema 1976:24). This best describes the vicinity of Fort 
Royal.
As with all other batteries on the island, soon the Dutch 
Fort Nassau deteriorated and was out of service. Thus it was 
when the British found it in 1781. Realizing its strategic 
potential they rebuilt the battery and christened it Fort 
Royal. The battery had an excellent command of the bay, as 
well as offering an observation post for the western side of 
the island. From here Fort Oranje, the Waterfort, Fort 
Rotterdam, Battery Concordia, Four-Gun Battery, and Battery 
Bouille are visible, as well as Oranjestad and the entire
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Cultivation Plain.
Inventories of the island defenses neglect Fort Royal. 
References to a "Nassau" in the Dutch records apparently refer 
to the coastal battery rather than this one. Later records 
(post 1781) mention its name (Royal) , but no specific 
information is offered in the available references to these 
inventories.
The battery first appears on maps with the circa 1781 
French cartographic rendition. It is named in the legend under 
number 12, the "Batterie Royal" (Figure 8). The 1795 map also 
marks "Royal Battery" (Figure 9) . By 183 0 Fort Royal had long 
been abandoned. It appears on the map of this date, but does 
not appear in the legend, nor is it named on the map itself 
(Figure 10). Both the circa 1840 and 1847 maps list Royal as 
"vervallen" and mark its position (Figures 11 and 12) . Neither 
call it by name.
The remains of the Fort Royal complex consist of a semi­
circular low wall on the cliff edge above Oranje Bay (Figure 
27). Situated further inland along the ridge top is a stone 
and yellow brick powder magazine, and further on the garrison 
barracks and cistern (Figure 28) .
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from 1.8 to 3.4 feet wide. The maximum height along the wall, 
from the exterior, was approximately 2 feet, and had 2 to 3 
courses of volcanic stone. The wall had other areas of 
concrete alone remaining, with no stone present. The stones 
were placed so as to present a faced surface. Along the wall 
were 7 cannon, some lying across the wall, others behind 
(SE96-FR-1 to SE96-FR-7). The cannon included three 18 
pounders, one 12 pounder, two 8 pounders, and one 8 or 9 
pounder.
Approximately 2 00 feet to the northeast of the southern 
wall of the battery are the remains of the suspected powder 
house. This building was constructed of stone, yellow brick, 
and mortar. It measured 17 by 13 feet, and standing walls were 
up to 7 feet in height, though most had fallen.
Continuing northwest some 100 feet beyond the powder 
house, along the eastern edge of the mountain, may be found 
the barracks compound (Figure 29) . This feature contained the 
foundations of the barracks area, a domed cistern of yellow 
brick, and several other foundations or low running walls. All 
were of mortared stone.
Running up the mountain side from the plain below the 
eastern edge was a road of unknown vintage. It now has several 
large boulders on it, making it impassable to all but foot
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travel. These appear to have rolled onto the road, and do not 
appear recent. Several trees have also grown up within the 
road. This feature does not appear on maps until 1830 (Figure 
10) . According to this map, it began in the Upper Town, 
climbed the mountain below Royal, and then followed the ridge 
up to the entrenchment between Battery Jussac and Fort Panga. 
Although it is not seen until this date, as the batteries were 
largely abandoned by 1830, and the necessity of its presence 
for the garrison before that date, it is suspected this road 
was contemporaneous with the 18th century barracks and 
battery.
Surface artifacts were few, including green glass bottle 
fragments, pearlware, stonewares, and pipestems. Additional 
artifacts, mostly green glass fragments, were noted in the 
cistern at the barracks.
The site has suffered disturbance within the last twenty 
years. A cement pad and antenna are within the battery, and a 
road along the ridge top extends within the battery walls. 
Both were constructed by a former oil terminal supervisor, 
sometime in the 1970's.
Fort Hollandia/ New Fort II
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Fort Hollandia, also referred to as the "Nieuwe Fort" 
(here New Fort II, to distinguish it from the Waterfort) , was 
said to have been built in 1748 "on the bay" (Hartog 1976:26) . 
The name Hollandia was that used until after 1749, when 
"Nieuwe Fort" became the more common appellation. Its intent 
was to help protect the warehouses springing in the Lower 
Town, as the island's importance as a trade center boomed.
Attema (1976:24) reports it was built amongst the 
"Manchenillebomen" (manchineel trees) , which apparently refers 
to somewhere along the Lower Town/Bay area. Such trees can be 
found in the vicinity of the Waterfort, and some records 
suggest extended up to Billy's Gut in the 18th century. She 
goes on to pin-point its proposed location as at "a place 
below the neglected New Fort [the Waterfort] between 
Tommelendijk and Fort Oranje" (Attema 1976:24). If this 
placement is correct then Fort Hollandia would have been 
located somewhere along the Lower Town between Smoke Alley (or 
even Billy's Gut) and the area below Fort Oranje.
No definitely identifiable traces of Fort Hollandia (as an 
independent fortification) were found. There are several 
possibilities. One is that it was also known by a name other 
than the Hollandia and the New Fort. If this is the case, the
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likely candidates are the Waterfort or Fort Rotterdam. The 
second possibility is that the remains of this defense have 
yet to have be discovered.
If Hollandia was in fact the Waterfort, that would explain 
discrepancies in the number of embrasures noted in the surveys 
and on historic maps. According to one resident familiar with 
the island's history, the Waterfort may also have been known 
as Hollandia from time to time (Lampe, personal communication, 
1990).
The Waterfort, known to have been severely deteriorated by 
the 1740's, could have been rebuilt by the 1748 project. If 
this is true, it soon reclaimed its former name. In 1753 there 
were 16 cannon at the "Nieuwe Fort" (Hollandia) according to 
the January 17 inventory. At this accounting it contained 12, 
8, 6, and 3 pounders (Attema 1976:25).
The "Nieuwe Fort" (II) appearing in the inventory does, 
however, seem to be distinct from the New Fort (I) , known to 
be the Waterfort. A letter of 1754 from Commander de Windt 
clearly states that the New Fort (I) was in ruins and devoid 
of artillery. The loss of 16 cannon in one year seems 
improbable, barring severe storms at such a low fort. The 
evidence suggests that the Waterfort was not in fact the 
Hollandia of the 1748 project, although it may have assumed
that moniker at some other time for a brief period.
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The second candidate for this first hypothesis is Fort 
Rotterdam. Little is known about this fortification. It is 
built in the area suggested for Hollandia in the records, at 
a slightly higher elevation than the Waterfort. Considering 
the rapid deterioration the Waterfort experienced, it seems 
logical a new fort would be placed in a somewhat more 
protected area, yet still at a level close enough to the 
water-line for effective ship destruction. Rotterdam fulfills 
these requirements.
The second hypothesis, that Hollandia remains 
undiscovered, is also a distinct possibility. Limited searches 
of the Lower Town for military sites resulted in a few 
potentialities. The first is a low, mostly buried yellow brick 
wall near the base of the "Slave Trail", in front of SE341. It 
is quite reminiscent of the embrasures seen at Battery Nassau. 
However, its placement in the warehouse section probably 
suggest it is no more than the remains of an entrance-way to 
a former commercial building.
The second site with military inclinations was SE383. Here 
there are two iron cannon (SE383-LT-1 and SE38 3-LT-2). SE383 
is described as "One north-south oriented stone wall 
fragment... 1.5 ft. wide" (Barka 1985:25). No further
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information could be found concerning this wall. It is 
probable that this is not a battery wall, though the exposed 
remains somewhat conform in size to batteries of the 1780's, 
if not in plan. The mere presence of the cannon is not in 
itself suggestive of SE383 as a military site. In fact, these 
cannon quite possibly represent two of the guns condemned in 
1778, credited with the salute to the Andrew Doria, and pushed 
over the cliff for scrap iron.
Fort Hollandia remains a mystery. Of all the known sites, 
it is best fitted to Fort Rotterdam. Rotterdam follows the 
style of construction seen at the Dutch fortifications of the 
first half of the 18th century, and it is located in an area 
that matches written descriptions for the placement of 
Hollandia. Further documentary research or archaeological 
exploration at Rotterdam or in the Lower Town may reveal new 
information, but little more may be said at this time.
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Fort de Windt 8E8
Lisburn's Battery, Back-Off Bay Battery
Fort de Windt, on Back-Off Bay, began as simple earthen 
"entrenchments" as early as 1748 if not before (Hartog 
1976:26). These were later transformed by Jan de Windt into 
the fortification which is now restored. The stone walled 
battery was erected in 1756 (Barka 1985:65). The site may be 
reached by following the Coast Road to its termination at 
Back-Off Bay, overlooking St. Kitts.
Fort de Windt was briefly excavated by a team from the 
College of William and Mary, under James Kochan, for 
restoration purposes in 1981. Unfortunately the resulting 
report (Kochan, J. Archaeological and Architectural 
Investigations at Fort de Windt# St. Eustatius, Netherlands 
Antilles, 1982) could not be located. A summation was given in 
Barka (1985:65-67). It reported in part that the:
...research revealed Fort de Windt to be an irregular 
fortification, built following the contour of the site it 
was constructed upon. The battery was probably designed 
and executed by an amateur or self-trained military 
engineer rather than a professional, to meet local 
conditions.
No remains of structural features were found within 
the battery, although building rubble and ceramic scatter 
near the site may indicate the possible location of a 
water cistern or small guardhouse.
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Fort de Windt was situated upon a point on the cliffs 
above the bay. This position could defend against passing 
ships from the direction of St. Kitts, as well as attempts at 
landing troops on the beach below. Although a more difficult 
ascent than at other landing sites, Back-Off Bay provides 
sufficient access to the island and is unobservable from 
Oranjestad and Fort Oranje.
The position also had utility as an observation post. 
Ships approaching from the eastern islands and Europe would 
commonly pass this point. In addition, the British island of 
St. Kitts, with its formidable Brimstone Hill fortress, was in 
view.
The "V,f shaped battery consisted of two parapets, and a 
low wall (Figure 3 0) . The wall is of cobble placed to present 
a faced surface. One parapet, that facing Brimstone Hill to 
the east, stands just under 5 feet high, with one embrasure, 
and is capped with lime mortar or cement. In this parapet is 
embedded a stone plaque reading "I.D.W." (Jan de Windt) with 
"A R" below. The southern parapet is much lower, standing 
approximately 1.5 feet high, with no embrasures. A low wall on 
the inward side possibly functioned as a retainer for the soil 
behind. The interior of the battery was cobble paved for a gun 
platform.
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Fort de Windt appears in the 1776 inventory as "de Wind" 
(Plate I). Although most likely a corruption of de Windt, it 
could also describe the site, as it is constantly under the 
winds of the sea. In fact, records indicate it was destroyed 
by hurricane winds in 1772, and had to be rebuilt (Hartog 
1976:44). Perhaps the omission of the "t" in de Windt was not 
completely a mistake.
The inventory lists 4 cannon at the battery, one 12 
pounder and three 6 pounders. The 12 pounder likely stood 
guard at the single embrasure facing St. Kitts, and the 6 
pounders along the lower parapet. A 1775 muster roll records 
three men stationed at de Windt, one corporal and two 
soldiers.
The next inventory that mentions the site is the 1780 
listing of De Jong. The 4 cannon remained, but the garrison 
had changed considerably. De Jong stated the battery was 
"manned by a constable, a small boy, and a black maid" (Attema 
1976:41).
The arrival of British forces in 1781 saw de Windt renamed 
"Lisburn*s Battery" (also spelled Lisbourne). It appears as 
such in inventories of 1784 and 1791, as well as both the 
circa 1781 and 1795 French maps (Figures 8 and 9) . Both armies 
utilized this fortification, but to what extent, if any, they
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modified or rebuilt it is unknown. The battery continued in 
use off and on from this time until around 1815 when it was 
abandoned at the end of the Napoleonic Wars (Barka 1985:65).
The battery is not listed in the legend of the 183 0 map 
(Figure 10) . There is a marking at the site which may be the 
fort's ruins, but available copies of this map are too 
illegible to be certain. It is unlikely that this fort could 
be overlooked, as substantial remains would have existed at 
that time, and several less impressive ruined batteries were 
located on this map. Both the circa 1840 and 1847 maps list 
the battery as "Vervallen", but revert to the use of the name 
"De Windt" (Figures 12 and 13).
An artifact collection was not undertaken in 1990. 
Artifacts noted included stonewares of the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, and assorted ceramics of the same date. Four 
cannons were inventoried, SE8-FDV-1,2,3, and 4. Two (SE8-FDV-1 
and 2) have been remounted onto reproduction carriages. There 
is one 18 pounder, one probable 12 pounder, and two probable 
6 pounders. The battery was restored in the early 1980's.
Battery Nassau SE66
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Battery Nassau was begun as a Dutch defense. It was first 
proposed for the projects of 1748. The battery at 
"Hillegatspoint", was to be named Zeelandia, and armed with 8 
cannon. Although planned, it was not actually built until a 
later date (Attema 1976:24 and p.52 note 19).
Although the starting date of construction is unknown, 
Fort Nassau was in use by 1750 (Hartog 1976:44). During the 
hurricane of 1772, Nassau was severely damaged. It was soon 
rebuilt and received "three extra rooms, which were used as 
the military hospital" (Hartog 1976:44). The remains of this 
building were not clearly identifiable during the survey. A 
small, rectangular stone cobble foundation and associated 
rubble was located, but this did not conform to the 
documentary description.
Map data on Battery Nassau is somewhat unreliable. The 
fort, as expected, does not appear on the 1742 map of the 
island. The 1775 map, which should denote Nassau, however, 
does not. This rendition is known to be a copy of the 1742 
map, and this omission exemplifies the poor quality and 
reliability of that document for military sites.
The French map of 1781 proves more trustworthy. The legend
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names "Batterie de Nassau" as number 4 (Figure 8) . Faden's 
1795 map also locates "Nassau's Battery" (Figure 9). In 183 0 
it reappears as "Batterie Nussea" (Figure 10) , and again in 
circa 1840 and 1847 as "vervallen" (Figures 11 and 12).
The position at Hillegatspoint sets at approximately 50 
feet above sea-level, on the northern cliff of Kay Bay. It was 
meant to monitor and control the approach of ships from the 
southeast, the direction from which a great deal shipping 
arrived. Although Kay Bay itself is of little value for 
landing, to the immediate north of the battery is a gut up 
which troops could easily march. The cliff itself also slopes 
down to the beach north of the site, facilitating access to 
the top. The major impediment to such landings here are not 
from the beach cliffs: they are from the coral reef along the 
coast here. This area presently has sufficient coral colonies 
to prevent any landing. Presumably this situation also existed 
in the 18th century.
The battery remains seem reasonably well preserved, 
although they are dangerously close to falling over the cliff 
edge. The ground plan of Nassau is a short, wide arc (Figure 
31) with rounded ends. Rubble shows the battery extended 
further to the north than the solidly intact wall. The wall 
sections measure approximately six feet wide.
Several areas exhibited what is thought to be the original
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surface capping, suggesting this battery had a low parapet. 
The interior height at an intact area measured .85 of a foot 
from the present soil surface. The exterior on this portion of 
the parapet stood 1.6 feet above the present ground level. The 
walls are constructed of cobble stone held together with
mortar. The parapet was capped with a smoothed cement.
As with several other earlier Dutch fortifications, Nassau 
was engineered with embrasures for its cannon. Even allowing 
for soil deposition on the battery floor, the parapet appears 
to have never been high enough to require this type of
feature. Their inclusion may be attributable to tradition 
rather than function. The use of such embrasures on the island 
appears to be associated with Dutch fortifications. Depending 
upon the date of construction of Fort Rotterdam, this may be 
further narrowed to Dutch works of the mid-l8th century and 
earlier.
Fort Nassau appears in several inventories. Although said
to have been in use by 1750 in Hartog (1976), Attema (1976)
does not mention its presence in the inventory of January 17, 
1753. This may be indicative of it not being in service yet, 
already in ruins, or simply having been omitted.
It does appear by 1775. In that year a muster roll of the 
island's garrisons was taken and Nassau was found to be manned
by two individuals, one corporal and one soldier.
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Another inventory (Plate I) of that period informs us that 
the battery was equipped with two 18 pounders and one 12 
pounder, both with serviceable carriages. A few years later, 
in 1780, de Jong found these cannon, and declared all three to 
be "untrustworthy” (Attema 1976:41). The 1990 survey recorded 
one cannon at Nassau (SE66-BN-1). Its bore was 13 0 mm. It may 
have been an 18 pounder.
The precise date of abandonment of the battery is never 
specified. In 1816 Fort Orange and 4 other forts were still in 
use. One was Fort Panga, leaving three unknown. Nassau may or 
may not have been among these. Either way it would have been 
out of service shortly thereafter if not before.
Fort Rotterdam
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Fort Rotterdam is another of the defenses shrouded in 
mystery. The first appearance of Rotterdam as such in those 
documents available for this study was not until the map of 
circa 1840 (although that section of the 1830 map was 
illegible). The St. Eustatius Historical Foundation Museum has 
a map of the island's defenses which gives Rotterdam a date of 
late 18th century. Inquiries could not discover the origin or 
author of this particular map. Field inspection and 
comparisons to other works on the island of known dates 
suggest to the researcher an earlier date.
It may be that Rotterdam was known by another name when it 
was first constructed, and was built and into ruins again 
before being located on maps. The 1742 map does not denote it, 
unless it is the "New Fort" rather than the Waterfort. The 
1775 version has no "Rotterdam" but that map also omits other 
defenses known to have been in use at that time.
It may well be that Rotterdam was Hollandia (New Fort II) . 
Architectural and masonry styles resemble those of the Dutch 
fortifications of the Waterfort, Nassau, and Fort Orange. 
Those are all pre-1750's works, which, by association, may 
indicate a similar date for Rotterdam.
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The late 18th century date given on the museum map may 
have its founding from a document of the Waterfort, or Fort 
Amsterdam that survives. A late 18th or early 19th century 
plan exists entitled "Plan en Profil op wat wyse de 
gedemoileerde Batterye Amsterdam diend herbouwd en Versterkt 
te worden" (Figure 20). The plan depicts walls conforming to 
the remains of the Waterfort, and perhaps represents a 
proposed reconstruction of the defenses.
Behind Fort Amsterdam's walls, north of the main battery 
on a higher topographical level, is another battery with two 
buildings. This plan conforms to the remains of Fort 
Rotterdam, and is in a similar location. It was marked as 
having (or to have) six cannon of 13 pounder size (?) , six 
mortars, and two howitzers. It was connected to the lower 
section by a stairway.
Whether or not this actually is Rotterdam is unknown, but 
it seems probable. The important question is whether this plan 
is a proposal like that of Bouille and Montplaisant that was 
not completed, or a map of a completed project. No trace of 
the two buildings indicated there were located, possibly 
indicating it was merely a proposal. The existence of a 
battery at this site in the plan does nothing to solve the 
date question. Rotterdam may well have been in existence when 
it was drawn up and as an intended renovation project.
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The fortification is situated upon a hill overlooking the 
Waterfort. This hill, beyond Smoke Alley, forms the 
southeastern side of Billy's Gut, and is the end of a ridge 
extending from the Upper Town. It faces Oranje Bay at a 
distance of an estimated 150 feet. It stands around 75 feet 
above sea level.
The ruins at Rotterdam have suffered fairly extensive 
damage from erosion and probable scavenging for building 
material (Figure 32) . The remaining parapet sections have 
fallen, but in situ foundations exist. The intact, though 
displaced, parapet remnants were of a massive stone mortared 
construction as seen at the Waterfort, built in the last 
decade of the 17th century or first decade of the 18th. It was 
open at the back, the whole being laid into an excavated area. 
Behind this, over the hill, is a flat area which contained the 
Godet (SE95) ruins. This tract was too overgrown to 
investigate, but associated barracks might also be somewhere 
in that vicinity, or back along the ridge toward the Upper 
Town, if there ever were such buildings.
The parapet wall stood some 5 feet high, consisting of at 
least 6 courses of mortared stone. The wall measured 4.6 feet 
thick. Exposed stones were faced, and the wall core included 
some coral as well. They were then capped on the top of the 
parapet with smoothed cement. Embrasures would have been
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necessary to allow the cannon to fire beyond these large 
walls. One definite and two possible examples of such features 
were detected.
Artifacts located at Rotterdam included the usual 
selection of ceramics, but a field assessment suggested more 
18th century types were represented than 19th. Several 
pipestems were located, as well as green glass, clear glass, 
and a wine-glass stem fragment among the other objects. No 
cannon were present at Rotterdam, which is to be expected 
considering its proximity to the bay and the relative ease 
salvors would have in retrieving cannon abandoned there. A 
site close to Rotterdam contained a British military button of 
circa 1781 (see "Powder-House”).
Battery Bouille SE69
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Battery Bouille is situated on the coastal cliff southeast 
of Gallows Bay, above and southeast of Crooks Castle (SE7). 
The position commands the approach to Oranje Bay from the 
direction of St.Kitts, as well as Gallows Bay. A gut north of 
the battery, situated behind Crook's Castle, would also be 
worthy of protection. It provided access to the Upper Town, 
and was within range of the battery guns. It is elevated 
approximately 70 feet above the sea. An early document gives 
its distance from Fort Oranje as 5,800 feet (Figure 13).
Battery Bouille is a well preserved example of an open 
coastal artillery battery of the 18th century. Hartog 
(1976:97) states that it was built by the French during their 
occupation of 1781, and named after the Marquis de Bouille, 
commander of the expeditionary force, at that time. This date 
is supported by evidence from several maps. Those maps pre­
dating the British occupation of 1781 show no sign of a 
battery at this location, although the few maps of this 
earlier period concentrated on plantations.
The first appearance of a battery at this location on 
known documents occurs on the circa 1781 French "Plan De 
L'Isle De St. Eustache" (Figure 8). As the map marks the 
landing site of the French forces, this denotes a tempus post
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quem of November 25, 1781 for the document, so it may date to 
1782. Here the site is listed as "Batterie de Bouille", number 
2 in the legend. It is depicted as an open battery with a 
central building behind, closely resembling the appearance of 
the ruins surveyed (Figures 33-35).
The next appearance of Battery Bouille is on the map 
engraved by William Faden dated November 10, 1795 for the
Marquis de Bouille (Figure 9) . The map notes that it was 
prepared "from the Original in His [Bouille1s] Possession". 
The original draft then would date after November 25, 1781,
presumably when the Marquis had the island mapped for his own 
defensive purposes. The battery is once again depicted as an 
open wall with a building to the rear.
Following the 1795 map, Bouille Battery appears on Samuel 
Falsberg's 1830 map (Figure 10). Ten years later the site is 
marked by A.H. Bisschop Grerelihk. This map, circa 184 0, 
denotes it as number 11, "Vervallen battery" (decayed or 
ruins) (Figure 11). Although the battery walls are depicted, 
no associated buildings appear on the map by this time. One 
additional map by the same cartographer, dated 1847, also 
records the "Vervallen" battery (Figure 12).
In addition to map references, at least one other document 
survives relating to the site. The Hague preserves a copy of
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the "Plan en Profil der Geprojecteerde Batteryen op Bouille en 
Montplaisant" (Figure 36) . This plan, dating to the late 18th 
or early 19th century, was a proposed project to reconstruct 
Bouille and supplement its defensive position with the 
addition of another battery, Montplaisant, to the north of the 
gut above Crooks Castle.
The plan suggests a new layout for Bouille which would 
accommodate "14 canons". These were to be supplemented by six 
mortars and two howitzers. The sister battery was to be armed 
with "14 stukken a 24 lb. 4 Mortieren en 2 Howitzers" 
(fourteen 24 pounders, four mortars and two howitzers). 
Investigations around the area indicated on the plan revealed 
no evidence of Battery Montplaisant. Limited investigations at 
Bouille did not show any significant alterations to that 
battery, suggesting the plan was never implemented. Cobble 
foundations were located that may have extended the battery 
somewhat. It is unknown whether these pertain to the original 
battery, or post-date it. The possibility also exists that 
some features may pre-date the suspected French origin for the 
battery. It is quite probable the British placed a work at 
this site.
Although the name of the battery, and literature (Hartog 
1976; Attema 1976), suggest the French built Bouille after 
November 25, 1781, no irrefutable evidence yet exists to
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support this claim. Documents record that the British also 
fortified the island during their occupation from February to 
November, 1781. Currently little information has come to light 
to confirm what defensive features the British had begun or 
completed by their ousting with the arrival of French forces. 
All that is known is that Admiral Rodney and General Vaughan, 
along with Colonel Cockburne, attended to the fortification of 
the island, and believed it secure. The long list of British 
forts on the island for 1781 may suggest that Bouille was in 
fact begun before the arrival of the French, though they may 
have been responsible for its completion.
The masonry of Bouille suggests time was not a large 
factor as the stone is carefully cut and faced. The parapets 
do not incorporate cobble as at Concordia, which is attributed 
to the British occupation. As the French occupied the island 
for several years after capturing it from Britain, they would 
have had the luxury of preparing the stonework. The British on 
the other hand were preoccupied with the distribution of 
captured commodities and the rapid re-fortification of St. 
Eustatius and therefore may have constructed in a hastier 
manner.
Battery Bouille*s parapet is constructed of cut stone and 
mortar. The stone, probably native, was cut into rectangular 
blocks. An average block measures 1.8 x .8 x .3 feet. Variance
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was more commonly found in length than width or breadth. The 
blocks were then laid with a lime based mortar incorporating 
crushed coral. Red brick is also utilized in the drain to the 
front left of the center section (Figure 37) . The brick was 
probably imported. The stone may have been quarried from the 
cliffs near Back-Off Bay, north of Fort de Windt, although 
this theory has not been investigated.
The interior of the battery was laid with a stone floor. 
The entire floor is presently covered in approximately two to 
six inches of soil, and could not be accurately mapped. A 
small section was uncovered beneath cannon SE69-BB-1. This 
area was floored with small flat stones roughly one inch thick 
and three to six inches wide. Probing of the remainder of the 
battery*s interior suggested a similar surface to be present 
throughout the interior of the battery.
To the rear of the battery are foundations of cobblestone 
and poured concrete. The concrete forms a triangular area 
centered between the two outer wings. The rear section was 
found to be open. From the end of either concrete footing 
extended cobblestone foundations. These may have functioned as 
gun platforms.
The front right wing had an additional cobble pile at the 
north-east termination. The configuration of the rubble
cut stone
brick
Figure 37 
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suggests it is the remains of a short extension of the wall. 
The lack of worked stone here may indicate a later feature, 
though this does not bring the battery up to the 
specifications noted on the proposed reconstruction plan.
The opposite termination had a smaller rubble pile nearby, 
but was not as indicative of a wall extension. From this 
(front-left) termination extended a small cobble foundation in 
a step pattern, creating an asymmetrical plan.
To the rear of the battery ruins was a large rectangular 
depression, approximately 2 3 feet wide by 47 feet long. The 
northern edge had several square stone blocks forming a 
partial foundation. No other foundation or footing was exposed 
along the depression's perimeter. This feature probably 
represents the barracks, and is that which is indicated on the 
18th century maps. A probable 19th century sketch also shows 
a guard house in this position (Figure 13). A rubble pile of 
large cobble is located between the barracks and the northern 
cobble floor foundations.
Northeast of the battery is a large rubble pile and hill, 
possibly the remains of a well or circular cellar. This may be 
the remains of another building on the sketch. A cistern with 
the western end now open is located closer to the present 
road, also north-east of the battery. It is not known if this
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is associated with the military site or plantation activity.
To the south-east of the battery is another possible 
foundation of laid stone. This feature suggests a small 
rectangular structure. This may be the powder magazine 
indicated on the early sketch, although it is not in the same 
position indicated.
The entire battery is situated within a slight depression 
apparently prepared at the time of original construction. This 
feature does somewhat conform, in principle if not in detail, 
to the "Plan en Profil". It is unlikely that this would have 
been landscaped after the battery was completed, as the main 
battery features are situated on top of the excavated area.
The battery faces west-southwest (approximately 250 
degrees), fronting the Caribbean. This placement allows the 
battery control of the area and approach south of Gallows Bay, 
and the southern approach to the Roadstead and Oranje Bay. The 
battery also could have controlled boat access to the beach 
and gut behind Crook's Castle, north of the battery. During 
the 18th century there was a path up this ravine giving access 
to the southern end of the Upper Town (Barka 1985:43-44), 
although the coral reef just offshore would have made landing 
there difficult.
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A surface artifact collection was undertaken at the site. 
A variety of artifacts were recovered, as well as the 
recording of three artillery pieces (SE69-BB-1,2,and 3). At 
least one gun, SE69-BB-1 may be attributable to British 
manufacture. This piece included a cartouche (Figure 57) , 
though difficult to view, due to the position of the gun and 
condition of the metal. The symbol appears to be a crown and 
cipher, as found on many British cannon. Its bore calibre also 
conforms to the size of an English 12 pounder. One 2 inch 
round iron solid shot was found in the soil in front of the 
muzzle of cannon SE69-BB-1. It may have been part of a grape 
or canister shot stored at the battery. An identical sized 
shot was noted below the battery, in the ruins of Crooks 
Castle (SE7), but was not collected. The second cannon appears 
to be a 12 pounder, and the third a 24 pounder, possibly 
French.
One narrowly identifiable military artifact was a brass 
button of the British Royal Regiment of Artillery (Figure 38) . 
This object was found on the present surface near the rear of 
the southern-most wing of the battery. The Other Ranks button 
is a one piece convex brass disk with eye. The face has a 
Norman shield with three cannon balls in line across the top, 
and three cannon in line down the shield. The cast button is 
backmarked, this being slightly obscured from oxidations. It 
read "...GOWAN LONDON" (Gowan or McGowan, both thought to be
British 15th Regiment of Foot 
(The East Yorkshire Regiment)
Other Ranks pewter button
style in use circa 1760*8— 1800
Regimental information suggests
this speciemen was from the 1781 occupation
(reconstructed view)
,\ 00th Regiment button 
British ? I
(The Clydesdale Regiment of Light Infantry ?) p 
SE81. Battery Concordia (Fort Amsterdam) ji
British Royal Artillery button
SE69, Battery Bouille
style in use from 1785— 1802
Figure 38 Uilitary buttons from St. Eustatius
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firms producing such buttons). The style of the button places 
it in the period 1785-1802 (Wilkinson-Latham 1973:96). The 
presence of a backmark suggests a manufacture in the last 
decade of the 18th century to 1802 when the button style 
changed. This time-frame suggests the button was lost during 
the British occupation of April 21, 1801 to November 21, 1802. 
The previous British occupation would have had uniformed 
artillerists with a different button design, as did the next 
British occupation in 1810. This artifact was returned to the 
archaeological laboratory at the College of William and Mary 
for conservation.
Among other artifacts found at this site were several 
ceramic shards including Dutch delft, Chinese porcelain, 
Germanic salt-glaze, English luster ware, creamware, 
pearlware/whiteware transfer print, white salt-glaze, and a 
variety of lead glazed and unglazed earthenwares. One green 
glass wine bottle base fragment was found, and probably dates 
to the early 19th century. Two tobacco pipe bowl fragments 
were found, one appearing Dutch, and having a heelmark. One 
leisure item was located, half of a clay marble. Miscellaneous 
metal artifacts include 3 to 5 iron nails, and a brass diamond 
shaped plate (approximately 1.8 x 1.3 x .1 cm).
Frederick's Battery
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Battery Frederick is located about midway between Battery 
Nassau and Fort de Windt. The site could not be located during 
the 1990 survey. Long time residents of the island who were 
questioned had not seen this battery. One suggested it may 
have suffered the fate Dollijn is quickly succumbing to, and 
had fallen over the cliff into the sea. Although this is one 
alternative, it is also possible that the site was simply 
missed. The terrain and vegetation often obscure such ruins, 
especially those with low walls or only foundations remaining. 
In addition, sections of the coast from Nassau to de Windt 
were not able to be thoroughly covered.
Frederick's battery appears on only two maps before again 
disappearing. It is number 5, "Batterie de Frederic" in the 
circa 1781 version, and.Frederick's Battery on the 1795 map.
Faden's map depicts this battery as an opened walled 
construction as Bouille, complimented with a barracks for the 
garrison behind. In all likelihood this battery was built by 
the British in 1781, and re-occupied by the French. It was 
probably abandoned after the return of the Dutch in 1784, for 
it soon disappears from all maps and records.
Fort Panga SE97
Signal Hill, Vigis, Digie
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Fort Panga is a battery and observation post at the 
pinnacle of Signal Hill. It is generally attributed to the 
French, although there is little evidence to substantiate this 
theory. Hartog simply states it is of "unknown origin" 
(1976:27), whilst Attema implies it may have been one of the 
proposed 1748 projects (1976:52 note 21). Other evidence 
suggests the 1748 project was in fact Fort Nassau (Royal) and 
not Panga. Later Hartog, while discussing the French re­
fortification of 1781-1782 writes that "a new fort was 
constructed where one could reconnoitre the sea" atop Panga 
(1976:97). This could have been a new fort altogether, or a 
rebuilding of an existing observational position. Early maps 
of St. Eustatius do not denote a fortification atop Signal 
Hill until after 1781. It is may therefore be likely this is 
the date of its origin.
The first occurrence, on the French map of circa 1781, 
marked "Fort de Panga" with a drawing of a square, four- 
bastioned fort (Figure 8) . The remains did not conform to the 
symbolic depiction. Fort Oranje is drawn in the same manner.
The next map, the 1795 version for the Marquis de Bouille, 
also marks it in the way the earlier one did (Figure 9). Such
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similarities suggest the circa 1781 map was used by Faden in 
the preparation of Bouille's map, possibly supplied to him by 
the Marquis himself.
In 1830 Panga is called "la Digie" in that map's legend 
(Figure 10). The nearby Battery Jussac is noted as the 
"Redoutte, aux Bombes", suggesting it was considered a part of 
Fort Panga rather than an independent battery as it appears on 
the previous maps. The sketch of the defenses, suspected to be 
of a similar date, calls Jussac "Redoutte", but refers to 
Panga as "Vigis" rather than "Digie" (Figure 13). These 
appellations might be translatable as "Lookout" from the 
French "Vigie". Within ten years, Fort Panga was called by yet 
another name. Both the 184 0 and 1847 maps refer to it as 
"Seinpost" (Figures 11 and 12).
Fort Panga was garrisoned from at least the French 
occupation of 1781, until its abandonment by the Dutch in 
1819. In that year it was destroyed by a hurricane, and was 
not rebuilt (Hartog 1976:97). Remains of modern Dutch and 
American ration containers and ammunition clips left at Panga 
are evidence of continued periodic military use during field 
exercises.
The work atop Panga is well fortified: not through strong 
defensive walls, but through its topographic position. Any
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approach to Panga requires an ascent of the mountain from one 
side or another, and would expose the enemy to the defenders 
cannon. The fort complex rests at 766.4 feet according to the 
Cadastral Survey map. The 19th century sketch gives this as 
1,185 feet, and 7,480 feet from Fort Oranje.
The shortest route to the fort is up the northern face, 
from the saddle where the present oil terminal gate is. 
Remains of a roadway were located during the 199 0 survey on 
this side, and together with the road from Fort Royal could 
have provided access to Signal Hill.
The side facing the Cultivation Plain is steep and rocky, 
and would have been a poor choice for an assault head. Another 
reasonable approach from the Plain would have been from the 
Fort Royal direction along the ridge, or up between the 
Horseshoe Mountain and Signal Hill.
Vegetation was quite abundant on Signal Hill, both 
reducing visibility of ground features and increasing 
difficulty of the ascent. Had this vegetation existed in the 
18th century an attacking army would have been severely 
hampered in the assault. The presence of a north-south stone 
wall on the northern side of the mountain however, may suggest 
the area was at one time in cultivation.
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The battery is constructed on the upper-most height of 
Signal Hill (Figure 39) . It is an elevated platform resting on 
a high, man-made, stone base (Figure 40) . The platform rises 
from 5 to 7 feet from the natural surface, in several courses 
of mortared stone cobble placed to present a faced surface. 
The road ends at the base of the platform, and at this point 
an earthen trench or road heads off to the west to connect 
Panga with the battery on Cul de Sac.
On the northeast side was a series of stone steps acting 
as an entrance to the battery platform. A second set of steps, 
though less preserved, were on the southwest side of the oval 
platform. Three cannon (SE97-FP-1,2,and 4) are located on top 
of the battery, and two more have fallen over the platform, 
one the west (SE97-FP-3) , and one, mostly buried, at the base 
of the northeast steps (SE97-FP-5). The first four cannon all 
have bores of 89 mm, or about 3.5 inches. The fifth was likely 
identical, but not measured. The bore measurements suggests 
they were 6 pounders.
The platform is stone paved and was surrounded by a low 
parapet of mortared stone. This parapet averaged 2 feet in 
thickness and the remaining standing portion was approximately 
1 foot high, although this was missing the original capping. 
At least one cannon position had a stone platform, distinct 
from the overall flooring, for its carriage. The others were
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soil covered and were not uncovered for observation. This 
platform consisted of smaller stones tightly cemented with 
large gravel and artifacts in the mix. It was lined with 
slightly larger stones. Within the concrete were shards of 
blue delft (2) , blue Chinese porcelain (1) , a kaolin pipe 
stem, and one fragment of creamware.
A large, deep stone-lined hole was on the platform, near 
the modern topographic survey cement marker. As it appeared to 
be deliberately lined, it is possible this was a flag-pole 
setting. A rough sketch of Panga drawn in 1981 does not show 
this feature. Intensive investigation was not undertaken in 
1990, so the assumption as to the hole is tentative.
The battery platform is situated within a larger complex 
that includes the garrison1s quarters, cistern, and auxiliary 
features. One additional building appears on the suspected 
19th century fort sketch (Figure 13) . It was not located 
during the survey, but was indicated as "G.H.", presumably a 
guard house.
The buildings that were located are to the immediate south 
of the gun platform (Figure 41) . They are constructed of faced 
stone, yellow and red brick, and mortar. The mortar contained 
several clearly visible fragments of coral suggesting it was 
prepared on the island from its own resources and not
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imported. The buildings supported large yellow bricked, 
concrete capped, roofing domes as those commonly used on 
cisterns, all of which have now fallen. The ruins probably 
represent one or two barracks, a food preparation area (a 
large red brick fire place), a powder magazine, and a cistern. 
The 19th century sketch does not indicate their function, only 
labeling them A-D. Excavation could clarify possible functions 
for the structures.
At the base of the northern gun-platform steps begins an 
earthen walled trench that connects Fort Panga with Battery 
Jussac. It runs northward averaging about 30 feet wide from 
crest to crest, and 6 or more feet high in places.
Few artifacts were noted at Panga, probably a function of 
prodigious vegetation and bare rock. No distinct historic 
military artifacts were located (excepting the cannon), 
although several modern pieces were found. Domestic artifacts 
included Dutch delft, Chinese porcelain, a kaolin pipe stem, 
a fragment of creamware, and green glass bottle fragments.
Fort Panga probably functioned mainly as an observation 
post. As the name of the hill implies, it is well situated to 
warn the island of approaching ships. The small cannon would 
be of little use against ships, the distance being too great 
for any serious hopes of striking a target. Their main task
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may have been in signalling the island of danger, or to defend 
the position against troops already landed.
The fort has an unobstructed view of all but the northern­
most parts of the island, and from here, along with Battery 
Jussac, most landing points can be monitored. The nearby 
islands of St. Kitts and Saba are also in view, along with St. 
Barthelemy on clear days or with a field-glass.
Communication with Panga from the Upper Town would not 
have been extremely difficult. Sound carries well up to the 
post. During mapping music could be clearly heard coming from 
Concordia where Carnival bands practiced. Signaling by musket 
or small cannon fire would certainly have been heard by the 
garrison.
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Battery Jussac SE98
Cul-de-Sac, Redoutte
Battery Jussac probably correctly belongs to Fort Panga, 
as a detached bastion or redoubt. Its connection to Panga by 
the trench and its apparent lack of separate barracks all 
suggest Jussac was an extension of the Panga fortification 
complex. However, it appears on most maps as a battery apart 
from Panga, and so will be thusly described.
"Batterie de Jussac" first appears along with Fort Panga 
on the post-1781 French map (Figure 8). Jussac's Battery is 
also on Faden's 1795 version (Figure 9). In 1830 it is called 
"Redoute, aux Bombes", presumably as a part of "la Digie" 
(Fort Panga) (Figure 10) . By 1840 it is a "vervallen" battery 
under the name of "Cul de Sac". The 1847 copy also reflects 
this (Figures li and 12) .
The battery on the tip of Cul de Sac is irregular in form, 
and was probably engineered to follow the contours of the 
natural hill-top. Its elevation is 689 feet (Cadastral 
Survey), or 1,150 feet according to an early sketch (Figure 
13). That document also gives it as 7,800 feet from Fort 
Oranje. It has a rounded front, flanked on either side by 
walls (Figure 42). The parapet stands up to 3 feet high from 
the interior of the rounded end, and up to 3.5 feet wide. The
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As at Panga, the battery platform is built up upon the 
natural surface with stone, placed to present a faced surface. 
The resulting outer wall has a maximum height of approximately
7.5 feet, on the northwest side. The height from the exterior 
ground surface to the floor level would measure about 4.5 
feet.
The walls are constructed of stone and mortar. Exposed 
faces were carefully laid to present a flat surface, but in 
general the stones were unworked. Large stones were employed, 
and up to 4 courses remain along the northwestern wall. The 
southwestern wall has more courses, but utilizes much smaller 
stones in the upper portions. This wall also contains a water 
drain, built into the masonry. It measures 3 inches wide by
7.5 inches high. It runs from the floor of the battery to the 
exterior of the work.
Within the battery, there are two distinct floor levels. 
The rounded bastion area is sunken a few inches below the 
rectangular rear section of the battery, with two stone steps 
along the south wall. Both floors had exposed areas of stone 
pavement, and it is suspected this covered the entire 
interior. This assumption was not confirmed through testing.
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The origin of Jussac, like Panga, is not known with 
certainty. Although attributed to the French, it may well have 
a Dutch predecessor. At least two periods of wall construction 
are clearly represented. On the southwestern wall, the parapet 
was raised at some point in time. The original parapet stood 
at about 1.5 feet high from the interior (if the present floor 
is contemporaneous to the older wall). It was cement capped as 
seen at several other batteries on the island. During a 
renovation this parapet was raised another 1.5 feet for a new 
interior wall height of 3 feet (Figure 43).
Three cannon were inventoried at Battery Jussac (SE98-JB- 
1,2, and 3), and a fourth was found between Jussac and Panga 
on the southern face of the southern breastwork (SE97/98- 
Trench-1). At Jussac two were identical to those at Panga, 
probably 6 pounders. The third was perhaps an 18 pounder, but 
was not of a uniform bore size. The trench gun was identical 
to the two at Jussac and those of Panga.
No barracks or other foundations were located near Battery 
Jussac, nor did any appear on the early sketch. There was a 
cistern approximately 100 feet southwest of the battery, which 
did not appear on the sketch. This feature was not surveyed in 
the 1990 project. The 1981 island survey sufficiently recorded 
the cistern for the purposes of this work. It is a typical 
domed yellow brick structure approximately 11.5 feet long by
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6.5 feet wide. The distance from the base of the cistern to 
the crest of the dome is about 8.2 feet. Surrounding the 
cistern is a low stone and mortar wall, some .8 of a foot 
wide, and about 26 by 27 feet on either side. This wall serves 
as a terrace upon which the cistern rests (Haviser fieldnotes 
1981) .
As with Fort Panga, Battery Jussac probably had more 
emphasis on observation than actual defense. Its placement on 
the more northern tip of the mountain allows it a view of 
those areas not clearly observable from Panga. These include 
the valley leading down to Tumble Down Dick Bay and the 
battery, as well as the northern mountains of the island and 
nearby Saba.
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Battery Concordia 8E81
Fort Amsterdam
Another of the batteries attributed to de Windt by Hartog 
is Battery Concordia (1976:27). Now commonly called Fort 
Amsterdam, this site was partially excavated for restoration 
purposes during the 1990 field season by the William and Mary 
field school. A report of this undertaking was prepared by Dr. 
Norman F. Barka, Department of Anthropology, The College of 
William and Mary.
This defense is situated at the end of the present 
airstrip, on the cliff above Bargine Bay. The area of the bay 
in general could be considered a prime landing site for an 
invading army. The shore is reasonably clear of obstacles such 
as protruding off-shore reefs, and the cliffs here are 
considerably less high than several other sites. Easy access 
to the Cultivation Plain and the Upper Town are afforded at 
sites such as Zeelandia, Smith's Gut, and smaller guts along 
the coastline. Among the drawbacks for landing along this 
beach are the rough waves, and stiff winds, making for 
difficult anchorage on the Atlantic side of the island. 
Landings in this area could also be readily detected foiling 
most attempts at surprise.
If Concordia was in fact among de Windt's projects, it was
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almost certainly completely rebuilt by the British in 1781. 
Records from the trial of Cockburne indicate the British did 
construct a battery here after their arrival.
The battery is of faced stone and mortar, with an overall 
interior cobble pavement (Figures 44 and 45) . Cement footings 
were laid, and the low parapet was protected with a soil 
embankment. This feature was added for additional protection 
against incoming shells. Much of it has disappeared through 
aeolian erosion, especially on the southeast section and part 
of the central section. It was best represented on the 
northwest section. Large stones were placed under the 
embankment as a fill.
Although somewhat irregular in plan, the battery is laid 
out in angular fashion common to the late 3rd and 4th quarter 
of the 18th century. It has three main sections with an open 
back. Two low wings had been added to either end. The 
northwest wing was sloped downward from the wall out, and 
cement capped. The southeast wing also got progressively 
shorter from the wall outward, but not in the continuous slope 
as its opposite.
The parapet, of faced volcanic stone and mortar, was 
capped with cement. This sloped towards the exterior, creating 
a wall of an average of 15 inch height on the outside and 29.5
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inches high on the interior at the eastern end. The wall width 
was some 28 inches here (Figure 46). A narrow drainage trough 
for the interior floor was located along the rear northwestern 
side, by the wing and wall section. It measured .25 feet deep 
and wide, in a V or U shape.
At the rear of the battery is a square pad, measuring 5.9 
by 5.65 feet. Similar to the flooring, it was stone paved. The 
center had been disturbed, possibly as the result of a local 
legend that it was a cellar roof. Excavation of the interior 
of the feature found it to be filled with rubble and soil. 
Fragments of a porcelain bowl were mixed in the soil. Clearing 
from the exterior, where the long trench began, found it to be 
formed in two courses of large mortared stone blocks, with a 
footing. Although no evidence for the function or purpose of 
this feature was found, it may have been a mortar platform. 
This assumption is based solely on its shape and size, both of 
which conform to small mortar platform dimensions. With the 
beach below the fort, safe from the direct fire of the large 
guns, a mortar would have been a prudent addition to the 
armament of this battery.
No inventories have been located that detail the site. One 
late 18th or early 19 century plan exists for a "Fort 
Amsterdam", but that is the present Water fort. How Battery 
Concordia came to be called Fort Amsterdam on modern maps is
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unknown. Historic maps of the island show a barracks behind 
the battery, and this was tested for during excavations. A 
surface collection was undertaken prior to the arrival of the 
field crew at the site, which revealed artifact clusters 
suspected to be associated with the barracks (Figure 47).
A 130 feet long trench was dug perpendicular to the 
battery in search of the barracks, which would intersect the 
area indicated on the maps. This effort revealed no definite 
traces of the barracks, although two areas were encountered 
with stone. Clearing of these found them to be isolated and 
not apparently foundations, even though one section had mortar 
with the stone. Only a few isolated artifacts were turned up 
in the trench. Test excavations dug near areas identified 
through the prior surface collection revealed a hard-packed 
earth surface with abundant artifacts (Figure 48). Numerous 
domestic artifacts were found, as well as large numbers of cut 
bone. Full analysis of the artifacts collected at SE81 could 
not be undertaken in 1990, and they are stored in the field 
school laboratory on St. Eustatius. A small number of 
artifacts were returned to the College of William and Mary for 
conservation.
An abbreviated listing of some of the domestic objects 
located include fragments of green wine bottles, creamware, 
pearlware, salt-glaze stoneware, delft, earthenwares, annular
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ware, kaolin pipestems and bowl fragments, blue 'slave' beads 
and fragments, bone buttons (including bone blanks with 
buttons removed from them, indicating on site manufacture), 
brass buttons, clear glass, porcelain, and a brass Jew's harp. 
A large square worked stone was also found and collected. In 
its center was a semi-spherical concavity, possibly a door 
swivel base.
At least one probable prehistoric artifact was also 
located during the surface collection. It was a hand grinding 
stone (mano) with a definite work surface. A few small lithic 
flakes were also found, but could be either prehistoric 
debitage or from a gun flint. The Cultivation Plain is known 
to contain several prehistoric sites (Versteeg and Effert 
1987).
Military items were also located at the site. Among this 
group were two regimental buttons, one of the 15th British 
Regiment of Foot (The East Yorkshire Regiment) and one of an 
undetermined 90th regiment (Figure 38) . The 15th regiment was 
left along with the 13th to garrison the island between 
February and November 1781. The button has a script "15" 
within a rope border. It is made of pewter, and had an iron 
shank, now missing.
The 90th regimental button is most likely British,
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although it is a style of both French and British use. The 
British did have at least some members of the 90th at St. 
Eustatius in 1781. Lieutenant Charles Forrest of that regiment 
engraved a depiction of the island as it appeared on April 13, 
1781 and gave it to the Prince of Wales (see Hartog 1976:141) . 
The two-piece brass button has a double loop shank. Although 
the British had members of the 90th on the island in 1781 this 
button may also be later in date.
Another button fragment may be that of a British officer. 
It has traces of gold plating, and a design similar to those 
known to have been worn by officers of some of the regiments 
present. It was too fragmentary for an accurate assessment in 
the field, and was returned, along with the other military 
buttons, to William and Mary for conservation.
One musket part was collected during the surface survey. 
This fragmented brass object proved to be part of a side-plate 
from a British Brown Bess musket, probably the First Model 
Land Pattern. The first model would have likely have been 
carried by most British troops serving in the American 
Revolution, and this artifact may be from the British 
occupation of 1781. Also found relating to such small arms 
were fragments of gun-flints, though of the amber color most 
often attributed to French origins.
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Two cannon (SE81-BC-1 and 2) were still present at Battery 
Concordia. Both suffer from extreme deterioration due to their 
constant exposure to the Atlantic winds and sea salts. One 
cannon had both the cascable and trunnions knocked off. This 
was a common practice prior to salvage, to facilitate rolling 
the barrel. This could also be explained by the weak nature of 
the iron, however. This piece was a classic naval gun with a 
very large breech proportional to the length, and limited 
flaring of the muzzle. It is possibly a British 9 pounder. The 
second piece had a bore presently measuring between a 3 and 4 
pounder. Both bores were difficult to assess accurately due to 
corrosion and flaking of the metal.
Battery at Turtle Bay
Schildpadden Baai
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A battery is said to have been built at "Turtle Bay" by 
Commander Jan de Windt in Hartog (1976:27). No traces of a 
battery were located at this bay (Schildpadden Baai). It may 
be that many of the smaller batteries de Windt are credited 
with by Hartog were insubstantial works, possibly earthen 
entrenchments. Only later were some rebuilt into the batteries 
of the 4th quarter of the century. If this is not the case, 
this battery may be that which would become Concordia, which 
is located very near to Turtle Bay. Other possibilities 
include it being a proposed defense never constructed, a site 
which has simply never been located, or one which has been 
totally destroyed, such as occurred to Four-Gun Battery.
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Battery St. Louis SE44
Battery Lucie
Battery St. Louis is situated on the north cliff above 
Compagnie Bay (Figure 5). It is at an estimated elevation of 
90 feet above the shore. The remains are extremely disturbed 
from erosional forces.
Battery "Lucie" may have been first begun by Commander de 
Windt just after the mid 18th century (Hartog 1976:27). As 
with Battery Corre Corre it does not appear on any pre-1781 
Dutch fortification list currently known. Post-1781 listings 
do not offer details nor itemized inventories.
The first occurrence of this defense on maps is that of 
the circa 1781 French version, where it is listed in the 
legend (Figure 8). It likewise appears in Faden's map for the 
Marquis de Bouille in 1795, and again in the 1830 map (Figures 
9 and 10). Both maps of the 1840's mark the site as St. Lucie 
and call it "vervallen" (Figures 11 and 12).
If St. Louis battery did pre-date the 1780's, it may have 
been rebuilt in 1781. The architectural style follows that 
attributed to the British and French occupiers of 1781, as 
seen at Battery Bouille and Concordia. The different 
appearances of Corre Corre and St. Louis might be explained by
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cultural or temporal differences, with the more regular ground 
plan of the latter common to the 1780's fortifications.
The battery was built from cobble and mortar, with exposed 
stone roughly faced or placed so as to give a faced 
appearance. Although by 1990 the ruins were extremely 
disturbed, combined with a 1981 sketch, it appears that the 
battery had a plan very much like Battery Bouille, three walls 
with an open posterior (Figure 49). Remnants of the flooring 
were present. The battery apparently had the entire interior 
paved with stone and mortar.
The walls of St. Louis have all fallen, and erosion has 
moved several sections downslope (Figure 50). Similarly, the 
original floor of the battery has been eroded into a series of 
small depressions and humps.
Fallen wall sections measured an average of 2.4 feet in 
width and up to 2.9 feet high. The original parapet height 
could not be determined, but is estimated to have been in the 
vicinity of 2.5 feet, to account for footing depth. No clear 
indications of embrasures were evident.
No structural remains of the barracks were found. A heavy 
artifact scatter was located southeast of the battery which 
may be related to the garrison's quarters. Several stoneware
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bottle fragments were noted, along with kaolin pipe stems and 
bowl fragments, green glass, and creamware shards. An artifact 
collection was not undertaken at this site. Fieldnotes from a 
1981 visit included these artifact types in addition to 
overglaze porcelain, delft, Buckley ware, and three cut 
building stones (Haviser fieldnotes 1981).
No cannon were located during surveys in 1990 or 1981. The 
site listing in Barka (1985:59) mentions two cannon and a 1.5 
feet high parapet at SE44, listed as "possibly St. Louis 
battery". The cannon and parapet description accurately 
describe SE81, Battery Concordia, which is located a short 
distance northward along the coast, and it is assumed that 
SE81 is described in the text for SE44.
The placement of a battery at this site may not have been 
for the purpose of warding off enemy troop landings. The 
cliffs at Compagnie Bay are high and steep, and would likely 
be the cause of heavy casualties in an attempt to scale them. 
The battery could check ships from anchoring in the bay and 
sending boats in either direction to more reasonable landing 
sites. In addition, it was centrally located between Concordia 
and Corre Corre and might be of use in the conveyance of 
messages and signals.
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Battery Corre Corre SE27
The battery on Corre Corre Bay may have been in existence 
as early as the mid 18th century. It is possible that it was 
among the fortification projects enacted by de Windt in the 
1750's (Hartog 1976:27). It was refortified in 1781, first by 
the British and followed soon after by the French.
The battery is on a small hill at the southeastern end of 
Corre Corre Bay. It is an estimated 30 feet above the beach. 
Here the coral reef ends, creating a clear approach from the 
Atlantic side to the beach. Access to the island from the 
beach is not difficult, and the ascent is up a low gentle 
slope. Troops landing here would have few difficulties 
disembarking and climbing above the beach once the boats had 
reached shore. The only obstacles would be vegetation and the 
distance overland to the town, but maps of plantations in the 
area show some roads would have been available by at least 
1742.
In the water, beach access at Corre Corre is hampered by 
wind, currents, and coral. The Atlantic side often experiences 
strong winds, and the result is large waves. The same 
phenomena cause fairly strong currents, which would hamper 
both long boats and the stable anchoring of troop ships 
disembarking large landing forces. Once this had been
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accomplished landing crafts would have to safely skirt the 
coral reefs in the area before beaching.
The site has both merits and detractors as an assault 
head. It is secluded, enabling a landing with a minimum of 
observance, but at the same time necessitating an overland 
march to reach the Fort (though much easier than the French 
route of 1781) . It also allows access to the Upper Town 
without having to climb steep embankments or cliffs as at 
Jenkin's Bay or Oranje Bay, but only after traversing a 
perilous approach to shore.
Corre Corre Battery, like Fort de Windt, has a view of St. 
Kitts, and would be useful as an observation post. The wind 
and current patterns normally caused ships to pass to the east 
of this battery, towards de Windt, and not up this coastline 
when coming from the vicinity of St. Kitts.
Inventory records cited in the literature seldom refer to 
this battery. Although it may have been in existence from at 
least the 1750's according to Hartog, it does not appear in 
the Dutch inventories or listings of 1753, 1755, 1776, or
1780. In 1784 Commander Oyen stated that 14 small batteries 
had been constructed during the British and French 
occupations. Whether this number includes renovations of 
former batteries is unknown, but after this time Corre Corre
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is mentioned as having a battery. This work was likely 
abandoned along with the others by 1816, if not before.
Battery Corre Corre initially appears on maps beginning 
with the circa 1781 French version, as number 7 in the legend, 
11 Batterie de Couroucourou Baye" (Figure 8) . The 1795 map 
indicates the battery, but does not name it (Figure 9). It is 
named under letter K as "Curry-Curry" in 1830 (Figure 10). By 
circa 1840 it is called the "vervallen" Curry-Curry battery, 
as does it appear in circa 1847 (Figures 11 and 12).
Corre Corre (Figure 51) was constructed of cobble, 
mortared together to form a wall approximately 1.5 to 1.9 feet 
wide. Erosion has tumbled the low parapet, but surviving 
remnants stood at least 1.5 feet high on the exterior, and 1.1 
feet on the interior. The wall probably originally stood 
around 1.5 feet high from the interior floor. The wall forms 
an arc, terminating at both ends with concrete footings at 
near 90 degree angles to the abutting wall. Heavy vegetation 
made investigations directly behind the battery impossible. 
The concrete footings disappeared into a soil covering before 
reaching the vegetation, but from probing did not appear to 
extend into the brush. A sketch made in 1981 shows a small 
platform at the front of the battery, which had, by 1990, 
mostly fallen away.
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Approximately 50 feet to the northwest of the battery were 
the foundations of what probably served as the garrison 
barracks (Figure 52) . The concrete foundations indicate a 
rectangular building some 15 feet long (shore face) by 7 or 
more feet wide. The remains stand some .5 to .7 of a foot 
high, and are from approximately .8 to 1 foot thick. Soil 
covered the island side of the foundations. This feature is 
situated in a depression caused by two low flanking hills. An 
eroded road segment was on the hill in front of the structure, 
to the north.
Artifacts located around the barracks included ceramic 
shards of a stoneware bottle, creamware plates, and lead 
glazed red earthenware. One flint flake was discovered, 
although its association is unknown as a possible prehistoric 
site lies to the north along the coast. The battery contains 
three cannon, SE27-CC-1,2, and 3. These represent a 12 
pounder, a 6 pounder, and a 4 pounder, although the bores were 
deteriorated and the last two designations are somewhat 
tentative.
Artifacts found in 1981 were more abundant for this site. 
Haviser noted the following items were collected: "a slave
'blue-bead', a button of brass x76", a belt buckle, a 
gunflint, creamware, pearlware, olive jar, porcelain, green 
glass, stoneware, and kaolin pipestems" (fieldnotes 1981).
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Fort Tietchy is an elusive battery. It is mentioned by 
this name in a few records but little else is known concerning 
it. The site (if it is in fact an independent site) was not 
located during the 1990 survey.
The earliest reference to this battery indicates it was 
built by Jan de Windt at the time Fort de Windt was upgraded 
from earthen entrenchments (Hartog 1976:27) . It is said to 
have been an open backed work, like the majority of the 
islandfs batteries (Hartog 1976:27).
A map in the St. Eustatius Historical Foundation Museum 
places Fort Tietchy above Gallows Bay, on the southern end of 
Oranje Bay, between Battery Bouille and the Fort. Here it is 
dated to the 11 late 18th century". The area indicated would 
suggest a site in the vicinity of the heights above the above 
Crook's Castle or the present Large ("Fishing") Pier. 
Inquiries were unable to determine the origin of the museum 
map, or detals to support its accuracy.
Fort Tietchy is mentioned in the 1780 inspection by C. de 
Jong. Attema (1976:41) states this is the only occurrence of 
"Tietchy" in the records, although Hartog indicates mention 
was made by de Windt or someone in his administration. De Jong
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listed 10 cannon at Tietchy, "which were so bad that ten 
others would be needed before they would be of any use" 
(Attema 1976:41, from de Jong 1807:112).
The main question concerning Tietchy is whether it was a 
separate battery, or merely a corruption of the name of an 
existing battery. One author suggests the latter, noting that 
Tommelendijk (Tumble Down Dick) had 10 cannon in 177 6 , and the 
two may be the same (Attema 1976:41) . An inhabitant of the 
island suggested it may have been Four-Gun Battery, but he was 
uncertain (Lampe, personal communication, 1990).
Another possibility is some rubble noted during the
Battery Nassau survey. From the cliff edge, remains of masonry 
could be seen in the surf to the northwest of the battery. 
These were inspected more closely and found to consist of 
mortared cobbles. There was some resemblance to the large
battery walls of Rotterdam, but the origin of these displaced 
ruins were not discovered. Examination of the cliff above 
revealed no conclusive evidence.
On the beach near Gallows Bay, north of the rubble, a gut
was located with a stone and mortar pavement leading to the
beach. Although this is not suspected to be related to the 
forts, it may have been the area Rodney mentioned was used for 
careening ships (barnacle removal and hull repair). It would
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not be unusual to have a battery above such a place, for this 
would indicate ships could beach there.
Finally, if Tietchy was between Bouille and Oranje, it may 
have fallen over the cliff edge, or have been completely 
scavenged. This would not be unusual as the total 
disappearance of Four-Gun Battery demonstrates.
The question of Fort Tietchy remains an open one. No 
fortification works were located that could be directly linked 
to Tietchy, nor were any records or documents found that 
cleared up the matter. Its brevity in the records may indicate 
this was only a temporary battery, or that in fact the name 
"Tietchy" was a corruption of the name of another defensive 
work.
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Four-Gun Battery
Battery Bourbon
Four-Gun battery or Battery Bourbon, was a small open 
backed battery similar to Bouille. It was placed on the cliff 
above the Lower Town, where two cemeteries now rest. Most maps 
place it east of where the present road curves to go down to 
the Lower Town. From this position it could supplement the 
guns of the Fort in protecting the Bay and Lower Town.
Four-gun Battery probably originated as a British 
emplacement in 1781. The French subsequently reoccupied the 
position, and assumedly are responsible for its new moniker of 
"Bourbon".
The first appearance of the site on maps is with the 
French cartographic work made after their arrival in 1781 
(Figure 8 , "13. Batterie de Bourbon"). Faden's map also shows 
"Bourbon's Battery" (Figure 9). On the 183 0 map it is called 
"Four-gun Batter ie" (letter B, Figure 10) . The circa 184 0 and 
1847 maps prefer to allow the name to suffice with a 
"vervallen battery" indication (Figures 11 and 12).
Four-gun Battery was not able to be mapped in 1990: it no 
longer exists. According to Mr. Franz Lampe, a descendant of 
18th century colonists to St. Eustatius, the last remains of
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the parapet fell over the cliff in 1989, and were broken apart 
and scavenged by island residents for building material 
(personal communication, 1990). A search of the talus slope 
below proved fruitless.
The walls, he stated, similar in plan to Bouille, were 
constructed from faced stone, brick, and mortar. The last wall 
to survive may have been 8  to 10 feet long. The battery was 
also on the 19th century field sketches Mr. Lampe provided 
(Figure 13) . It states an elevation of 95 feet, and a distance 
of 14 4 0 feet from Fort Orange. A small structure is indicated 
to the southeast of the battery.
Battery Cochan, Jenkin's Bay
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Battery Cochan was not surveyed during the 1990 field 
season. An employee at the oil terminal discouraged attempting 
an overland approach to the site, as it lies at the base of 
steep cliffs in rough terrain. Safe access is best achieved by 
boat k
Most references in the literature suggest this battery 
was built around 1781 by the French. This is where they 
landed, climbing the cliffs in the night, and marching 
overland to capture the island the following morning.
The battery is mentioned on some post-1781 maps, although 
others simply denote Jenkin's Bay as the site of the French 
landing without specific mention of a battery there. The 
earliest such map, the circa 1781-1784 French map (Figure 8 ) 
lists "Jenkis Baye, ou les Francois one debarque en 1781" as 
number 10 in the legend. No mention is made of a battery. A 
similar treatment is afforded the site in the Marquis de 
Bouille*s 1795 map by William Faden (Figure 9) . This rendition 
also indicates the route of the French into Oranjestad.
The battery is not mentioned by name on those maps 
currently known, until 1830. At this date it appears in the 
legend of Samuel Falsberg's map under letter "L", as "Batterie
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Cochon (le D e 'barquement Francais l'an 1781)" (Figure 10). On 
the circa 1840 map (Figure 11) it is marked, but not by name, 
and now is listed as a "Vervallen battery" (in ruins) as are 
all except Fort Oranje. This designation is mimicked in the 
1847 copy of this map (Figure 12) .
Evidence for the origin of this battery from the maps does 
not appear until the early 19th century. Documentary evidence, 
however, mentions this defense as early as 1785. Upon the 
return of the island to the Dutch, reports were sent back to 
the Netherlands on the condition of the forts and batteries 
(Attema 1976:44 and 55, note 4). This supports an early 1780's 
French origin theory. The fact that the French were able to 
land here and go on to take the island would also argue for 
the French having placed a battery here, for fear of the feat 
being repeated by someone else.
It is thought that the battery lies on Jenkin's Bay, as 
opposed to the cliffs above, precisely where the French landed 
on November 25, 1781. Contemporary accounts tell of a rocky 
landing where the expedition lost most of their landing craft. 
Above this was the "heights...a rock of between 700 and 800 
feet, almost perpendicular height..." (Connecticut Gazette 
January 25, 1782).
It is assumed the French would have placed this battery at
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the lower level, such as the Dutch battery at Tumble Down 
Dick. A battery 700 or 800 feet above the sea would have 
difficulty firing to the shore below. Island residents 
questioned about Cochan had not seen evidence of this battery. 
Previous surveys to the area make no mention of such ruins 
being located.
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Cocolouch Bay
One island resident suggested there might be another 
battery, distinct from Jenkin's Battery, located at Cocolouch 
Bay, just north of Jenkin's Bay (Lampe, personal 
communication, 1990). No additional evidence was found to 
support this, nor was ground survey attempted. A number of 
fortifications named by the British in 1781 are still 
unaccounted for, so there may be truth to this statement.
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Venus Bay
A "stronghold" is mentioned as having been located at 
Venus Bay. It appears only after 1781, and is no longer 
mentioned after 1785 (Attema 1976:44). This may have been a 
British or French project, but no information is known 
concerning this possible site. It was not visited in the 
fortification survey due its remote location. No island 
residents interviewed could recall any battery at this site, 
though few acknowledged ever having been there.
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Powder House
On the Netherlands Antilles Cadastrial Survey map, an area 
referred to as "Powder House" appears in the vicinity of 
Billy's Gut. No additional information concerning this 
apparently martial site could be located. Limited field survey 
revealed no evidence of ruins in the area that could be termed 
a powder-house. The 1981 island survey remarked on this site, 
also citing negative evidence for any such ruins. The only 
military evidence in the area was a 15th regiment button 
(British, as found at SE81 and other sites on Statia), noted 
at the mouth of Billy's Gut along the beach. Above the 
indicated site, however, can be found a powder-house 
associated with Fort Royal, which may explain the question.
Other Sites
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No hard evidence exists for any American defensive works 
on St. Eustatius. There is the possibility, however, as some 
passages in Admiral Rodney's writings may suggest. It is known 
that nearly 2,000 American sailors were on the island at the 
arrival of the British in 1781 (Rodney 1789).
The sailors offered to defend the island, but were turned 
down. Most were then captured, although "still a considerable 
Number remain lurking on the Mountains" (Rodney 1789:13). It 
is possible that these "lurkers" hastily constructed minor 
defensive positions in the northern mountains. Scattered 
reports of such remains were alluded to by some informants, 
but nothing that could be confirmed. Undoubtedly, if such 
positions were prepared, they were small, insubstantial, earth 
or loose stone breastworks intended for use in fending off 
British scouting parties in search of American sailors.
Several sites in Oranjestad had a military presence at 
some time. Statements by Rodney (1789) clearly show the Upper 
Town was well occupied by his troops, presumedly billeted in 
exisiting structures as well as their own constructions. 
Several years of excavation at SE219, the "Guest House" have 
unearthed military buttons, including at a minimum those of 
the 15th, 90th, and 95th British regiments.
Chapter 9
The Artillery Survey of St. Eustatius
The basic weapon used for both defense and offence in ship 
and fortification warfare was the cannon. Artillery predated 
hand-held firearms in Europe by several centuries. Its main 
task was to assist in the besiegement of fortifications. By 
the 16th century ships were commonly armed with small cannon, 
but island assaults still depended upon landing troops, for 
the guns were insufficient to be of any serious threat to a 
fortification. This rapidly changed over the following two 
centuries.
In the 18th century warships had become little more than 
floating artillery platforms. The massive fire-power they now 
carried were easily capable of reducing a small fort to ruins. 
No campaign in the Caribbean would have been planned without 
the inclusion of artillery, nor would any defensive plan fail 
to make artillery their main weapon.
By the period of the most intense fortification of St. 
Eustatius, cannon were constructed by uniform designs. All
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guns were made of either "gun brass" (bronze) or iron. Most 
ships carried iron guns, and all the guns remaining on Statia 
were of iron. An iron gun heated and cooled differently than 
a bronze gun, and was felt superior at sea. They were also 
cheaper to produce. Records show brass guns were at Fort 
Oranje in the early 4th quarter of the 18th century, but no 
more are ever mentioned before or after that time.
With the exception of a few siege guns, pieces were 
mounted on wooden carriages, often painted red. Sea carriages 
had wooden wheels, and fortification carriages normally were 
supported by ones of iron. Those cannon on St. Eustatius that 
are now remounted have iron wheels. Barrels were usually 
blackened or painted gray (Coggins 1969:147).
Although details and specifics could vary widely, the 
tubes were limited to certain proportions necessary in their 
manufacture. This was most crucial in the calibre of the bore, 
and hence the size of the projectile. An artillery battery 
with each gun having different sized projectiles was 
cumbersome, not to mention unwise, during battle.
To control.this,cannon were made, and classified, by their 
calibre. This was denoted by the weight of a solid shot the 
piece could fire. Thus an "18 pounder" fired a round shot of 
that many pounds. Calibers ranged from very small deck guns to
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enormous siege guns, but the majority fell somewhere between 
the 3 and 48 pounder size. Deck or swivel guns were normally 
only 1  or 2  pounders.
By far the most common projectile fired in the 18 th 
century was the round solid shot of cast iron. Solid shot was 
normally the ammunition of choice by both naval gunners and 
coastal batteries. This type was better suited to damaging a 
ship hull than other shot. The larger balls had a lower 
velocity, which tore planks rather than pierced them as a high 
velocity shot could. The pierces were easily patched, 
shattered planking was not. They were also suited to 
destroying a battery on shore (Manucy 1949:64).
Related to solid shot are two variants: bar shot and chain 
shot. Bar shot is a split solid shot connected by an iron bar. 
Chain shot is two round balls connected by a chain. Both were 
specifically intended for ripping ship rigging. At least one 
specimen of bar shot has been located on St. Eustatius, and is 
presently housed in the Historical Foundation Museum. Numerous 
solid shot are also represented there.
Another class of shot intended for the mass destruction of 
ship rigging, field carriages, or personnel was case shot. 
Case shot incudes a variety of projectiles, all of which use 
small shot contained within a charge. The most two common
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types were grape and canister. Case shot literally transforms 
a cannon into a giant shotgun.
Grape shot is a collection of small iron balls, nine being 
the most common. They are layered and tied together with 
canvas so as to come apart in flight. Grape was most useful 
against ship rigging, landing craft, and for dismounting land 
artillery.
The weight of the shot used in grape varied according to 
the calibre of the gun. A 32 pounder had balls of 3 pounds 
each. A 24 pounder, 2 lbs., a 12 pounder 1 lbs., and a 6  
pounder, 8  ounces (Coggins 1969:154). The shot found at 
Battery Bouille and by Crook's Castle both suggest use in a 12 
pounder. Two 12 pounders are at the battery, and the ball was 
found at the muzzle of one of these. Several more examples are 
in the museum collection.
The other case shot most frequently used in the 18th 
century was canister shot. This is a container filled with 
small iron or lead musket balls. Upon firing the balls 
scatter, creating a deadly rain to massed troops. This shot 
was most popular in land engagements, though occasionally used 
at sea. It lost its lethal effect past about 200 yards.
Exploding shells were rare for naval guns. The only
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exceptions were on "Bomb ships", which were essentially 
floating mortar batteries. These would be used to batter a 
coastal fortification if they were available in the fleet. 
Land batteries commonly had exploding shells in their arsenal, 
but seldom used them against a ship. The explosion was caused 
through a hollow round shot being filled with powder ignited 
by a fuse.
More popular to use against ships was "hot shot". This was 
simply a solid shot heated to red hot, or else a canister of 
burning coal. As fire aborad a wooden ship was most 
devastating, it was an effective defense against a fleet. As 
the use of this projectile type was dangerous to load, ships 
seldom attempted it. Too often their own vessel was set afire 
in the process.
In the event a battery ran out of conventional ammunition, 
it could still fire. Langridge was the technical term for 
improvised projectile matter. Scraps of iron, nails, broken 
glass, and etc, could be loaded and fired in an emergency.
No matter what type of ammunition was chosen, it was 
loaded in a similar fashion. As the guns of this era were 
smoothbore, shot fit fairly loose in the barrel. The space 
left over between the bore and the projectile was called 
windage. The greater the amount of windage, the less accurate
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the aim could be.
As the guns were mostly without sights, aim was a matter 
of skill and guesswork. Few gunners were ever able to claim 
great accuracy and those who could were highly valued. Firing 
at long ranges was usually a waste of powder and shot. 
Elevation adjustment accounted for the most common method of 
aiming, but on board ship cannon were generally not adjusted 
on a shot to shot basis. That was taken care of by the natural 
role of the ship.
In firing a gun, from ship to ship or from a battery to a 
ship, "point blank" was most effective. Point blank is the 
range a ball will travel at zero degrees elevation before 
striking the surface. The "first consideration of naval 
gunnery" wrote British Royal Navy gunner Philip Broke, is 
"accuracy of shot at long point blank" (Broke 1794 quoted in 
Padfield 1973:132). This tactic was most likely to debilitate 
a ship at water-line, its most vulnerable spot.
Although the iron flying back and forth wrecked havoc 
above deck, only shots below the water line could actually 
sink a ship. Relatively few vessels were ever actually sunk in 
battle. Most damaged ships sunk later on, after gradually 
taking on water for some time (Coggins 1969:156). The loss of 
masts and rigging, however, could leave a ship dead in the
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water and at the mercy of the victor. Even so, Philip Broke 
wrote he preferred a fight at a reasonable distance, though 
still qualifying as close action. When two enemies were so 
close that every shot was sure to hit, skill was no longer the 
deciding factor. He favored a distance which resulted in 
victory from the best "horizontal gunnery", a feat at which 
the British were superior (Broke 1794, in Coggins 1969).
Many guns were made in both long and short varieties which 
gave them different range capabilities. The long versions were 
generally more accurate at a distance, but less manageable, 
especially aboard a ship. Over time this duality of tube 
lengths became less common as the shorter ship guns became 
more numerous.
The range of a gun depended upon its angle of elevation 
more than the size of the powder charge (Muller 1780) . 
Experiments in the 18th century found a 12 pounder, a common 
size in the islands, could fire a projectile an average 450 
"paces" at point blank (no elevation) and up to 5,000 at 
"random" elevations (Muller 1780:viii). In more tangible 
terms, the "extreme effective range" was generally around 
1,700 yards (Gooding 1988:19; Hughes 1969:116), but it could 
still throw a solid shot up to nearly a mile (Coggins 
1969:152). The accuracy at this range was negligible. Other 
calibers could fire at lesser or greater ranges according to
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their size.
The range for grape and canister shot was somewhat less. 
Normally these shots were reserved for close-in fighting, 
either against personnel or ship rigging. A large gun could 
throw grape up to three-quarters of a mile, but with little 
effect at that range. Test firing of a 32 pounder using grape, 
at 750 yards, had 10 hits on a ship out of 27 balls in the 
charge. One penetrated four inches into the oak planking 
(Coggins 1969:153). Case shot was not used over a few hundred 
yards if any significant results were expected.
The loading and firing of a gun was rehearsed constantly 
at sea. There were no less than 12 steps necessary to fire a 
cannon (Coggins 1969:149-150; Tuchman 1988:118). These often 
had to be performed in less than ideal conditions. 
Nevertheless, a typical well trained crew could fire once 
every two minutes (Whipple 1978:30, cited in Tuchman 
1988:118). This rate was not sustainable for extended periods 
of time, due to fatigue and the heating of the gun (Coggins 
1969:150).
Realizing the importance of artillery to the defense of 
St. Eustatius, remaining guns were inventoried during the 
fortification survey project of 1990. Fifty-six pieces were 
located and recorded on the island. The majority were found in
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association with the batteries, although several others 
have been moved over the years to different locations. Still 
more were found underwater in Oranje Bay. One being 
conserved at William and Mary was also noted but not 
measured. All but one of the submerged cannon were located 
and noted, but not measured in 1990.
The artillery pieces were measured using a field form 
developed from the recommended measurements to be taken 
given in Roth (1989). Roth provides a table listing average 
bore size for most standard cannons (long guns only) (Table 
1 ) -
Another table was located which was commonly included in 
field books of naval and artillery officers of the period 
(Table 2) . This chart gives the diameter of a shot in inches 
(mm x .04) for French and English shot. If they were to 
acquire shot or guns from the enemy, they could calculate in 
what gun their own shot could be fired, or what enemy shot 
could be fired in which English cannon. French and English 
guns were not identically classed. A British 12 pounder for 
instance fired a maximum shot of 4.4 inches, whereas a 
French 12 pounder fired up to a 4.6 inch shot. A gun, then, 
with a bore of 4 inches (100 mm) can be a British 9 pounder, 
or a French 8  pounder which could take a ball of up to 4.02 
inches.
TABLE 1 (R oth  1989)
R. ROTH: PROPOSED STANDARD FOR REPORTING HISTORIC ARTILLERY
Danish Dulch English French Pori­
ng uc.sc
Prus­
sian
Russian Spanish Swedish Amer­
ican
4S-poundcr — IS7 — — 190 — — — 195 —
42-poundcr — — 179 — — — — — — —
36-pounder 176 170 — 175 173 — 173 174 178 —
32-poundcr — 104 163 — — — — — — 177
30-pounder '— 160 — 165 — —- 165 — — —
24* pounder 153 149 148 153 151 — 153 153 152 I4S
Itf-pounJcr 139 436 135 138 137 — 139 140 141 134
16-pounder — — — . 134 — — — — — —
l?-poundcr 122 120 118 121 120 140 12! 122 123 117
9-poundcr — — , » 107 — — — — — 106
K-poumier 106 105 — 106 109 — 106 107 108 —
6-pounder 95 96 94 96 95 I l l 96 — 98 93
4-poundcr 84 M 82 84 — — — — 86 —
3-pounder 76 77 74 53 — 90 _ __ 77 _
2-pounder 67 68 65 ■ — — — _ _ 68 — ■
1 j-pmmder — — 59 — — _ _ _ ___
1-pounder 53 55 52 — — — — — 54 _
{•pounder •11 — — — — -
i 1 ! i IiJUT.LL.rJ 1 T TT1 Tin i i i n  it
W eight
W
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12  
13 
M
15
16
17
1 8
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
25
TABLE 2 (W ilk in so n —L a th a m  1 9 7 3 )
DIAMETER OF IRON SHOT, ENGLISH AND FRENCH, EXPRESSED IN INCHES
Diameter D iam eter W eight D iam eier
CEnglish) {French) lb) (English)
I. 9 2 2 . 0 1 2 6 5 . 6 9
2 . 4 2 2-53 27 5 . 7 6
2 . 7 7 2 . 9 0 2 8 5 . 8 3
3-05 3 19 29 5-90
3 . 2 8 3-44 30 5*973-49 3 . 6 6 31 6 . 0 4
3 . 6 7 3 8 5 32 6 . 1 0
3 . 8 4 4 . 0 2 33 6 . 1 6
4 . 0 0 4 . 1 8 34 6 . 2 3
4 . 1 4 4-33 35 6 . 2 94-27 4-47 36 6 . 3 5
4 . 4 0 4 . 6 0 37 6 . 4 0
4-52 4-73 38 6 . 4 6
4 6 3 4 . 8 5 39 6 . 5 2
4 . 7 8 4 . 9 6 40 6 . 5 7
4 . 8 4 5 . 0 7 4 1 6 . 6 3
4-94 5-17 42 6 . 6 8
5 . 0 4 5-27. 43 6-73
5 1 3 5-37 44 6 . 7 8
5 . 2 2 5 . 4 6 45 6 . 8 4
5 . 3 0 5 - 55 4 6 6 . 8 9
538 5 . 6 4 47 6 . 9 4
5 . 4 0 5 . 7 2 4 8 6 . 9 8
5-54 5 . 8 0 49 7 . 0 3
5 . 6 3 5 . 8 8 50 7 . 0 8
D iam eier  
(French )
5 . 9 6
6 . 0 4  
6.11 
6 . 1 8
6 . 2 5  
6 . 3 2  
6 . 3 9  
6 . 4 5  
6 . 5 2  
6 . 5 8  
6 . 6 4  
6 . 7 0  
6 . 7 6  
6 . 8 2  
6.88 
6 . 9 4  
6 . 9 9
7 . 0 5  
7 . 1 0  
7 . 1 6  
7 . 2 4
7 . 2 6
7 . 3 1
7 . 3 6
7 . 4 2
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Unfortunately, the two tables are not always in strict 
agreement. As the second table was intended to tell a gunner 
what dimension of shot was maximum for what gun, it was 
decided to approximate pounder designations on the Statia 
forms using primarily Roth's table. In questionable cases, 
the lower class was chosen, or the designation was omitted. 
A ball could be fired with excessive windage (fitting loose 
in the barrel), but a ball even a fraction of an inch over 
the bore would not be able to be fired at all.
For these reasons, plus the fact that most guns have not 
been identified as to nationality of manufacture, all 
"pounder" designations given on the forms (Appendix 4), or 
in the fortification survey chapter, must be taken as 
estimates only. Further study using the entire gun's 
measurements and proportions would be required for more 
substantial estimations, as well as research into the noted 
markings for place of origin information (Figures 55-61). In 
cases where no listing was in Roth (such as a 100mm bore), 
or the gun was obviously of the "short" variety, the second 
table was used for the designation.
The guns on St. Eustatius were continually listed as 
being in a poor or useless state. Often this was a result of 
the condition of the gun carriage (Figure 53) . With the
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exception of clogged bores or vents, little could go wrong 
with a properly produced gun, but an unmounted gun was 
useless. Those with internal weaknesses were often 
undetectable until too late. At least one gun inventoried 
(SE8-FDV-4) appears to have burst. Mention of this 
occurrence is also made in the records. De Windt wrote to 
the Heren that "...some time ago soldier Jacob Kage of the 
1758 unit was killed when a cannon exploded..." (quoted and 
translated in Attema 1976:19).
Inferior weapons often found their way into the 
colonies, most destined for trade elsewhere. They were also 
commonly supplied with old surplus and outdated supplies. 
The French were especially notorious for having outdated 
guns or examples in poor condition on their ships (Coggins 
1969:159). This could partially explain their interest in 
removing guns from Statia whenever they evacuated, along 
with keeping them out of English hands.
Supplies for their own artillery were not easily 
procured on Statia. A letter of July 16, 1750 by Commander 
Johannes Heyliger (Pzn.) states the "Heren have not sent any 
cannonballs with the 12 and 18 pounder cannons that I have 
received. So I request the Heren to send these as soon as 
possible. Also two gun-carriages. Without that can not make 
any use of them. Also I have no cannon-balls of that size
344
and cannot obtain them here..."(quoted and translated in 
Attema 1976:51).
Commander de Windt had no better luck with the cannons. 
On 1 st September 1760 he requested guns and ammunition from 
the Heren X because "...the deplorable state of the 
artillery, its small calibre and the age of the cannons 
allow few to be fired without fear..." (quoted and 
translated in Attema 1976:19).
During the American Revolution it seems that Commandant 
Ravene found the iron cannon in Fort Oranje unacceptable. He 
had them replaced in 1778 with bronze pieces (Hartog 1976). 
These did not survive, however, possibly having been removed 
by the British or the French, for by 178 6  new cannon were 
installed in the Fort. These iron cannon, clearly dated, 
still remain. Attema (1976) states they were all from 
Amsterdam.
The French who occupied St. Eustatius in 1795 "carried 
away old cannon on their departure in 1801..." (Hartog 
1976:77-78). This could have included a variety of iron 
cannon, and any of the more valuable bronze cannon that may 
have been left. In any event, no bronze cannon were found on 
the island during the artillery inventory.
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More cannon were removed by 19th century scrap-iron 
dealers (Hartog 1976). Others have been taken for 
restoration purposes and museums. Some of the cannon used 
for the Andrew Doria salute were reportedly sold by Harbour­
master De Geneste around 1870, to scrap iron dealers. A 
visitor to the island of 1911, Frederick A. Fenger, said 
"The trunnions were knocked off so that they would roll 
easier and they were thrown over the edge of the cliff" 
(Hartog 197 6:78) . Only four were reported to have be taken, 
out of at least 11. Fenger related seeing the remaining 
cannon at Gallows bay in 1911. Three of these "salute guns" 
were removed in 1961 by Lucius Burch, E.T. Muller, and 
Congressman George Grider, and are now in Memphis, 
Tennessee, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Naval 
Institute at Washington, D.C. Whether these were in fact 
from the salute cannot be proven. One other gun purported to 
be from that notable battery is in Curacao (Hartog 1976:78).
The remainder of the Statia guns are scattered 
throughout the island. Mr. Franz Lampe remembered hearing of 
two or three more guns being buried under the pavement of 
the coastal road, where it goes south from the Guest House 
(SE219) . One more cannon is incorporated into the wall 
surrounding the house, on the left side of the staircase 
gate as you exit the compound.
Chapter 10
Summary and Conclusions
The study of the fortifications on St. Eustatius revealed 
many things. As an island that was occupied and fortified by 
at least three different nations over a long period of time, 
it has potential in comparative research. This fact soon 
became obvious during the mapping of the batteries. One main 
difference noted between the defenses was in the style of 
construction. Unfortunately, due to the chain of events in the 
island*s history, it is difficult to explain all of the 
observations.
Fortifications built by the Dutch tended to include 
embrasures. All works surveyed that were undoubtedly of Dutch 
origin incorporated this feature. Even the very low walled 
Battery Nassau had embrasures. At this site there was no 
apparent reason for their inclusion. Artillery could easily 
clear the wall. Some embrasures with intact capping at Nassau 
stood a mere three-quarters of a foot high from the exterior. 
Although it is possible that there are missing components, no 
such evidence was detected.
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Fort Oranje, the Waterfort, and Fort Rotterdam are also 
considered Dutch sites. Each was built with massive stone 
walls, several feet thick and up to five or six feet high. 
Fort de Windt also has one such massive wall along with one 
low wall. This "monumental" construction technique also seems 
to be solely a function of the Dutch works.
Unfortunately, these two observations are limited in 
scope. Although the defenses were Dutch, which might lead to 
that as the explanation, they also dated to the first half of 
the 18th century or earlier, with Fort Rotterdam the only 
possible exception. If in fact all are pre-1750, this could be 
a reason for their construction style. It becomes obscure then 
whether the inclusion of embrasures and the size of the walls 
are a function of nationality or time. Large walls would 
require the embrasures, but that cannot explain them at sites 
such as Battery Nassau.
The same problem is found when looking at the circa 1781 
fortifications. These tend to be low walled batteries, with no 
embrasures. Most walls stood around one and one-half to two 
and one-half feet high, low enough for the guns to clear them 
without embrasures.
Differentiating between British and French works is 
dubious at best. The only possible differences noted were
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between the "rough" cobble in the walls of Concordia, Corre 
Corre, and St. Louis and the fine cut stone of Bouille. The 
first three, though some are possibly of Dutch origin, 
probably now reflect British works. The last is attributed to 
the French. As the French had several years on the island and 
were not as fearful of recapture, they may have spent more 
time on their batteries, hence the more polished appearance. 
The British expected an imminent attack, and presumably built 
with rapidity.
The problem with this type of assumption lies in the fact 
that the two nations occupied the batteries in the same year. 
There is presently little hope of clearly identifying which 
elements are from which occupants. Even if the faced cobble 
batteries were begun by the British, they were used by the 
French for at least four years, then successively by the 
Dutch, French, and British on and off for the next 3 0 years. 
Even the cut stone of Bouille could be a British rebuilding of 
a French battery during the Napoleonic wars. Only further 
documentary and archaeological research will help to clarify 
the situation.
It should also be noted that these batteries, though of 
British and French origin, were late 18 th to early 19 th 
century works. Their style of construction is definitely at 
least a partial product of this time frame. To test the
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possibility that nationality was a factor of the style, 
batteries of the same period of known Dutch construction would 
also have to be present, and they are not.
The choice of placement for fortifications cannot be 
comparatively studied to a great degree. It is not possible 
from surface survey to determine if an early Dutch work 
underlay a later British or French position. The remaining 
surface evidence on the defenses did, however, suggest that 
the British and French were somewhat more attentive to the 
placement of their fortifications than the Dutch.
As with any study in historical archaeology, the project 
could have been greatly supplemented by the use of additional 
documents. Access to the surviving records was restricted for 
two reasons. First, most are located in the Netherlands, and 
second, they are in Dutch. Both of these facts limited their 
usefulness to the researcher. What documents were used were 
mostly reported in secondary sources. These were therefore 
often fragmentary. Only one document was available in its 
entirety, from photographs of the original. Future research 
into the fortifications would greatly benefit from more 
intensive investigation of the remaining documents in the 
Hague, and those presumably held in the archives of Britain 
and France.
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Other recommendations for future research include 
archaeological projects. The surface collections from the 
survey are stored on St. Eustatius, and could reveal 
interesting information. The extensive collections from 
Battery Concordia, SE81, may prove most beneficial.
Excavations of the fortifications could also clear up many 
questions raised here. Exploration around Fort Oranje may show 
evidence of its early 17th century appearance. Projects at 
Fort Rotterdam may provide insight into its origin, and 
therefore be useful for the study of construction style as a 
function of nationality or time.
Excavation of the barracks and associated buildings of 
several of the batteries could elucidate upon the lives of the 
garrisons. Comparative studies between the island, other 
islands, other colonial areas, and European barracks of the 
same date could reveal interesting information on military 
life. There may also be the opportunity to compare material 
culture of colonial militia and island troops with regulars 
stationed in Europe or North America.
The fortifications survey and study is suggestive of 
several points concerning the business of the defense of St. 
Eustatius as well. The small island had numerous 
fortifications and coastal batteries, yet continually fell to
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invader after invader. This phenomena is attributable to one 
or a combination of reasons. Among these would be a lack of 
naval protection from the motherland, a lack of batteries to 
fend off ships carrying troops, improperly placed and/or 
constructed batteries, insufficient weaponry or ammunition, 
improperly trained or motivated personnel, or habitually being 
besieged by overwhelming odds.
The evidence gathered in this study indicates that the 
island probably surrendered so often due to all of the 
aforementioned factors. It also suggests that these were not 
insurmountable, and that the island need not have changed its 
colours as often as it did.
The first factor, insufficient naval protection, was 
probably foremost among the deficiencies in the defense of St. 
Eustatius. Had the Dutch navy been capable of warding off 
enemy fleets, the batteries need never have come under the 
guns of rivals. The same holds true for subsequent 
administrations, such as the British and French. No matter how 
well or poorly fortified an island is, it was safe so long as 
friendly vessels kept hostile ships at bay.
The Dutch navy cannot be held responsible for the loss of 
Statia, for they never had sufficient ships or men to protect 
their islands. As a sea-faring nation, perhaps the government
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of the Netherlands was most negligent, for not providing the 
naval strength so vital to a colonial and trading nation. The 
British and French however, can both be faulted for the loss 
of the island by not providing adequate naval protection when 
it was within their power to do so.
The second factor, a lack of fortifications on St. 
Eustatius, does not seem to be a primary cause, especially 
after 1781. Before this it was definitely a major source of 
consideration. Prior to the British invasion, there were 
scattered coastal batteries around the island, along with the 
main fort. Even so, numerous landing sites lay unprotected. 
Troops wishing to land could do so without falling under the 
defenders guns until well established on the beach or 
approaching the Fort itself.
In the 17th century the island was reasonably protected by 
Fort Oranje and the occasional entrenchments. Situated as it 
was above the bay, the Fort was a formidable obstacle to most 
attempts at invasion or piracy. It was not until the rise of 
the use of large warships that its defensive role diminished.
As military theorists proposed, the lack of coastal 
batteries in the earlier years was not all that crucial. What 
was crucial was the proper defensive works being in place to 
deal with enemies whom had already landed. Had the Statians
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placed their batteries to force landings at specific areas, 
easily defended once a field engagement had resulted, they 
could have significantly reduced their vulnerabilities.
After 1781 this practice was better adhered to. The 
British and French both re-fortified the island, covering 
areas of desireable landings. This did force assaults to come 
from inconvenient areas. The French attack of November 1781 is 
a prime example. They landed at Jenkin's Bay, which required 
a difficult and dangerous ascent up the cliffs, followed by an 
overland trek across rough terrain. Had the British followed 
up on their strategy and been prepared to meet the French, the 
story may have had a different outcome.
The fortifications were also a mixture of competency and 
incompetency. In the late 17th century and early 18th century, 
Fort Oranje was built according to the established methods of 
the time. As a four-bastioned fort, it was defensible from 
land attacks. The majority of the guns were placed to protect 
the main bay, as was most prudent. The ascent to the Fort from 
the Lower Town was difficult, and as Rodney said, would have 
cost the aggressor much if it had put up a fight. From the 
land side it theoretically had the advantage of being able to 
detect the approaching troops, as well as having their coastal 
side safe from land attack. Its only real drawback was the 
proximity of the Upper Town, which impeded its effectiveness
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from the land side.
After the loss of two bastions, the Fort no longer 
maintained this position. Although by any means still 
defensible, it now had increased vulnerabilities. Once the 
bastion system was no longer operational for providing 
coverage to all areas of the Fort, it failed Vauban' s most 
basic premise of proper defensive works. A determined attacker 
could easily launch a frontal assault without fear of total 
failure. The change of the artillery to smaller calibers also 
greatly decreased the Fort's effectiveness.
The batteries were functional, but commonly substandard. 
All remaining batteries were of stone. This was a chief source 
of casualties to defenders, as a hit to the stone wall was 
more likely to wound a gun crew from flying debris than the 
shell itself. Military engineers understood this principle 
well and advocated earthen batteries. Some even took it so far 
as to suggest the soil be screened to remove stone if it were 
present (Tousard 1809).
At least two batteries, Tumble Down Dick and Battery 
Concordia, added soil embankments to the front of their walls. 
Whilst this helped, by providing an absorbent for the incoming 
shells, it was not perfect. By 1990 at least, most of the 
batteries had no sign whatsoever of having had this added
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protection.
In general the batteries were open backed constructions. 
This, although making it indefensible from a land attack, was 
not discouraged by learned strategists. The main function of 
the battery was to provide the initial defense from the 
amphibious assault. It was the function of the Fort to protect 
the inhabitants from landed troops. In this aspect the Statian 
batteries were acceptable. In fact, this open design was 
beneficial in that it discouraged richochets within the 
battery walls.
The placement of the batteries was by and large, 
competent. They protected the major landing sites, and most 
were sufficiently elevated to fire the recommended shots 
whilst making return fire difficult from the sea. The works 
most vulnerable to return fire were Battery Corre Corre, 
Battery Dollijn, and the Waterfort. Others placed on cliffs 
were reasonably safe. These included Nassau, Bouille, Four- 
Gun, Concordia, and St. Louis for example. Overall, the 
British and French forts tended to be built on the better 
topographic inclinations. This may be due to professional 
military personnel planning them over the less experienced 
Dutch colonials. In all, the fortifications and batteries were 
reasonably placed and constructed.
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The major fault of the defenses was in their condition and 
maintenance. From the beginning of the islands occupation, the 
defenses were perpetually reported to be in wretched 
conditions. Batteries such as Tumble Down Dick were 
constructed and useless in less than a decade. Cannon were 
continually out of service, usually due to deteriorated 
carriages. As a carriage was able to be built by local 
carpenters, this was blatant negligence.
The insufficient upkeep of the defenses was partially the 
fault of the islanders and partially that of the governing 
body in Holland. It was the Statians themselves that allowed 
the defenses to deteriorate, when regular maintenance may have 
prevented a great deal of the problems. Once these had 
developed, however, there was always a problem in obtaining 
the necessary equipment and supplies to repair the damage. Had 
the island received "sufficient powder, weapons, and 
cannons... from Holland in time to strengthen the forts, it is 
quite likely that some of the unexpected attacks could have 
been beaten off" (Attema 1976:20).
Even when supplied from the Netherlands, the island 
batteries were almost always outgunned by military 
expeditions. Warships commonly carried guns of larger calibre 
than many of the coastal batteries:
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It was one of the peculiar functions of technology that 
shore batteries on the islands were generally of 
inadequate caliber and range to knock out a ship 
approaching with hostile intent. One is moved to wonder 
why, if a 1 0 -pounder gun could be mounted on the rolling 
deck of a sailing vessel, the same or larger could not be 
mounted on land? The fact is that blind parsimony of the 
defense kept the shore batteries usually too few in 
number to equal in firepower the heavy guns of a ship of 
the line (Tuchman 1988:95).
In fairness to 18th century military engineers, it should 
be remembered that 12, 18, and 24 pounders were suggested for 
most coastal batteries. The reality, however, cannot be 
overlooked: land batteries such as found on St. Eustatius were 
seldom armed with calibers larger than an 18 pounder, whilst 
a typical ship of the line carried 24, 32, or even larger guns 
with little effort..
In addition to the larger calibers they carried, a single 
ship of the line mounting 90 guns in itself outgunned the 
entire island, according to Admiral Rodney's count of 1781 
(Rodney 1789). A fleet of such warships could easily be 
considered overwhelming odds.
Another reason the defenses were allowed to deteriorate 
was from a lack of motivation by the inhabitants. Most were 
solely concerned with trade or other lucrative endeavors, and 
seldom thought of defense until too late. This was a common 
pattern throughout the Caribbean islands of all nationalities. 
Added to this was the reported low standard of training and
358
motivation that the regular island garrisons exhibited. Well 
trained troops from Europe commonly lost much of their 
effectiveness when sent to the Caribbean. Morale was 
excessively low, and disease exceedingly high. What troops 
were stationed on the island were often too few in number to 
withstand a siege.
The choice made by the leadership of St. Eustatius in time 
of besiegement, therefore, was most often immediate surrender. 
Had the island kept their defenses in working order, well 
supplied and manned, it is not doubtful that at least some of 
the invasions would have been successfully repelled.
Others, such as the capitulation to the British expedition 
of 1781, were probably the right decision. Surrendering a 
fort, ship, island, etc. , did not have the same negative 
connotation it later would acquire. It was not dishonorable to 
surrender without a fight to a superior force. In fact, 
needless waste was less acceptable than a judicious surrender. 
The submission of the island in most cases probably saved many 
lives with only the cost of some material goods.
The defense of St. Eustatius was a difficult matter. In 
the early years of the colony, a fort and a few scattered 
batteries proved sufficient for the most part. As naval 
technology advanced it became necessary to defend an island,
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any island, by the use of ships. In this respect, St. 
Eustatius was doomed. The Dutch navy was no match for the 
navies of Britain or France, even in their own waters, let 
alone in the Caribbean and the Americas. The only real defense 
of St. Eustatius was its role as a supplier for the colonies 
of all nations: its "... utility was its defense. The 
universality of its use, the neutrality of its nature was its 
security and its safeguard" (Tuchman 1988:19).
As long as it held this role of a trade center and central 
open port, the island would always remain in danger. It became 
entangled in war after war simply by allowing the arguing 
nations to use its bay. The economic collapse of the island in 
the 19th century was ironic. It ruined the economy of Statia 
and resulted in its depopulation, but it also meant the island 
would now be safe from aggression. St. Eustatius had finally 
found a way to live in peace: it was no longer of use to
European nations.
Appendix 1
The French Invasion Force as it set out for 
St. Eustatius on November 15, 1781.
Troops:
Regiment____________________________ Strength
Auxerroir regiment 400 men
Royal Comtois 320 men
Dillon's and Waith's regiments 400 men
Martinique Grenadiers 50 men
Matrosses (artillerymen) 24 men
Ships th e y  em barked on; 
Ship_____________________
Medea
Amazon
Galatea
Corvette Eagle 
Sloop St. Louis 
Sloop Diligent 
Schooner Felicity 
Schooner Charmante
Commander
La Chevalier de Girardin 
M. De Villages 
Chevalier de Rocquart 
Mons. de Prencos
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Appendix 2 
Ship Lists
Ships with Rodney and Hood, 1781 (Spinney 1969, James 1926). 
Ship________________Guns_________ Commanding
Barfleur 90 Sir Samuel Hood, Rear Admiral
of the Blue, J. Inglefield
Gibralter 80 Walter Stirling
Invincible 74 C. Saxton
Vengence 74
Princessa 70 Sir T. Rich
Monarca 70 J. Gell
Prince William 64 Stair Douglas
Belliquex 64 T. Fitzherbert
Prince Edward 62 (Former Dutch Mars)
Panther 50 or 60 J. Harvey
Sybil 28
Sloop Swall
Unknown 38
Unknown 32
French Ships with the St. Eustatius Invasion Force,
Shio Commander
Medea La Chevalier de Girardin
Amazon M. De Villages
Galatea Chevalier de Rocquart
Corvette Eagle Mons. de Prencos
Sloop St. Louis 
Sloop Diligent 
Schooner Felicity 
Schooner Charmante
361
Appendix 3
A Report of the French taking of St. Eustatius.
The following was written by "Chevalier de Goussencourt" 
who was presumed to have accompanied de Grasses' fleet in 1781 
and 1782. It was apparently a pseudonyme.
[November 1781]
We were greatly surprised, on arriving at Fort Royal, to 
learn the departure of the Marquis de Bouille with 1500 
men, on two frigates and all the boats or domains, on an 
expedition to which no one had any clue.
December. [1781]
On the 1st we learned that he had just taken St. 
Eustatius, a Dutch emporium which Rodney had captured, as 
I stated on our arrival in the West Indies. To recover 
this colony, he used one of those bold strategems that 
always succeed with a man of talent who has won the 
affection of his troops. The Marquis de Bouille knew how 
negligently the English lay at St. Eustatius, and first 
landed Dillon's Regiment, which, in red coats, and 
speaking English, could better cover the design.... A 
hundred men of Walsh's regiment had landed on another 
side, commanded by Mr. O'Conor. Imagining that he heard 
the signal, he marched straight on the fort, but was much 
surprised to see, instead of his fellow-soldiers of 
Dillon's regiment, the English recruits at drill. He 
fired on them at once; they fled into the fort, and he 
after them up to the gate, which he seized. The French 
troops came up in a moment, rushed in, and compelled the 
English to capitulate in their quarters, breeches in 
hand. Mr 0'Conor went and arrested the governor, who, 
taking him for an officer of his garrison, scolded him 
for the firing and the trouble among the troops, but was 
much amazed when informed that his interlocutor was 
French, and himself a prisoner of his Most Christian 
Majesty. He went to the window to look, and fell back 
fainting when he saw the regiment of Auxerrois drawn up 
in line of battle on the square, and Mr. de Bouille 
giving orders. He then repented of the party of pleasure 
in the country to which he had just been, and from which 
he got back two hours before the surprise. The garrison, 
to the number of 756, were taken prisoners of war.... 
(Gossencourt n.d., reprinted from an 1864 reprint in Shea 
1971:91-93).
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APPENDIX 4 
THE ARTILLERY OF ST. EUSTATIUS
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-1
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate ’’Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Amsterdam, Netherlands 
Date of manufacture: 1786
Markings: on tube; Cartouche (Figure 55) above N 1 
W III X, crown on muzzle face, 1786 on left trunnion, 
right trunnion.
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1883 mm 
Cascable: 100 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1983 mm 
Diam. of bore: 77 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 23 0 mm
Min. tube diam: 169 mm muzzle face diam: 17 0 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 2 35 mm 
overall width: 399 mm trunnion length: 82 mm
diam. of backring: 280 mm diam. at vent: 274 mm
Cascable diameters: Min: 63 mm Max: 81
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: Restored to gun carriage
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-2
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam ?
Date of manufacture: 1786
Markings: On left trunnion; 419(or 2)95 CAS..O 1786. 
right trunnion; 3*P 8 'L'O 8 + 16.
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1680 mm
Cascable: 150 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 183 0 mm
Diam. of bore: 80 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 225 mm
Min. tube diam: 172 mm muzzle face diam: 142 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 234 mm
overall width: 380 mm trunnion length: 80 mm
diam. of backring: 275 mm diam. at vent: 267 mm
Cascable diameters: Min: 70 mm Max: 77
Number of staves or rings: 6
Present condition: Restored to carriage
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no Additonal comments or information:
954 
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-3
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Date of manufacture: 1786 ?
Markings: On muzzle face are 3 crowns and "26". On tube is 
arsenal mark (figure 53), and "N LII 958 W III X". Left 
trunnion marked ”178. . . ” (last numeral missing) , right marked 
"F".
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1890 mm 
Cascable: 105 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1995 mm 
Diam. of bore: 79 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 230 mm
Min. tube diam: 168 mm muzzle face diam: 175 mm
Trunnion diam: 74 mm diam behind trunnions: 23 0 mm 
overall width: 395 mm trunnion length: 91 mm
diam. of backring: 280 mm diam. at vent: 256 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 62 mm Max: 85 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: sound, restored to carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-4
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Date of manufacture: 1786
Markings: On tube is arsenal mark (figure 53), and "N : II 
966 W III X ”. Left trunnion marked "1786", right marked 
"F". Muzzle face marked with two crowns flanking "2 3" 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1885 mm 
Cascable: 113 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1998 mm
Diam. of bore: 79 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 214 mm
Min. tube diam: 166 mm muzzle face diam: 178 mm
Trunnion diam: 74 mm diam behind trunnions: 230 mm 
overall width: 395 mm trunnion length: 91 mm
diam. of backring: 280 mm diam. at vent: 265 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 62 mm Max: 85 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: sound, restored to carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information:
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-5
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Date of manufacture: 1786
Markings: On tube is arsenal mark (figure 53), and MN XLIII 
948 W III IX V". Left trunnion marked "1786", right marked 
"F". Muzzle face marked with two crowns flanking ,,19n (?) 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1890 mm 
Cascable: 105 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1995 mm 
Diam. of bore: 79 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 232 mm
Min. tube diam: 165 mm muzzle face diam: 169 mm
Trunnion diam: 7 mm diam behind trunnions: 23 0 mm 
overall width: 395 mm trunnion length: 91 mm
diam. of backring: 290 mm diam. at vent: 2 6 8  mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 62 mm Max: 85 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: sound, restored to carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO - 6
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: On tube is arsenal mark (figure 53) . Left trunnion
is marked "3.P 8  11 0 8 J 6 " (?) . Right is marked "41.....
17 9" (last numeral appears to be a date, but the third
character is obscured).
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1692 mm 
Cascable: 160 mm Overall (tube -I- cascable) : 1852 mm
Diam. of bore: 80 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 225 mm
Min. tube diam: 173 mm muzzle face diam: 14 6  mm
Trunnion diam: 77 mm diam behind trunnions: 234 mm 
overall width: 380 mm trunnion length: 83 mm
diam. of backring: 286 mm diam. at vent: 274 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 70 mm Max: 77 mm
Number of staves or rings: 6
Present condition: sound, restored to carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information:
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-7
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Date of manufacture: 1786
Markings: On tube is arsenal mark (figure 53), and "N XX XV 
976 W III XI V". Left trunnion marked "1786", right marked 
"F". Muzzle face marked "IS"
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1885 mm 
Cascable: 115 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2 000 mm
Diam. of bore: 78 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 229 mm
Min. tube diam: 170 mm muzzle face diam: 170 mm
Trunnion diam: 74 mm diam behind trunnions: 23 0 mm 
overall width: 395 mm trunnion length: 91 mm
diam. of backring: 282 mm diam. at vent: 270 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 62 mm Max: 85 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: sound, restored to carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO - 8
Present location/context: Fort Oranje 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture: Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Date of manufacture: 1786
Markings: On tube is arsenal mark (figure 53) , and "N XLV 
III 950 W. Ill IX X". Left trunnion marked "1786", right 
marked "F". Muzzle face marked "...8 " (18?)
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1885 mm 
Cascable: 115 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2000 mm
Diam. of bore: 78 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 216 mm
Min. tube diam: 167 mm muzzle face diam: 168 mm
Trunnion diam: 74 mm diam behind trunnions: 230 mm 
overall width: 395 mm trunnion length: 91 mm
diam. of backring: 296 mm diam. at vent: 274 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 62 mm Max: 85 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: sound, restored to carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 11
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Vent is spiked (plugged).
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: FO-9
Present location/context: Fort Oranje, central monument 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 4
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: 8 6  mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: embedded in concrete monument.
How many pieces at this location: 3 in monument, 11 in fort 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: The bore diameter may
have been altered as all three have a solid shot ball 
embedded half into the muzzle.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: FO-IO
Present location/context: Fort Oranje, central monument 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 4
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: 8 6  mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: embedded in concrete monument.
How many pieces at this location: 3 in monument, 11 in fort 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: The bore diameter may
have been altered as all three have a solid shot ball 
embedded half into the muzzle.
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Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: FO-11
Present location/context: Fort Oranje, central monument 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 4
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: 85 mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: embedded in concrete monument.
How many pieces at this location: 3 in monument, 11 in fort 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: The bore diameter may 
have been altered as all three have a solid shot ball 
embedded half into the muzzle.
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Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE99-TDD-1
Present location/context: SE99, Tumble Down Dick Battery 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12-18
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings: on backring "...I...OA"
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2685 mm 
Cascable: 250 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 293 5 mm 
Diam. of bore: I30d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 275 mm
Min. tube diam: 250 mm muzzle face diam: 225 mm
Trunnion diam: 105 mm diam behind trunnions: 350 mm 
overall width: 555 mm trunnion length: 12 0 mm
diam. of backring: 390 mm diam. at vent: 3 70 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 100 mm Max: 140 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: corroded 
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location: 3 
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Cannon have been moved 
into their current positions by the Oil Terminal.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE99-TDD-2
Present location/context: SE99, Tumble Down Dick Battery 
Approximate "Pounder” designation: 12-18
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings: on vent ring "11 3 1(?)480A"
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2 685 mm 
Cascable: 2  50 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 293 5 mm 
Diam. of bore: I30d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 275 mm
Min. tube diam: 250 mm muzzle face diam: 225 mm
Trunnion disun: mm disun behind trunnions: 350 mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: 390 mm disun. at vent: 370 mm
Cascable disuneters:
Min: 100 mm Max: 14 0 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: corroded 
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location: 3 
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Both trunnions are
missing, possibly for salvage preparation. Cannon have been 
moved into their current positions by the Oil Terminal.
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Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE99-TDD-3
Present location/context: SE99, Tumble Down Dick Battery 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 222 0 mm 
Cascable: 170 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 23 90 mm 
Diam. of bore: 92d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 225 mm
Min. tube diam: 180 mm muzzle face diam: 160 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 285 mm 
overall width: 435 mm trunnion length: 75 mm
diam. of backring: 37 0 mm diam. at vent: 355 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 90 mm Max: 130 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: heavily corroded 
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location: 3 
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Cannon have been moved
into their current positions by the Oil Terminal.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE99-TDD-4
Present location/context: SE99, Tumble Down Dick Battery 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6  or 9
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2210 mm 
Cascable: 245 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2455 mm 
Diam. of bore: lOOd mm Diam of muzzle swell: 210 mm
Min. tube diam: 190 mm muzzle face diam: 180 mm
Trunnion diam: 90 mm diam behind trunnions: 300 mm 
overall width: 490 mm trunnion length: 95 mm
diam. of backring: 380 mm diam. at vent: 3 60 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 90 mm Max: 130 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: corroded 
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location: 3 
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Cannon have been moved 
into their current positions by the Oil Terminal.
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Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-1
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2590 mm 
Cascable: 270 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2860 mm 
Diam. of bore: 135 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 315 mm
Min. tube diam: 250 mm muzzle face diam: 275 mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: 470 mm diam. at vent: 440 (est.) mm 
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: stable
How many pieces at this location: 7
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Cannon was mostly buried
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-2
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2 610 mm 
Cascable: 290 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 29 00 mm
Diam. of bore: 135 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 32 0 mm
Min. tube diam: 270 mm muzzle face diam: 250 mm
Trunnion diam: 110 mm diam behind trunnions: 370 mm 
overall width: 570 mm trunnion length: 100 mm
diam. of backring: 430 mm diam. at vent: 410 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 13 0 mm Max: 170 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: sound
How many pieces at this location: 7
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
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Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-3
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture: Possibly Dutch 
Date of manufacture: 18th century 
Markings: Trunnion marks similar to SE69-BB-2 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2885 mm
Cascable: 270 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 3155 mm
Diam. of bore: 140 (deteriorated) mm Diam of muzzle
swell: 310 mm
Min. tube diam: 270 mm muzzle face diam: 260 mm
Trunnion diam: 13 5 mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: 135 mm
diam. of backring: 480 mm diam. at vent: 440 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 130 mm Max: 170 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location: 7 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Partially buried in soil.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-4
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 8
Place of manufacture: Dutch ?
Date of manufacture: 18th century 
Markings: Trunnion marked "S17"
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2240 mm 
Cascable: 150 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2 390 mm 
Diam. of bore: 105 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 22 0 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 170 mm
Trunnion diam: 100 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 470 mm trunnion length: 100 mm
diam. of backring: 390 mm diam. at vent: 360 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 90 mm
Number of staves or rings: 7 groups 
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location: 7 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Muzzle face abuts wall, 
partially buried tube.
373
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-5
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 8
Place of manufacture: Dutch ?
Date of manufacture: 1787 (?)
Markings: On backring ,,1690,,. Trunnions marked "X" and
'* 1787" (or 1747 ?) .
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2240 mm 
Cascable: 150 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2390 mm 
Diam. of bore: 105 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 22 0 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 170 mm
Trunnion diam: 90 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 450 mm trunnion length: 90 mm
diam. of backring: 380 mm diam. at vent: 340 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 90 mm
Number of staves or rings: 7 groups 
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location: 7 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Numbers on backring are 
weight marks, not date as suggested in Barka 1985:62.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-6
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture: late 18th century ?
Markings: "IF" on right trunnion, identical to SE69-BB-1. 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2535 mm 
Cascable: 2 00 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 273 5 mm 
Diam. of bore: 120 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 340 mm
Min. tube diam: 300 mm muzzle face diam: 210 mm
Trunnion diam: 110 mm diam behind trunnions: 34 0 mm 
overall width: 560 mm trunnion length: 110 mm
diam. of backring: 440 mm diam. at vent: 400 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 120 mm Max: 140 mm
Number of staves or rings: 6 
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location: 7 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Trunnion mark like on a 
suspected British cannon at Battery Bouille.
374
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE96-FR-7
Present location/context: SE96, Fort Royal 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 8  to 12
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture: 1787 (?)
Markings: Right trunnion marked "X".
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2250 mm 
Cascable: 150 mm Overall (tube 4 cascable): 2400 mm 
Diam. of bore: 110 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 220 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 170 mm
Trunnion diam: 90 mm diam behind trunnions: 27 0 mm 
overall width: 450 mm trunnion length: 90 mm
diam. of backring: 360 mm diam. at vent: 32 0 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 90 mm
Number of staves or rings: 7 groups 
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location: 7 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Nearly identical to SE9 6 - 
FR-5 SE, so date is assumed. Left trunnion was not able to 
be uncovered from the soil.
375
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE8-FDV-1
Present location/context: Fort de Windt (SE8)
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings: On backring; "...OA", trunnion and vent marks. 
(Figure 56)
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2595 mm 
Cascable: 230 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2825 mm 
Diam. of bore: 132/5 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 320 mm
Min. tube diam: 260 mm muzzle face diam: 260 mm
Trunnion diam: 130 mm diam behind trunnions: 390 mm 
overall width: 610 mm trunnion length: 110 mm
diam. of backring: 470 mm diam. at vent: 440 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 130 mm Max: 180 mm
Number of staves or rings: 6
Present condition: Restored to reproduction carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Tube has "Willem Pul P 
Vet 1986 SIEP VEIDSTRA" hand stamped onto it.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE8-FDV-2
Present location/context: Fort de Windt (SE8)
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture: English ?
Date of manufacture:
Markings: Cartouche on barrel. Crown over the obscured
remainder.
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 24 60 mm 
Cascable: 250 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2710 mm 
Diam. of bore: 125 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 265 mm
Min. tube diam: 210 mm muzzle face diam: 265 mm
Trunnion diam: 90 mm diam behind trunnions: 320+ mm 
overall width: 500 mm trunnion length: 105 mm
diam. of backring: 420 mm diam. at vent: 370 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 110 mm Max: 150 mm
Number of staves or rings: 5
Present condition: Restored to reproduction carriage.
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
376
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE8-FDV-3
Present location/context: Fort de Windt (SE8)
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6 or 9
Place of manufacture: English if a 9 pounder 
Date of manufacture:
Markings: none 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2230 mm 
Cascable: 185 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2415 mm 
Diam. of bore: 100 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 205 mm
Min. tube diam: 165 mm muzzle face diam: 160 mm
Trunnion diam: 65 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 380 mm trunnion length: 110 mm
diam. of backring: 350 mm diam. at vent: 340 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 90 mm
Number of staves or rings: 6
Present condition: One trunnion broken off.
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Cannon laying on ground 
by cliff edge. In danger of falling if erosion continues to 
ground north of wall.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE8-FDV-4
Present location/context: Fort de Windt (SE8)
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6 or 9
Place of manufacture: English if a 9 pounder ?
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm 
Cascable: 180 mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: 98 mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 280 mm 
overall width: mm trunnion length: 110 mm
diam. of backring: 390 mm diam. at vent: 360 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 120 mm Max: 125 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: Cannon apparently burst, leaving only
rear half.
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: With SE8-FDV-3, on cliff 
edge.
377
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE66-BN-1
Present location/context: SE66 Battery Nassau 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings: "F" on trunnion.
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2590 mm 
Cascable: 270 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 28 60 mm 
Diam. of bore: 130 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 300 mm
Min. tube diam: 275 mm muzzle face diam: 270 mm
Trunnion diam: 120 mm diam behind trunnions: 37 0 mm 
overall width: 610 mm trunnion length: 120top mm
diam. of backring: 460 mm diam. at vent: 410 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 130 mm Max: 160 mm
Number of staves or rings: 5 groups 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 1 
Number of variant styles at this location: 1 
Photo on file ?: no 
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE69-BB-1
Present location/context: SE69 Battery Bouille 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12 
Place of manufacture: Britain ?
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: Crowned cartouche on tube. IF (Figure 57) on right 
trunnion.
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2440 mm 
Cascable: 217 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2 657 mm 
Diam. of bore: 119 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 310 mm
Min. tube diam: 240 mm muzzle face diam: 225 mm
Trunnion diam: 105 mm diam behind trunnions: 545 mm 
overall width: llltop mm trunnion length: 430 mm
diam. of backring: 386 mm diam. at vent: 110 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 130 mm Max: 6 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: Sound
How many pieces at this location: 3
Number of variant styles at this location: 2
Photo on file ?: No
Additonal comments or information:
378
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE69-BB-2
Present location/context: SE69 Battery Bouille 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12
Place of manufacture: Netherlands 
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: Cartouche (Figure 58) on tube. On backring
11VA??EH11. Both trunnions have markings (figure 58) 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2590 mm 
Cascable: 270 mm Overall (tube *1- cascable): 2860 mm
Diam. of bore: 123 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 280 mm
Min. tube diam: 240 mm muzzle face diam: 248 mm
Trunnion diam: 133 mm diam behind trunnions: 390 mm 
overall width: 620 mm trunnion length: 125 mm
diam. of backring: 430 mm diam. at vent: 42 0 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 48 mm Max: 135 mm
Number of staves or rings: 5 groups 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 3 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: 2 inch ball found at
muzzle.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE69-BB-3
Present location/context: SE69 Battery Bouille 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 24
Place of manufacture: Dutch or French ?
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: "X" on bottom of tube between trunnions. Both
trunnions marked (Figure 59) .
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 3110 mm 
Cascable: 375 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 3485 mm
Diam. of bore: 155 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 370 mm
Min. tube diam: 305 mm muzzle face diam: 305 mm
Trunnion diam: 150 mm diam behind trunnions: 425 mm 
overall width: 680 mm trunnion length: I50top mm
diam. of backring: 550 mm diam. at vent: 535 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 130 mm Max: 165 mm
Number of staves or rings: 5-6 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 3 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2 
Photo on file ?: no 
Additonal comments or information:
379
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE97-FP-1
Present location/context: SE97 Fort Panga 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture: Possibly British 
Date of manufacture: late 18th century
Markings: on backring; "H 10P 1234". See figure 60 for
trunnion markings.
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1790 mm 
Cascable: 155 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1945 mm 
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 195 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 27 0 mm 
overall width: 42 0 mm trunnion length: 85 mm
diam. of backring: 295 mm diam. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 115 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 5 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE97-FP-2
Present location/context: SE97 Fort Panga 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture: Possibly British 
Date of manufacture: late 18th century
Markings: on backring; "ANN....."."VB(?)" on trunnions. 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1790 mm 
Cascable: 155 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1945 mm
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 195 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 420 mm trunnion length: 85 mm
diam. of backring: 295 mm diam. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 115 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 5 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
380
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE97-FP-3
Present location/context: SE97 Fort Panga 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1790 mm 
Cascable: 155 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1945 mm 
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 195 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 420 mm trunnion length: 85 mm
diam. of backring: 295 mm diam. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 115 mm
Number of staves or rings: 5 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 4 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE97-FP-4
Present location/context: SE97 Fort Panga 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture: Possibly British 
Date of manufacture: Late 18th century
Markings: See figure 61 for trunnion mark. Backring; "A
P12.2.8" (center characters obscured)
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1930 mm 
Cascable: 120 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2050 mm
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 2 35 mm
Min. tube diam: 170 mm muzzle face diam: 180 mm
Trunnion diam: 85 mm diam behind trunnions: 23 0 mm 
overall width: 400 mm trunnion length: 85 (top) mm
diam. of backring: 310 mm diam. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 65 mm Max: 80 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: sound
How many pieces at this location: 5
Number of variant styles at this location: 2
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
381
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE97-FP-5
Present location/context: SE97 Fort Panga 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: 250 mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: 360 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: Partially buried
How many pieces at this location: 5
Number of variant styles at this location: 2
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE97/SE98-Trench-l
Present location/context: Trench running between SE97 and 
SE98, Fort Panga and Battery Jussac.
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture: Possibly British 
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: on backring; "A 1226".
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1790 mm 
Cascable: 155 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1945 mm 
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Disun of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 195 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 420 mm trunnion length: 85 mm
disun. of backring: 295 mm disun. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable disuneters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 115 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
382
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE98-JB-1
Present location/context: SE98, Jussac Battery. 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture: Possibly British 
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: on backring; "A 1772 7PJ22.6" (J may be a 1) .
Trunnions are marked HRV"
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1790 mm 
Cascable: 155 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1945 mm
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 195 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 42 0 mm trunnion length: 85 mm
diam. of backring: 295 mm disun. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable disuneters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 115 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 3 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2 
Photo on file ?: no 
Additonal comments or information:
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE98-JB-2
Present location/context: SE98, Jussac Battery 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12 to 18
Place of manufacture: Possibly Dutch 
Date of manufacture:
Markings: Similar to trunnion marks on SE69-BB-2. 
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 258 0 mm
Cascable: 270 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2850 mm
Diam. of bore: 13 0 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 3 00 mm
Min. tube diam: 235 mm muzzle face diam: 235 mm
Trunnion diam: 120 mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: 110 mm
diam. of backring: 450 mm diam. at vent: 410 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 105 mm Max: 140 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: sound
How many pieces at this location: 3
Number of variant styles at this location: 2
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information:
383
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE98-JB-3
Present location/context: SE98, Jussac Battery.
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6
Place of manufacture: Possibly British 
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: on backring; ,,49PJ234" (J may be a 1) . Trunnions 
are marked "RV"
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1790 mm 
Cascable: 155 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1945 mm
Diam. of bore: 89 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 195 mm muzzle face diam: 195 mm
Trunnion diam: 80 mm diam behind trunnions: 270 mm 
overall width: 420 mm trunnion length: 85 mm
diam. of backring: 295 mm diam. at vent: 290 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 115 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4 
Present condition: sound 
How many pieces at this location: 3 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2 
Photo on file ?: no 
Additonal comments or information:
384
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE81-BCON-1
Present location/context: SE81, Battery Concordia
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1795 mm 
Cascable: 180 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1975 mm 
Diam. of bore: 80 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 285 mm
Min. tube diam: 210 mm muzzle face diam: 200 mm
Trunnion diam: 100/140 mm diam behind trunnions: 325 mm 
overall width: 450 mm trunnion length: 70/100 mm
diam. of backring: 3 30 mm diam. at vent: 325 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 75 mm Max: 85 mm
Number of staves or rings: 2+?
Present condition: Deteriorated. Fe deeply cracked.
How many pieces at this location: 2 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2 
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Exposure to the Atlantic 
winds and salts has caused severe deterioration.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE81-BCON-2
Present location/context: SE81 Battery Concordia 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 9 or 12
Place of manufacture: Britain ?
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1650 mm 
Cascable: 130 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 178 0 mm 
Diam. of bore: llOd mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 230 mm muzzle face diam: I65d mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: missing mm
diam. of backring: 380 mm diam. at vent: 340 mm
Cascable diameters: Missing 
Number of staves or rings: 4
Present condition: Deteriorated. Cascable and both
trunnions missing
How many pieces at this location: 2 
Number of variant styles at this location: 2 
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Cascable and trunnions 
being knocked off was common to prepare for salvage, 
however, deteriorated condition of the piece may account for 
some of this alteration. Style of the gun is very typical of 
pieces meant specifically for naval use.
385
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE27-CC-1
Present location/context: SE27, Battery Corre Corre 
Approximate "Pounder1* designation: 4
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1750 mm 
Cascable: 160 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1910 mm 
Diam. of bore: 85 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 230 mm
Min. tube diam: 225 mm muzzle face diam: 175 mm
Trunnion diam: 100 mm diam behind trunnions: 300 mm 
overall width: 440 mm trunnion length: 70 mm
diam. of backring: 310 mm diam. at vent: 310 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 65 mm Max: 80 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: heavy corrosion
How many pieces at this location: 3
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Exposure to Atlantic
winds and sea salts has caused heavy deterioration.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE27-CC-2
Present location/context: SE27, Battery Corre Corre 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 6 or 9
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1770 mm
Cascable: 180 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1950 mm
Diam. of bore: lOOd mm Diam of muzzle swell: 240 mm
Min. tube diam: 190 mm muzzle face diam: 180 mm
Trunnion diam: 90 mm diam behind trunnions: 290 mm 
overall width: 430 mm trunnion length: 70 mm
diam. of backring: 345 mm diam. at vent: 310 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 70 mm Max: 90 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: heavy corrosion
How many pieces at this location: 3
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Exposure to Atlantic
winds and sea salts has caused heavy deterioration
386
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE27-CC-3
Present location/context: SE27, Battery Corre Corre 
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2490 mm 
Cascable: 300 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2790 mm 
Diam. of bore: 120 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 320 mm
Min. tube diam: 260 mm muzzle face diam: 270 mm
Trunnion diam: 160 mm diam behind trunnions: 380 mm 
overall width: 700 mm trunnion length: 120 mm
diam. of backring: 470 mm diam. at vent: 427 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 130 mm Max: 175 mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: corroded
How many pieces at this location: 3
Number of variant styles at this location: 2-3
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Exposure to Atlantic
winds and sea salts has caused heavy deterioration
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE219-1
Present location/context: SE219, the Guest House, in the
compound wall.
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: sound, but encased in concrete wall 
How many pieces at this location: 1 
Number of variant styles at this location: 1 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Not measured
387
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE383-LT-1
Present location/context: Cliff side of Bay Road, on low 
wall (SE383).
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 12
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2061 mm 
Cascable: broken mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2 07 3 mm 
Diam. of bore: 125d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 320 mm
Min. tube diam: 250 mm muzzle face diam: 250 mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: 460 mm diam. at vent: 445 mm
Cascable diameters: Missing 
Number of staves or rings: 5
Present condition: Deteriorated, trimmed for salvage
How many pieces at this location: 2 
Number of variant styles at this location: 1 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Cannon may have been
removed here from elsewhere, or could be associated with 
Lower Town batteries.The former is suspected as both guns 
had the cascables removed, possibly for salvage purposes, 
and known salvage activity along the bay in the 19th 
century.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE383-LT-2
Present location/context: Cliff side of Bay Road, on low 
wall (SE383).
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture: Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2 054 mm 
Cascable: broken mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2 069 mm
Diam. of bore: 140d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 350 mm
Min. tube diam: 310 mm muzzle face diam: 305 mm
Trunnion diam: est.140 (broken) mm
diam. of backring: 520 mm diam. at vent: 475 mm
Cascable diameters: Missing 
Number of staves or rings: 5
Present condition: deteriorated, trimmed for salvage 
How many pieces at this location: 2 
Number of variant styles at this location: 1 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Cannon may have been
removed here from elsewhere, or could be associated with 
Lower Town batteries.The former is suspected as the guns had 
cascables and trunnions removed, common for salvage 
purposes, and known salvage activity along the bay in the 
19th century.
388
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: HF-1
Present location/context: St. Eustatius Historical
Foundation Museum collections
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 18
Place of manufacture: Dutch
Date of manufacture: 18th century
Markings: "120A" above vent
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 2685 mm
Cascable: 2 60 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 2945 mm
Diam. of bore: 137 mm Diam of muzzle swell: 275 mm
Min. tube diam: 242 mm muzzle face diam: 229 mm
Trunnion diam: 120 mm diam behind trunnions: 349? mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: I2 0top mm
diam. of backring: 449 mm diam. at vent: 423 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 98 mm Max: 135 mm
Number of staves or rings: 6
Present condition: restored to carriage, tube painted black 
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Cannon mounted in front 
of museum on carriage with iron wheels. Reportedly 
originally from Battery Tumble Down Dick.
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: HF-2
Present location/context: St. Eustatius Historical
Foundation Museum, on ground by rear door at time of 
recording.
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 3
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1210 mm 
Cascable: 135 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1345 mm 
Diam. of bore: 80d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 195 mm
Min. tube diam: 150 mm muzzle face diam: 140 mm
Trunnion diam: 65/75 mm diam behind trunnions: 240 mm 
overall width: 340 mm trunnion length: 75/50 mm
diam. of backring: 3 00 mm diam. at vent: 270 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 60 mm Max: 65 mm
Number of staves or rings: 5d 
Present condition: deteriorated 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Piece was thought to have 
been brought up from Oranje Bay.
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: HF-3
Present location/context: St. Eustatius Historical
Foundation Museum, on ground by rear door at time of 
recording
Approximate "Pounder" designation: 1
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: 1150 mm 
Cascable: 100 mm Overall (tube + cascable): 1250 mm 
Diam. of bore: 48d mm Diam of muzzle swell: 140 mm
Min. tube diam: 115 mm muzzle face diam: 85 mm
Trunnion diam: 50 mm diam behind trunnions: 170 mm 
overall width: 240 mm trunnion length: 67 mm
diam. of backring: 200 mm diam. at vent: 190 mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: 70 mm Max: 77 mm
Number of staves or rings: 4-5
Present condition: deteriorated, severe flaking, in need of
immediate conservation
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Thought to have been
brought up from Oranje Bay.
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: HF-4
Present location/context: St. Eustatius Historical
Foundation Museum
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: heavy crustation 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Swivel gun from Oranje 
Bay, not measured.
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: HF-5
Present location/context: St. Eustatius Historical
Foundation Museum
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location: heavy crustation 
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Swivel gun from Oranje 
Bay, not measured. Remnants of original packing. Said to be 
from a lost cargo, and with HF-6.
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: HF-6
Present location/context: St. Eustatius Historical
Foundation Museum
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: heavy crustation 
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Swivel gun from Oranje 
Bay, not measured. Said to be from a lost cargo, and found 
with HF-5. Packing material removed.
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: UT-1
Present location/context: House yard in upper town across 
from cemetery
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: deteriorated 
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Not measured. Small gun 
deck or swivel gun.
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: GE-l
Present location/context: The Golden Era 
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition:
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Not measured
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: OB-1
Present location/context: Oranje Bay 
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: Coral encrusted
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Appears to be of a
similar size to SE382-LT-1 and 2. Not measured.
Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: OB-2
Present location/context: Oranje Bay, north of the Large 
("fishing") Pier
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: Coral encrusted
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: yes
Additonal comments or information: Not measured.
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Artillery Survey Form
Field Number: OB-3
Present location/context: Oranje Bay 
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions;
Length, muzzle face to back of base ring: mm
Cascable: mm Overall (tube + cascable): mm
Diam. of bore: mm Diam of muzzle swell: mm
Min. tube diam: mm muzzle face diam: mm
Trunnion diam: mm diam behind trunnions: mm
overall width: mm trunnion length: mm
diam. of backring: mm diam. at vent: mm
Cascable diameters:
Min: mm Max: mm
Number of staves or rings:
Present condition: Coral encrusted
How many pieces at this location:
Number of variant styles at this location:
Photo on file ?: no
Additonal comments or information: Swivel gun ? Not
measured.
Artillery Survey Form 
Field Number: SE502/151E5
Present location/context: College of William and Mary
Archaeological Conservation Labs (to be returned to St. 
Eustatius Historical Foundation Museum)
Approximate "Pounder" designation:
Place of manufacture:
Date of manufacture:
Markings:
Dimensions; Not measured
Present condition: Cleaned and consolidated, but retains
much concretions.
How many pieces at this location: 1 
Photo on file ?: No
Additonal comments or information: Found at shipwreck SE550, 
at a depth of 55 feet. Two swivel guns were located, one on 
the starboard and one on the port bow. Several muskets were 
noted at the stern. The companion gun to this was not given 
a number here, nor observed in 1990.
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